The Juice Plus+ Company, LLC
Fifty-six years old, sells to roughly a million customers who can buy at retail on the public website with no distributor in the loop - and its own disclosure puts 83.11% of US Partners on $84, $222 and $717 a year before expenses.
One of the cleanest entry structures in direct selling - $52 a year, no kit, no inventory, no mandatory autoship, and a genuine no-recruitment path to the 25% pay tier - attached to a capsule priced at roughly 68 times its measurable vitamin payload and a company that handed its equity to its lenders in September 2025.
Can you actually make money with Juice Plus+?
Yes, under conditions, and the entry structure is among the cleanest this site has graded, so it goes first. Fifty-two dollars a year for the license. No starter kit, no inventory to hold, no minimum order, no mandatory autoship, and the company handles fulfillment, shipping and customer service, so a Partner never touches a box. Anyone can buy the product at retail on the public US storefront with no referral code and no distributor in the loop. Very few plans in this category permit that at all.
The plan also contains a documented route to the 25% tier that never requires sponsoring anybody. Fifteen thousand PPV from personal customers across a minimum of 40 customer orders reaches Sales Coordinator with zero recruits, with stacked customer rewards of $500, $750, $1,000 and $1,250 along the way. And it actively resists being satisfied by your own household: Partner rank needs 900 PPV from at least two distinct customers with separate names and email addresses, and household orders are capped at 1,300 PPV and 2,700 PPV at the middle ranks. That is the reverse of the usual design.
Now the earnings, from the company's own 2022 US Earnings Summary. It puts 83.11% of Partners in the bottom three ranks, averaging $84, $222 and $717 for the year, before expenses, which the document states plainly it has not deducted. Some 62.82% average under $250. Four in five Partners earn less across a year than a single Essentials subscription costs at $1,350. The document publishes averages with no medians and no zero-earner count, and the most recent edition anybody could verify is four years old.
Two facts bear on the next few years. The equity transferred to the lender group on 30 September 2025 in a consensual debt-for-equity swap, which is a balance-sheet event and not a finding against anyone, but it changes whose interests the margin serves, and field commissions are the largest controllable margin line any direct seller has. Roughly three months later, for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026, the consumer return window went from six months to 30 days, unopened and resaleable only.
Partner Application Fee, renewing annually - no starter kit, no inventory, no minimum order and no mandatory autoship
- Selling to customers is the plan, not building a team. The Customer Track is documented and real, and it is the only route in this plan to a mid-tier commission rate that never asks you to sponsor a person.
- You can defend the price with a customer looking at you. The measurable vitamin payload of the $54-a-month capsules is matched by a $0.79-a-month warehouse-club multivitamin, and roughly 0.8 g of fibre a day at label dose is a micronutrient concentrate rather than a produce substitute.
- The $52 renewing every year is fine with you. The widely circulated $10 to join is a promotional price tied to a qualifying order rather than the standing cost of holding the license.
- You are reading the 2022 disclosure as the newest thing that exists. No 2023, 2024 or 2025 edition could be located, and the Become a Partner page references a current statement without hosting a retrievable link to one.
That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.
Legal status
LEGAL - no court or regulator anywhere has found Juice Plus+ to be a pyramid scheme, and no FTC complaint, civil penalty, consent order or Section 5 enforcement action against the company could be located. The file that does exist is an advertising file, not a structural one: a €1,000,000 Italian competition-authority decision of 27 March 2019 against the corporate entities in the UK, Italy and Germany for hidden marketing in secret Facebook groups and false health claims (appeal outcome unknown); A$37,800 across three Therapeutic Goods Administration infringement notices in Australia in February 2020, issued for the company’s own advertising with no admission of liability; an FTC warning letter of 5 June 2020 over COVID-era health and earnings claims made by distributors - a warning letter, not an enforcement action, carrying no penalty; and three self-regulatory DSSRC proceedings in 2023, 2023 and 2025, all closed with recommendations, none referred to the FTC. No FDA warning letter and no UK Advertising Standards Authority ruling against this company could be located on the public record.
Confidence: Medium-High
Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.
Follow the money
A Tennessee direct-selling company, trading since 1970 as National Safety Associates and since 1993 under the Juice Plus+ name, selling fruit, vegetable and berry concentrate capsules, chewables, powders and an omega blend through roughly 200,000 independent Sales Partners on a differential unilevel plan - you earn the spread between your own commission percentage and your downline’s, plus a 3% Performance Bonus pool and a 3% Promote Out Bonus pool.
