LifeVantage Corporation
The rarest thing on this site: a direct seller whose commission line is an audited, filed number. It paid 44.75% of revenue into the field in FY2025 - and its own income disclosure says 64.48% of 54,531 US consultants earned nothing at all.
Almost every number in this report comes from a filed SEC document rather than a marketing page - which is why the good marks are unusually secure and the bad ones are unusually hard to argue with.
Can you actually make money with LifeVantage?
Yes, under conditions, and this is the one file on the site where you can check the company's homework against an audited filing. Commissions and incentives were 44.75% of revenue in FY2025, which is $102.260 million on the face of the income statement rather than an estimate. A plan funded at that rate out of margin is being paid from product sales, not from money arriving behind you.
Two controls in the plan are rarer than they should be. Personal purchases count toward rank qualification only up to 150 Sales Volume, which is a hard cap on buying your own way up the ladder. And the monthly 150 SV activity requirement can, in the plan's own words, be fulfilled solely through customer orders. The 10-K states plainly that the company does not pay commissions for enrolling independent consultants.
Now the disclosure, which publishes a median at every one of fifteen ranks and states its own denominator. Of 54,531 US consultants, 64.48% earned no commission at all in calendar 2024. Among those who did, the median across twelve months was $186 and the average for a typical consultant was $683, both gross of everything. The modal rank holds 43.19% of paid consultants at a median of $18 a month.
The direction of travel is the part to weigh hardest. Active accounts stood at 109,000 on 31 March 2026, down 22.1% year on year, and revenue fell 19.15% across the first nine months of FY2026 to $140.209 million. The customer-to-consultant ratio has slid from 1.80:1 in FY2019 to 1.42:1 in March 2026, so customers are leaving twice as fast as consultants are.
a Start Kit is required by Policies §3.1; its price does not appear on any server-rendered page this review could retrieve. A 250 SV Enrollment Pack is the promoted alternative. The first year’s renewal is free, with an unstated "small fee" thereafter. Staying Active requires 150 Sales Volume a month, and the plan does not publish what 150 SV costs in dollars anywhere.
- You would rather sell to customers than recruit, because the plan is built for that and the numbers reward it. The main working bonus keys off customer sales volume only, and from rank C3 upward half your volume has to be customer volume.
- You can establish what 150 Sales Volume costs you in dollars before you commit. The company does not publish it anywhere, and it is the recurring figure that decides whether a month leaves you ahead or behind.
- You are joining a business whose account base is shrinking and you are willing to be part of why it stops. Down 22.1% in a year is the environment you would be selling into, not a footnote to it.
- You never want to advertise on paid search and can accept a two-year bar on recruiting any consultant after you leave. Paid search is banned outright, the trademarks cannot sit in a domain, and the genealogy belongs to the company.
That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.
Legal status
LEGAL - no court or regulator has ever found LifeVantage to be a pyramid scheme, and the government file, as retrievable, is close to empty: no FTC complaint, consent order or civil penalty action; no SEC enforcement matter, litigation release or administrative proceeding; no state attorney general action located; no restatement and no disclosed material weakness; and the FY2025 Form 10-K states in terms that there were "no open letters from the FDA to us as of June 30, 2025." The one substantial matter is Smith et al. v. LifeVantage Corp. et al., filed January 2018 in the District of Connecticut (No. 18-cv-135) and transferred to the District of Utah (No. 18-cv-621), pleading an illegal pyramid scheme, illegal health claims, unlicensed sale of securities, antitrust violations and fraud on the patent office. In December 2019 the court denied the motion to dismiss as to the pyramid-scheme claims only, finding "enough plausible facts to state a claim" - that is a ruling that the allegations, taken as true for the purpose of the motion, state a legal claim, which is the lowest judicial threshold and is not a finding of fact. The securities, antitrust, patent-fraud and unjust-enrichment counts were dismissed. The class was putative and never certified, and the action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in December 2022 - a plaintiff-initiated termination that bars re-filing and is not a vindication either. There is no judgment for or against the company on the pyramid allegation. The October 2021 FTC Notice of Penalty Offenses was a mass mailing to roughly 1,100 companies and is not an allegation, charge or finding against any recipient. Three TINA.org letters (November 2016 on health claims, December 2017 and February 2024 on income claims) are a watchdog nonprofit’s analysis, not regulatory action; the company responded on the record to each.
Confidence: High
Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.
Follow the money
A Nasdaq-listed dietary supplement and skincare company selling in seventeen markets through US independent consultants on a plan called Evolve, combining a retail markup, a customer-volume bonus, a capped sharing bonus, up to nine levels of team commission and a seven-generation leadership match.
The transparency should be stated first because it is the most unusual thing about this file and it is not a marketing claim. LifeVantage is an SEC reporting company audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, with no restatement, no disclosed material weakness, no probable loss contingencies and zero debt. Its commission line is a filed number: $102.260M in FY2025, 44.75% of revenue, funded out of a gross margin of roughly 80%, with the company still earning $12.199M of operating income. Its income disclosure publishes a median as well as an average at every rank, states the full US consultant population of 54,531, and states outright that 64.48% of them earned nothing. It reports active customers and active consultants separately, quarterly, with definitions in the footnote. Almost nothing else graded on this site can be tested this way, and the good marks on the scorecard are secure precisely because they are audited rather than asserted.
The plan has real customer machinery in it. The monthly 150 SV activity requirement is one "which can be fulfilled solely through Customer orders," and personal purchases are capped at 150 SV toward rank qualification no matter what rank you are chasing. The 10-K states "we do not pay commissions for enrolling independent consultants," and the Sharing Bonus that does exist is 10% of a new enrollee’s sales volume capped at $100 per consultant. The Personal Sales Bonus, at 5% to 20%, triggers only on Customer Sales Volume, starting at 500 CSV a month. From rank C3 upward, at least 150 SV a month must be genuine customer volume. Those are not cosmetic provisions.
Then the numbers the company itself publishes. Of 54,531 US consultants in calendar 2024, 64.48% earned no commission at all. Among those who did, the median for the year was $186 and the average for a "typical Consultant" was $683 - both gross, before the cost of holding 150 SV a month, which the company does not price in any document this review could retrieve. The modal rank holds 43.19% of paid consultants at a median of $18 a month. Roughly one participant in eighteen reaches a rank whose median plausibly covers the cost of staying qualified. About 130 people nationally sit at Executive Consultant 1 or above.
And the business is contracting. Revenue for the first nine months of FY2026 was $140.209M against $173.416M, down 19.15%. The MindBody GLP-1 System - launched October 2024, $15.7M in FY2024, $56.2M in FY2025 - fell to $6.3M in the third quarter of FY2026, down 61.2% year on year, and accounted for 64% of the entire nine-month decline. Active accounts stand at 109,000, down 22.1% year on year, and the customer-to-consultant ratio has slipped from 1.80:1 in FY2019 to 1.42:1. Revenue is flat across seven years on an account base 41% smaller: $1,221 per active account in FY2019 against $1,731 in FY2025. Fewer people are being asked to spend more.
Where each dollar of consumer spend went in FY2025
Taken directly from the audited consolidated statement of operations in the FY2025 Form 10-K. This is a filed income statement, not a model - which makes it the strongest payout-split evidence available for any company graded on this site.
| Product | Price | Pays |
|---|---|---|
| Protandim® Nrf2 Synergizer® The founding product and still the largest line: $95.3M in FY2025 and $62.9M over nine months of FY2026. A 675 mg proprietary blend of milk thistle, bacopa, ashwagandha, green tea and turmeric extracts plus 77 mg calcium. Its US patents expired in March 2025. The storefront renders prices client-side and returned "Loading…" on every fetch, so no retail price is asserted here. |
not published per unit - 30 caplets |
CV-based, all mechanisms |
| LifeVantage® MindBody GLP-1 System™ (MB Core™ + MB Enhance™) Launched October 2024. Berberine, lemon bioflavonoids, chromium picolinate, yerba mate, matcha and hesperidin. US patent-pending - an application filed, not a granted patent. $15.7M in FY2024, $56.2M in FY2025, $6.3M in Q3 FY2026 alone, down 61.2% year on year. Carries a 30-day money-back guarantee. |
not published per unit - 60 capsules, 2 daily |
CV-based, all mechanisms |
| TrueScience® skincare and Liquid Collagen $48.7M in FY2025, $28.8M over nine months of FY2026. The firming complex is described by the company as validated through a third-party clinical trial; the Liquid Collagen is the subject of a filed US patent application. |
not published per unit |
CV-based, all mechanisms |
| AXIO® nootropic energy drink mix $15.3M in FY2025. Regular and decaf. Competes directly with mainstream ready-to-drink and powder energy products sold at ordinary grocery and warehouse prices. |
not published per unit |
CV-based, all mechanisms |
| Petandim® for dogs $2.1M in FY2025. Carries the National Animal Supplement Council Quality Seal - a real third-party quality mark, and worth naming as a credit in a category that mostly has none. |
not published per unit |
CV-based, all mechanisms |
| Start Kit (required to enrol) Policies & Procedures §3.1 requires an applicant to "Purchase a LifeVantage Start Kit," and the enrollment page says "all it takes is a Start Kit." Its price does not appear on any server-rendered page this review could retrieve. That is a real disclosure gap: a prospective participant cannot compute their own entry cost from any published company document. |
not published one-time |
— |
| Enrollment Pack (promoted alternative) The Evolve page references an Enrollment Pack valued at 250 SV. The SV-to-dollar conversion is not published anywhere in the plan, the perks PDF or the enrollment page. |
not published - 250 SV one-time |
— |
| 150 SV monthly activity requirement Required to be an Active Consultant. It can be met entirely from customer orders, which is the plan’s genuine strength - but if it is not, it is met from your own account. The dollar value of 150 SV is the single most consequential unpublished figure in this file. |
not published monthly |
— |
Who runs it, and what they ran before
A genuine redox-biology figure - co-discoverer of superoxide dismutase - and that matters, because it is rare in this category for the science principal to be a real scientist. It also creates the central problem with the evidence base. He is the senior author of the 2006 open-label study that produced the "40% in 30 days" figure still used on the product page today, and he appears as an author on several of the supportive mechanistic papers. The 10-K describes the product as "the subject of numerous independent scientific studies"; a substantial share of that supportive literature has the product’s own scientific principal on the author line, which is legitimate but is not the same thing as independent. No regulatory action, fraud judgment or criminal proceeding against him could be located.
A named co-author on the same 2006 Free Radical Biology & Medicine paper (PMID 16413416) that supplies the flagship efficacy figure. No conflict-of-interest or funding statement appears in the PubMed record for that paper, which is notable given the author composition. No regulatory action, fraud judgment or criminal proceeding against him could be located in any source reviewed.
Ran the company through the launch and collapse of the MindBody GLP-1 System. His retirement was announced on 4 February 2026 in the same Form 8-K that carried the guidance cut - the filing contains both the Q2 FY2026 earnings release, taking FY2026 revenue guidance from $225–240M down to $185–200M, and the retirement release. Whatever the internal sequence, the market received both on the same day. His filed "compensation actually paid" for FY2025 was $7.473M against a Summary Compensation Table total of $2.816M, the gap being mark-to-market on unvested equity as the share price tripled on the back of the GLP-1 launch. His realized pay peaked on exactly the product cycle that then reversed. Transition terms: 18 months of medical premium coverage, a prorated bonus, and continued vesting of certain equity awards through 11 September 2026.
The seat has turned over repeatedly: David Brown to about 2011, Douglas Robinson to 2015, Darren Jensen to early 2021, Fife to April 2026 (dates before February 2021 are not re-verified against filings). When Fife left, the board had no successor. Michael A. Beindorff - age 73, a sitting director since January 2012 - ran the company as interim CEO from 1 May 2026 on a consulting agreement at $45,833 a month in cash, an annualised $550,000, while the company was missing its own reduced guidance. He stepped off the Compensation and Nominating committees on taking the role, which is the right mitigation but does not cure a 14-year-tenured director being paid by the company he oversees. Terrence O. Moorehead took over as President and CEO on 5 August 2026 on a package of roughly $8.35M - $850,000 base, a bonus of up to 100% of salary with FY2027 guaranteed at $425,000, $2.8M of RSUs and $4.7M of PSUs, and 18 months of severance enhanced by 50% on a change of control. The equity grant alone is 1.7 times the company’s entire nine-month FY2026 operating income of $4.433M. He brings a genuine 25-year operating record in this business rather than a promoter’s CV - but the two employers where he spent the bulk of it are a Nasdaq-listed direct-selling supplement company graded elsewhere on this site and a legacy global beauty direct seller graded elsewhere on this site, so the answer to a collapsing franchise was hired from inside the same industry rather than from outside it.
Registered address
Lehi, Utah, USA
A Nasdaq-listed SEC reporting company (LFVN, CIK 0000849146, SIC 2834), audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, with quarterly reviewed financials and product-line revenue disaggregated in XBRL. That is the reason this report reads differently from most on this site: the commission percentage, the gross margin, the account counts and the customer-versus-consultant split are filed figures rather than company statements or trade-press estimates. The corporate provenance is worth recording without overweighting it - the listed vehicle began as a Colorado mineral-exploration shell renamed twice before a supplement business was reversed into it in 2004. It has been a genuine operating business with audited accounts throughout the period examined. It carries zero debt at every reporting date checked, ended FY2025 with $20.201M of cash against $37.317M of total liabilities, and holds an accumulated deficit of $104.147M against $139.962M of paid-in capital - currently profitable and reducing that deficit, but with a long-run history of cumulative losses. Markets: the United States, Mexico, Japan, Australia, Hong Kong, Canada, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Taiwan, Austria, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, New Zealand and Singapore. Philippines operations closed on 30 June 2025.
The veteran's checklist
Eight questions that decide whether this is a business or a transfer mechanism. Same eight, every review.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who legally owns it? |
OK
LifeVantage Corporation, Nasdaq: LFVN, CIK 0000849146, operating from Lehi, Utah. Audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, no restatement, no disclosed material weakness, zero debt, and a majority-independent board with consumer-products, listed-supplement and private-equity experience. Four chief executives since 2011 and a fifth from 5 August 2026.
|
| What does it really cost? |
CONCERN
Not computable from any published company document. A Start Kit is required and its price is not published; a 250 SV Enrollment Pack is the promoted alternative; the first year is free to renew with an unstated "small fee" thereafter; and 150 SV a month is required to stay Active with no dollar value stated anywhere.
|
| Published income disclosure? |
CONCERN
Yes, and a good one by the standards of this category - a median as well as an average at all fifteen ranks, the full population of 54,531 stated, and an explicit 64.48% zero-earner rate. It shows a $186 median for the year among earners and a $683 average for a "typical Consultant," both gross of costs.
|
| Does the plan pay for recruiting? |
WATCH
Not per head. The 10-K states "we do not pay commissions for enrolling independent consultants," personal purchases are capped at 150 SV toward rank, and the activity requirement can be met entirely from customer orders. But rank advancement runs on group volume up to 1,000,000 GSV, and up to 13% of global commissionable volume is reserved for the top 0.82%.
|
| Regulatory action against the company, ever? |
OK
None located in sixteen years as a public filer. No FTC complaint, consent order or civil penalty action; no SEC enforcement matter; no state attorney general action; no outstanding FDA letter. An October 2021 FTC Notice of Penalty Offenses was a mass mailing to about 1,100 companies and is not an allegation against any recipient.
|
| What happened with the pyramid-scheme lawsuit? |
WATCH
Filed January 2018, transferred to Utah. In December 2019 the court declined to dismiss the pyramid count, which is a ruling that the allegations state a claim - the lowest judicial threshold, not a finding of fact. The class was never certified and the action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in December 2022. No judgment either way.
|
| Does the flagship product work? |
CONCERN
No therapeutic claim is made or endorsed here. The "40% in 30 days" figure comes from a 2006 open-label single-arm study co-authored by the formulation’s co-inventor. The only double-blind placebo-controlled human trial was company-funded and null on both primary endpoints. One independent NIH-protocol study found extended male median lifespan in mice. The US patents expired in March 2025.
|
| Merchant play or miner play? |
WATCH
More merchant than most of this category, and that is a real distinction - the customer bonus keys off customer volume only, self-purchase is capped for rank, no fee is paid for enrolling. But nine levels of team commission and a seven-generation leadership match are where the money concentrates, and the customer-to-consultant ratio is falling.
|
What has to be true for you to get paid
| To cover | You need |
|---|---|
| Stay Active for one month | 150 SV meetable entirely from customer orders under the plan’s own definition, or entirely from your own account; the company does not publish what 150 SV costs in dollars |
| Trigger the first customer-volume bonus tier | 500 CSV in a month 3.3 times the activity requirement, in genuine third-party sales, for a 5% Personal Sales Bonus; the top 20% tier needs 4,000 CSV a month |
| Earn enough to cover the cost of staying qualified | Senior Consultant 1 or above 15.86% of paid consultants, 5.63% of all 54,531 - roughly one participant in eighteen, on a median of $257 a month |
| Replace a $60,000 salary, gross of everything | Managing Consultant 3 or above median $5,236 a month at MC3; 1.32% of paid consultants and 0.469% of all, about 256 people nationally, with a median 20 months to reach it |
Read this twice
This arithmetic is unusual for two opposite reasons, and both belong in the same paragraph. The earnings side is exceptionally well documented: the company publishes a median as well as an average at all fifteen ranks, states its full US consultant population of 54,531, and states that 64.48% of them earned no commission at all in calendar 2024. Among the 35.52% who earned anything, the median for the year was $186. The modal rank is Consultant 1, holding 43.19% of paid consultants at a median of $18 a month, which is $216 for a year. Those figures are the company’s own and they are gross, before any expense. The cost side, by contrast, cannot be computed at all. Being Active requires 150 SV a month, every month; holding rank from C3 upward requires 300 SV of which at most 150 may be personal; a Start Kit is required to enrol; and an annual renewal is free in year one and a "small fee" thereafter. Not one of those has a published dollar figure. The only price relationship the company states in retrievable text is the plan’s worked example of $100 retail against $80 to the consultant. An audited cross-check gives some sense of scale - FY2025 revenue of $228.530M across roughly 132,000 active accounts is $1,731 per account per year, about $144 a month blended across customers and consultants - but that is a derived average, not a price. So the honest statement is this: on the company’s own disclosure, roughly one participant in eighteen reaches a rank whose median monthly commission is in the range that a monthly qualification order plausibly costs, and about 130 people nationally sit at Executive Consultant 1 or above. Two things cut in the company’s favor and should not be buried. The 150 SV can be satisfied entirely by genuine customer orders, in which case the participant is not spending that money at all. And the Personal Sales Bonus, which is where the real money starts for a working seller, keys off customer volume only - so someone with an actual customer base sits materially better than the medians describe.
Run your own numbers
Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.
Twenty dollars is the 20% retail margin taken from the company’s own worked example - $100 retail against $80 to the consultant - applied to a customer spending $100 a month. The cost line is the 150 Sales Volume a month required to stay Active, modeled at approximately one dollar a point, and that modeling is the weakest number on this page: the company does not publish what 150 SV costs in dollars anywhere, and no server-rendered price for any product could be retrieved, so treat the cost slider as an estimate and not as a company figure. The structural point in this plan’s favor, and it is a real one, is that personal purchases are capped at 150 SV for rank qualification and the 150 SV requirement can be met entirely from customer orders - that is unusual and it is why the unit here can honestly be a customer. Level and generational commissions running nine levels deep with seven generations of depth are excluded, because they are earned from other people’s customers. For calibration, use the audited and disclosed figures rather than this slider: 64.48% of 54,531 United States consultants earned no commission at all in 2024, and the median was $186 for the year. Your own subscription cost of $150/mo is included.
What it costs to replace this yourself
This exercise cannot be priced, and saying so is more useful than guessing. The LifeVantage storefront renders every price client-side and returned the literal string "Loading…" on every fetch; the Wayback Machine rejected the request with HTTP 403; and third-party retailer pages were either 404 or JavaScript-gated. No retail price on either side of this table is asserted. What can be asserted is structural and it comes from the audited accounts: cost of sales was 19.6% of revenue in FY2025, so roughly one dollar in five of what a customer pays is the physical product. The other four buy the distribution model. And since the flagship’s US patents expired in March 2025, there is no longer any legal barrier to any manufacturer selling the identical blend.
| What they sell you | What you'd use instead | Your cost |
|---|---|---|
| Protandim Nrf2 Synergizer - 675 mg five-botanical blend, 30 caplets | The same five extracts bought singly: milk thistle, bacopa, ashwagandha, green tea and turmeric from NOW Foods, Nature’s Bounty, Swanson, Nature Made, Sports Research, Himalaya or Nature’s Way | off-patent since March 2025; shelf prices not verified |
| The same, if you want one bottle rather than five | A combined Nrf2-activator formula from Life Extension, Thorne or Jarrow Formulas - legal to sell in the identical composition since the patent lapsed | not verified |
| Any of the above, at the cheapest possible entry | Pharmacy and grocery own-brands: CVS Health, Walgreens, Target Up&Up, Costco Kirkland Signature, Trader Joe’s, Amazon Basic Care | not verified |
| MB Core - berberine, chromium picolinate, yerba mate, matcha, hesperidin | Berberine-led formulas from Thorne (Berberine-500), NOW Foods (Berberine Glucose Support), Sports Research, Swanson, Life Extension or GNC, plus chromium picolinate from Nature Made or NOW Foods | not verified |
| AXIO nootropic energy drink mix | Celsius, Alani Nu, C4, Ghost Energy, or own-brand energy powders from Costco, Walmart and Trader Joe’s | not verified |
| TrueScience TrueRenew "retinol alternative" firming complex | CeraVe Skin Renewing Retinol Serum, The Ordinary Granactive Retinoid, RoC Retinol Correxion, Neutrogena Rapid Wrinkle Repair or Olay Regenerist Retinol 24, all sold in ordinary pharmacies | not verified |
| TrueScience Liquid Collagen | Vital Proteins, Sports Research or Costco Kirkland Signature marine and bovine collagen | not verified |
| The curated monthly "system" experience | A direct-to-consumer subscription from Ritual, Care/of, Seed, Persona or AG1 - no rank, no volume requirement, cancel any time | not verified |
| 150 SV a month to stay Active, every month, indefinitely | Buying what you actually take, when you actually run out | $0 of obligation |
| Total as sold Not published - the storefront renders every price client-side and no company document states the SV-to-dollar ratio |
Total, built yourself Openly priced on any shelf, from six named mainstream brands, four own-brands and five direct-to-consumer subscriptions |
Price-to-value
The honest verdict is that the price comparison could not be completed, and that this is itself the finding. A prospective participant cannot compute what 150 SV a month costs them, cannot find the Start Kit price on a server-rendered page, and cannot learn the renewal fee - while every comparator above prints its price on the shelf. What the audited accounts do establish is that 19.6% of revenue is cost of goods, so the product itself is roughly a fifth of what is paid; that the flagship has been off-patent in the United States since March 2025, removing the last defensible exclusivity argument for a premium; and that a buyer purchasing the identical botanical actives from a named mainstream retailer or an own-brand pays a manufacturer’s margin and a retailer’s margin and nothing else. The 30-day 100% refund and the 12-month buyback are genuine and mean a dissatisfied buyer is not stuck - which is more than most of this category offers.
Three operators, five horizons
Probability of cumulative net profit
Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.
The friend who signed up
joins to support someone, holds 150 SV a month, a handful of customers at most
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 4% | −$470 |
| 6 mo | 4% | −$940 |
| 1 yr | 4% | −$1,880 |
| 3 yr | 3% | −$5,600 |
| 5 yr | 3% | −$9,400 |
The one who actually sells
builds real customer volume, reaches Senior Consultant 2 - 5.22% of paid consultants, 1.85% of all
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 22% | −$120 |
| 6 mo | 45% | +$700 |
| 1 yr | 58% | +$3,200 |
| 3 yr | 62% | +$9,600 |
| 5 yr | 63% | +$16,000 |
Full-time builder
30+ hrs/wk aiming at the executive ranks; 0.238% of all US consultants, about 130 people nationally, ever reach EC1
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 6% | −$2,200 |
| 6 mo | 10% | −$4,300 |
| 1 yr | 14% | −$8,000 |
| 3 yr | 18% | −$18,000 |
| 5 yr | 19% | −$24,000 |
Methodology note. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims and not predictions, and the modeling is unusually lopsided here - so it is worth being precise about which half is anchored and which half is not. ANCHORED to the company’s own US Income Disclosure Statement for calendar 2024: that 64.48% of 54,531 US consultants earned no commission at all; that the median among earners was $186 for the year and the average for a "typical Consultant" was $683; that 43.19% of paid consultants sit at rank Consultant 1 with a median of $18 a month; that Senior Consultant 2 has a median of $444 a month and is 5.22% of paid consultants; that Executive Consultant 1 has a median of $11,449 a month, is 0.36% of paid consultants and 0.238% of all, and takes a median 30 months to reach. Anchored also to the published plan: the 150 SV activity requirement, the 300 SV rank requirement above C3 with a 150 SV personal cap, the 500 CSV floor on the Personal Sales Bonus, the 20% consultant discount implied by the $100/$80 worked example, and the nine-level and seven-generation structure. MODELED by us, and flagged: the entire cost side. The company does not publish the dollar value of 150 SV, the Start Kit price or the renewal fee, so the expense line in every row above is a modeled band derived from the only two anchors available - a $190 free-gift threshold on subscription orders and an audited $1,731 of revenue per active account per year. Treat the dollar amounts as orders of magnitude, not as figures. Also modeled: the share of each cohort in cumulative profit, and the cohort definitions, which the company does not segment. One calibration that cuts the company’s way and must not be lost: the 150 SV can be met entirely from genuine customer orders, and the Personal Sales Bonus keys off customer volume only - so a participant with a real customer base is not carrying the cost line at all, and the second profile above is what that looks like.
Where you are actually allowed to promote this
Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.
Red flags and green flags
Red flags
151The customer-to-consultant ratio is deteriorating
264.48% of US consultants earned no commission at all in calendar 2024
3Revenue is flat across seven years on an account base 41% smaller
4A one-product growth spike that reversed inside five quarters
5Active accounts down 22.1% year on year
6A monthly volume requirement with no published dollar value
7Up to 13% of global commissionable volume is reserved by rule for the top of the plan
8A leg-balance rule that structurally forces recruiting width
9The 70% rule counts personal and family consumption toward the 70%
10The flagship efficacy claim rests on a 2006 uncontrolled study
11The only double-blind placebo-controlled human trial was company-funded and null
12US patents on the flagship expired in March 2025
13A supplement named after a prescription drug class
14A chief executive retiring in the same 8-K as a guidance cut
15An incoming package of roughly $8.35M against nine-month operating income of $4.4M
Green flags
101The plan is demonstrably funded out of margin, not out of recruit inflow
2The income disclosure publishes a median as well as an average, and states the denominator
3Personal purchases are capped at 150 SV toward rank qualification
4The activity requirement can be met entirely from customer orders
5No commission is paid for enrolling anyone
6The main working bonus keys off customer volume only
7Customers are counted, defined and reported quarterly - and they outnumber consultants
8Return and buyback terms above the category norm
9A near-empty government-regulatory file, across sixteen years as a public filer
10One genuinely independent positive scientific result
We would like to be wrong about this
Upward
- Publication of the SV-to-dollar conversion, the Start Kit price and the annual renewal fee, so that a prospective participant can compute their own cost of qualification from a company document rather than from a sponsor’s estimate.
- The customer-to-consultant ratio turning back up and holding above roughly 1.6:1, with active accounts stabilising - the single most structurally meaningful improvement available, and one the company already measures and publishes quarterly.
- Retirement of the quantified "40% in 30 days" claim unless an independent, adequately powered, double-blind human trial reproduces it; retirement or renaming of the GLP-1 product designation; and removal of the two-year post-termination non-recruit covenant.
Downward
- The customer-to-consultant ratio falling below roughly 1.2:1, at which point the customer defense becomes arithmetically thin, or a further fall in the zero-earner or median figures in the next income disclosure.
- Any FTC, state attorney general or self-regulatory action on income or health claims, an FDA warning letter, or a restatement or material-weakness disclosure in the pending FY2026 Form 10-K.
- Loss of profitability, or debt taken on to fund the plan - the moment commissions stop being covered by product margin, the strongest number on this card collapses and the whole grade moves with it.
Grade is C at 6.37 - the second-highest score published on this site, and the reason is transparency rather than opportunity.
Lead with what is real, because here it is unusually real. LifeVantage is a Nasdaq-listed SEC reporting company audited by Deloitte & Touche LLP, with no restatement, no disclosed material weakness, no probable loss contingencies and zero debt. That matters for a specific reason: the hardest number in this entire category - what share of revenue actually reaches the field - is a filed, audited line item here rather than an estimate. It was $102.260M, or 44.75% of revenue, in FY2025, and 42.50% across the first nine months of FY2026, funded out of a gross margin of roughly 80%, with the company still profitable and generating cash after paying it. The plan is not being paid for out of new-recruit money. Alongside that, the income disclosure publishes a median as well as an average at all fifteen ranks, states the full US consultant population of 54,531, and says outright that 64.48% of them earned nothing. And the plan itself contains two structural provisions that are genuinely uncommon: personal purchases are capped at 150 SV toward rank qualification no matter what rank you are chasing, and the 150 SV monthly activity requirement is one "which can be fulfilled solely through Customer orders." There is no per-head enrollment commission at all. In sixteen years as a public filer there has been no FTC action, no SEC enforcement, no state attorney general matter located and no outstanding FDA letter.
Now the numbers that same company publishes. Of 54,531 US consultants in calendar 2024, roughly 35,161 earned no commission. Among those who did, the median for the year was $186 and the average for a "typical Consultant" was $683 - both gross, before the cost of holding 150 SV of volume a month, which the company does not price in any document this review could retrieve. Forty-three percent of paid consultants sit at the second rank with a median of $18 a month. Roughly one participant in eighteen reaches a rank whose median plausibly covers the cost of staying qualified, and about 130 people nationally sit at Executive Consultant 1 or above. Meanwhile the business is contracting: revenue for nine months of FY2026 was $140.209M against $173.416M, down 19.15%; active accounts are 109,000, down 22.1% year on year; and the customer-to-consultant ratio has fallen from 1.80:1 in FY2019 to 1.42:1, with customers leaving twice as fast as consultants.
The product file is the third element and it has to be read carefully, because it is neither the fraud some readers expect nor the science the marketing implies. These are real manufactured goods, shipped and returnable, and there is one genuinely independent positive result of real weight - the NIH Interventions Testing Program found the formulation extended male median lifespan in mice under a blinded three-site protocol built to resist sponsor influence. Against that, the flagship claim that the product "reduces oxidative stress by 40% in just 30 days" rests on a single 2006 open-label, single-arm study co-authored by the formulation’s co-inventor. The only double-blind placebo-controlled human trial in the literature was funded by LifeVantage itself and was null on its primary endpoints, finding no change in 5-km running time and no reduction in resting TBARS. A 2026 controlled study in horses at six times the human dose found nothing. And the US patents expired in March 2025, so the identical blend can now be made and sold by anybody. Add the weight-management line named after a prescription drug class, which fell 61.2% in a single quarter and took 64% of the nine-month revenue decline with it, and three watchdog-nonprofit letters over eight years. None of that is a regulatory finding. All of it is a claim that outran its evidence.
Read the income disclosure before the compensation plan
The plan document tells you what is possible. The disclosure tells you what happened. It is published, it is not long, and it says 64.48% of 54,531 people earned nothing, the median earner made $186, and 43.19% of those who were paid sit at a rank whose median is $18 a month. The company deserves credit for printing all three of those numbers. Read them before you read anything about rank advancement.
Ask what 150 SV costs, in dollars, in writing
It is the single most consequential figure in the file and it is not published anywhere - not in the plan, not in the perks PDF, not on the enrollment page. Neither is the Start Kit price, nor the renewal fee beyond "a small fee." Ask your sponsor for all three in writing before signing anything, and treat a vague answer as the answer. You cannot underwrite a business whose recurring cost you cannot compute.
If you want the product, buy the product
The customer route needs no Start Kit, no monthly volume, no rank and no two-year post-termination restriction, and it carries a 30-day 100% refund and a 12-month buyback that are genuinely better than most of this category offers. And since the flagship’s US patents expired in March 2025, the identical five-botanical composition can legally be sold by any manufacturer - so a buyer who simply wants milk thistle, bacopa, ashwagandha, green tea and turmeric can also compare what NOW Foods, Nature Made, Swanson, Thorne, Life Extension or a pharmacy own-brand charge for the same actives.
Sell into the category without the plan
Supplement search intent is enormous and almost entirely un-served by honest, sourced comparison - which is precisely what a consultant here is contractually prevented from producing, because paid search is banned outright, the trademarks cannot be used in a domain, and product claims outside official materials including personal testimonials are prohibited. A merchant business built on ingredient comparison, price transparency and citation of the actual trial literature needs no kit, no monthly volume, no rank and no permission, and it produces an asset you own and can sell.
Nine dimensions, weighted
Dimension profile
Further from center is better. Hover any point.
Hard caps that bind here
The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.
What we read
Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.
- LifeVantage Corporation Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 30 June 2025, filed 4 September 2025 (accession 0000849146-25-000068)
LifeVantage Corporation Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 30 June 2025, filed 4 September 2025 (accession 0000849146-25-000068) - consolidated statements of operations (revenue $228.530M, cost of sales $44.864M, commissions and incentives $102.260M, operating income $12.199M, net income $9.805M), balance sheet (zero debt, $20.201M cash, $104.147M accumulated deficit), commitments and contingencies note ("no probable loss contingencies"), revenue by product line and by market, corporate history, the March 2025 Protandim patent expiry, the FDA statement "there were no open letters from the FDA to us as of June 30, 2025," and Exhibit 23.1 (Deloitte & Touche LLP consent)
- EDGAR filing index for the LifeVantage FY2025 Form 10-K, including Exhibit 23.1 (Deloitte & Touche LLP consent) and Exhibit 21.1 (subsidiaries)
- LifeVantage Corporation Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 March 2026, filed 6 May 2026 (accession 0001193125-26-208922)
LifeVantage Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 March 2026, filed 6 May 2026 (accession 0001193125-26-208922) - nine-month revenue $140.209M against $173.416M (−19.15%), commissions and incentives $59.591M (42.50%), operating income $4.433M, net income $3.793M, revenue by product line, and the LoveBiome acquisitions note ($4.243M consideration, $2.2M allocated to a "consultant sales force" intangible, earnout written down $0.4M)
- LifeVantage Q4 and fiscal 2025 earnings release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K of 4 September 2025 - initial FY2026 revenue guidance of $225–240M and the quarterly active account counts with their stated definitions
LifeVantage Forms 8-K of 4 September 2025, 4 November 2025, 4 February 2026 and 6 May 2026 - initial FY2026 guidance of $225–240M, its reiteration, the single formal cut to $185–200M on 4 February 2026 alongside the CEO retirement release, and the 6 May 2026 steer to "close to the lower end of our previously issued guidance range"; quarterly active-account counts with the stated definitions of Active Independent Consultant and Active Customer
- LifeVantage Q1 fiscal 2026 earnings release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K of 4 November 2025 - reiteration of FY2026 guidance and active account counts
- LifeVantage Q2 fiscal 2026 earnings release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K of 4 February 2026 - the single formal guidance cut to $185–200M
- LifeVantage press release announcing the CEO retirement, Exhibit 99.2 to the same Form 8-K of 4 February 2026 (Items 2.02, 5.02 and 9.01, accession 0001628280-26-005431)
- LifeVantage Q3 fiscal 2026 earnings release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K of 6 May 2026 - the steer to "close to the lower end of our previously issued guidance range" (accession 0001193125-26-208934)
- LifeVantage Corporation Form 8-K of 6 May 2026 (cover filing for the Q3 FY2026 results)
- LifeVantage U.S. Income Disclosure Statement for 1 January – 31 December 2024 (revised 3 February 2025) - 54,531 U.S. Consultants, 64.48% earning no commissions, $186 median and $683 typical-Consultant average, and the fifteen-rank table
LifeVantage US Income Disclosure Statement for 1 January – 31 December 2024, at lifevantage.com/legal/us-en/income-disclosure-statement - 54,531 US consultants, 64.48% earning no commissions, a $186 median and $683 "typical Consultant" average for the twelve months, and the full fifteen-rank table of monthly averages, medians and median months to achieve
- LifeVantage Evolve Compensation Plan Guide for Independent LifeVantage Consultants, USA (company legal page)
LifeVantage Evolve compensation plan (lifevantage.com/legal/us-en/compensation-plan) and the Evolve Perks PDF - the 150 SV activity definition "which can be fulfilled solely through Customer orders," the 150 Personal Sales Volume rank-qualification cap, the fifteen-rank GSV and Maximum Volume Rule ladder, the Personal Sales Bonus tiers at 500/1,000/2,000/4,000 CSV, the $100-capped Sharing Bonus and Doubler, nine levels of level commission, the seven-generation Leadership Match capped at 9% of global CV, the 4% Leadership Pool, the 70% rule, and the $100 retail / $80 consultant worked example
- Evolve Compensation Plan Guide, USA, effective 1 November 2024 - filed as an exhibit with the SEC: the 150 SV Active definition "which can be fulfilled solely through Customer orders," the 150 Personal Purchase Cap, the fifteen-rank GSV and Maximum Volume Rule ladder, the $100-capped Sharing Bonus and Doubler, the seven-generation Leadership Match with per-match caps, and the 4% global-CV Leadership Pool
- LifeVantage Evolve Perks booklet, US English, May 2026 revision (PDF)
- LifeVantage Evolve program overview page, including the Evolve Perks booklet link and the Launch Period bonuses
- LifeVantage Policies and Procedures, United States (revised 25 February 2026, effective 1 April 2026) - §3.1 Start Kit requirement, §6.1.1 concurrent recruiting prohibited, §6.1.2 post-termination non-recruit, §7.1 ownership of Marketing Organization Activity Reports, §8.2 trademark and domain restrictions, §8.3.2 product and testimonial claims, §8.3.3 income claims, §8.5.17 the outright pay-per-click and paid-search ban, and the returns and buyback terms
LifeVantage Policies & Procedures (lifevantage.com/legal/us-en/policies-and-procedures) - §3.1 Start Kit requirement, §6.1.1 and §6.1.2 cross-recruiting and the two-year post-termination non-recruit, §7.1 company ownership of Marketing Organization Activity Reports, §8.2 trademark and domain restrictions, §8.3.2 product and testimonial claims, §8.3.3 income claims, §8.5.17 the outright PPC ban, and the returns and buyback terms
- LifeVantage Corporation definitive proxy statement on Schedule 14A, filed 19 September 2025 (accession 0001628280-25-042171) - board composition and tenure and the Pay versus Performance table
LifeVantage DEF 14A filed 19 September 2025 (accession 0001628280-25-042171) - board composition and tenure, and the Pay versus Performance table showing FY2025 PEO compensation actually paid of $7.473M against a $2.816M Summary Compensation Table total; Form 8-K of 16 April 2026 (accession 0001193125-26-159324) with the incoming CEO employment agreement and the interim CEO consulting agreement at $45,833 per month
- LifeVantage Corporation Form 8-K of 16 April 2026 (accession 0001193125-26-159324) - the incoming CEO appointment
- Exhibit 10.1 to the LifeVantage Form 8-K of 16 April 2026 - incoming CEO employment agreement
- Exhibit 10.2 to the LifeVantage Form 8-K of 16 April 2026 - interim CEO consulting agreement
- Nelson SK, Bose SK, Grunwald GK, Myhill P, McCord JM - "The induction of human superoxide dismutase and catalase in vivo: a fundamentally new approach to antioxidant therapy," Free Radical Biology & Medicine, 2006 (PMID 16413416)
Peer-reviewed literature: Nelson, Bose, Grunwald, Myhill and McCord, Free Radical Biology & Medicine 2006 (PMID 16413416 - the open-label single-arm source of the 40% figure); Ueberschlag et al., PLOS ONE 2016 (PMID 27513339, correction 33096544 - the LifeVantage-funded double-blind randomised placebo-controlled trial, n=38, null on 5-km time and resting TBARS); Strong et al., Aging Cell 2016 (PMID 27312235 - NIA Interventions Testing Program, male mouse median lifespan); Semanchik et al., Journal of Animal Science 2026 (PMID 41397914 - n=40 horses, null); ALSUntangled No. 31 (PMID 26414415)
- Ueberschlag SL et al. - "The Effect of Protandim Supplementation on Athletic Performance and Oxidative Blood Markers in Runners," PLOS ONE, 2016, n=38 double-blind randomised placebo-controlled trial (PMID 27513339)
- Correction: The Effect of Protandim Supplementation on Athletic Performance and Oxidative Blood Markers in Runners, PLOS ONE, 23 October 2020 (PMID 33096544)
- Strong R et al. - "Longer lifespan in male mice treated with a weakly estrogenic agonist, an antioxidant, an α-glucosidase inhibitor or a Nrf2-inducer," Aging Cell, 2016, NIA Interventions Testing Program (PMID 27312235)
- Semanchik et al. - Journal of Animal Science, 2026, n=40 horses (PMID 41397914)
- ALSUntangled No. 31: Protandim, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Frontotemporal Degeneration, 2015 (PMID 26414415)
- Truth in Advertising, Inc. brand file: LifeVantage - the 2016 health-claims and 2017 and 2024 income-claims timeline with the company's responses
TruthInAdvertising.org company file at truthinadvertising.org/companies/lifevantage/ - the November 2016 health-claims letter, the December 2017 and 14 February 2024 income-claims letters and databases, and the company responses of 2 December 2016, 3 January 2018 and 29 February 2024; the February 2024 letter formed part of a sweep of 100 direct sellers in which 98 were found in the same posture, and carried no statement of referral to the FTC
- TINA.org letter to LifeVantage Corporation re deceptive and illegal health claims, 22 November 2016 (PDF, within the compiled DSA notification letters)
- LifeVantage Health Claims Database (TINA.org), with the note that the company responded on 2 December 2016
- LifeVantage response to TINA.org's 2016 health-claims findings, 2 December 2016 (PDF, redacted)
- 2017 LifeVantage Income Claims Database (TINA.org), noting the company response of 3 January 2018
- TINA.org letter to LifeVantage re the 2023 income-claims investigation, 14 February 2024
- 2023 LifeVantage Income Claims Database (TINA.org), noting the company response of 29 February 2024
- "MLMs Continue to Recruit with Deceptive Earnings Claims" - the 100-company sweep in which 98% were found in the same posture, 26 February 2024
- SEC EDGAR company submissions index for LifeVantage Corporation, CIK 0000849146 (full filing history in JSON)
SEC EDGAR company submissions and the XBRL company-concept API for CIK 0000849146 - used to cross-check the nine-month revenue figures independently of the filed narrative, together with the FY2019 Form 10-K for the FY2018 and FY2019 active-account counts and revenue
Not established by this document: The XBRL company-concept endpoint for a specific LifeVantage revenue tag was not fetched and is therefore not asserted; the submissions index above is the verified EDGAR machine-readable entry point for CIK 0000849146.
- SEC EDGAR annual-report filing index for LifeVantage Corporation, CIK 0000849146 (Forms 10-K)
- LifeVantage Corporation Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 30 June 2019, filed 14 August 2019 (accession 0000849146-19-000063) - the FY2018 and FY2019 active-account counts and revenue
What we could not get
- PREMISE CONFIRMED, and worth publishing as such: the watchlist said revenue was down 19.1% for the first nine months of FY2026 and that the GLP-1 bump had already reversed. The filed figures are −19.15% ($140.209M against $173.416M), and the MindBody GLP-1 line ran $15.7M in FY2024 to $56.2M in FY2025 to $6.3M in the third quarter of FY2026 - down 61.2% year on year and accounting for 64% of the entire nine-month decline. If anything the premise understated it.
- PREMISE CORRECTED - the wrong figure and the right one, side by side. The watchlist said guidance had been "cut twice." The filed record shows one formal cut: on 4 February 2026 the FY2026 revenue range went from $225–240M to $185–200M, a 17.2% reduction at the midpoint. On 6 May 2026 the company issued no new range and instead steered to "close to the lower end of our previously issued guidance range." That is one range revision plus one downward steer, not two cuts.
- Every current retail price, on both sides of the comparison. The LifeVantage storefront renders prices client-side and returned the literal string "Loading…" on every fetch; the Wayback Machine rejected the request with HTTP 403 and its CDX endpoint likewise; third-party retailer pages were 404 or JavaScript-gated. This is a retrieval failure, not an absence of prices, and no price claim is made anywhere in this report as a result.
- The SV-to-dollar conversion ratio - the single most consequential unpublished figure in the file. It does not appear in the compensation plan, the Evolve Perks PDF, the enrollment page or any other company document retrieved. Without it, neither a participant nor this review can price the 150 SV monthly activity requirement.
- The Start Kit price, which Policies §3.1 makes a condition of enrollment, and the annual renewal fee, described only as free in year one and "a small fee" thereafter with requirements that "vary by market." The 250 SV Enrollment Pack is stated in volume only.
- Any FDA warning-letter history. The FY2025 Form 10-K affirmatively states there were "no open letters from the FDA to us as of June 30, 2025," but the wording does not foreclose closed-out letters historically, and the FDA warning-letter database is a JavaScript-driven view whose full-text query returned only the search shell. Searched, none located - but that is "could not retrieve," not established absence.
- The self-regulatory file. No DSSRC case involving LifeVantage was located, but the BBB National Programs decision-search URL returned HTTP 404 and full decision texts sit behind a subscription archive. Trustpilot returned HTTP 403 to every fetch and no BBB rating could be obtained. All three are retrieval failures rather than findings.
- A 2023 proxy contest. EDGAR full-text search surfaced an 8-K/A dated 13 November 2023 described as reporting the outcome of a proxy fight, but the underlying filing could not be retrieved. The identity of the dissident, the slate and the outcome are all unverified, and nothing about it is asserted here. Also unverified: whether the Consultant Agreement contains an arbitration clause or class-action waiver, which could not be located in the retrievable policy text, and whether any non-US income disclosure exists for Japan, Australia, Canada, the UK or the EU.
Not advice
This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.
Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.
Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.
- Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
- The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
- Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
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LifeVantage - frequently asked
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Author, editor and publisher
This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - LifeVantage’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.
Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.
The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.
Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.
About the author and our conflicts · Contact the editor · Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com
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