Three structural facts sit in the company’s favor and belong at the top. First, anyone can buy the product at retail from the public US storefront with no distributor, no referral code and no gate - the terms describe assignment to a local Partner as something that may happen after purchase, as a service overlay, not as a condition of sale. On company figures of roughly a million customers against roughly 200,000 Partners, that is about four to five customers per Partner, which is at the healthier end of this sector. Second, the plan contains a genuine Customer Track: Sales Coordinator and its 25% combined rate can be reached on 15,000 PPV from personal customers across at least 40 customer orders, with zero recruits, plus stacked customer rewards of $500, $750, $1,000 and $1,250. Third, entry is genuinely cheap and the plan resists self-stacking - $52 a year, no kit, no inventory, no minimum order, no mandatory autoship, Partner rank requiring two distinct customers with separate names and emails, and household orders capped at 1,300 PPV at the middle ranks and 2,700 PPV at Sales Coordinator.
Then the disclosure, which the company publishes itself and which is the reason for the grade. In the 2022 US Earnings Summary - the most recent edition anyone could verify, four years old - 39.48% of Partners were at entry rank averaging $84 a year, 23.34% at Partner Plus averaging $222, and 20.29% at Qualifying Sales Coordinator averaging $717. That is 83.11% of the field in the bottom three ranks, before expenses, which the document states it has not deducted. Some 62.82% average under $250 a year. Only 0.84% reach National Marketing Director or above. Against a realistic active cost of roughly $800 to $2,500 - the $52 fee, a personal subscription at $648 to $1,350 a year, samples, events - the modal participant is materially net-negative, and the disclosure carries no medians, no expense guidance and no count of those who earned nothing.
The product question is separate from the plan question and needs answering on its own terms. The capsules do something measurable: they raise plasma folate and β-carotene, replicably, and the company has funded dozens of studies over three decades at real universities, which is more than most supplement operators can say. But the core body of that research is 7 studies funded or authored by the contract manufacturer, 4 by the distributing company, 2 by individual distributors and 1 independent - company-funded research, not independent research, whatever the letterhead of the university says. And by mass the capsules cannot be a produce substitute: about 0.8 g of fibre across a whole day at the recommended dose, roughly 194.5 mg of carrot per capsule, around 10 calories a day, and a headline vitamin load substantially made up of added β-carotene, d-α-tocopherol, ascorbic acid and folic acid rather than concentrated produce.
The last element is the balance sheet, and it needs stage-labeling carefully. The company was leveraged under private-equity ownership from on or before 2018. In June 2023 the sponsor injected $30 million of fresh equity and lenders extended maturities by three years - reported as a rescue against deteriorating operating cash flow. Effective 30 September 2025 the company completed a consensual restructuring and ownership transferred to the core lender group in a debt-for-equity swap. That is not a finding of wrongdoing, not an insolvency proceeding and not an allegation against anybody. It is, however, a change in whose interests the margin now serves - and within roughly three months the consumer return window went from six months to 30 days, unopened only, for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026.
Where every $100 of estimated revenue goes
The company publishes no accounts. Only the first line is sourced to a published trade-press estimate - BusinessForHome puts the 2025 commission payout at roughly 42%, about $13.83 million a month against roughly $395 million of estimated revenue. The remaining lines are this report’s reconstruction and are labeled as estimates, not company figures.
| Product | Price | Pays |
|---|---|---|
| Partner Application Fee The whole mandatory cost of holding the license, and it renews every year rather than being a one-time joining fee. Includes a personalized online store, back office and team and customer management. Promotional pricing at $10 with a qualifying order has run in 2026 windows - that is a promotion, not the standing price. No starter kit, no inventory and no minimum order is required at any point. |
$52 annual |
— |
| Fruit & Vegetable Blend Capsules The flagship. Ships as one box every four months and bills monthly. $21.60 to an entry-rank Partner per customer per cycle, so roughly 2.4 cycles sold clears the $52 annual fee. Commissions are actually computed on PV and the PV-to-dollar ratio is not published, so all dollar figures here are proxies. |
$54.00/mo · $216 per cycle 4-month cycle, billed as four installments |
10% at entry rank · 25% at Sales Coordinator |
| Fruit, Vegetable & Berry Blend Capsules $960 a year at three cycles. $32.00 to an entry-rank Partner per cycle, $80.00 at Sales Coordinator. |
$80.00/mo · $320 per cycle 4-month cycle |
10% / 25% |
| Fruit, Vegetable, Berry & Omega Blend ("Essentials") Eight bottles, $1,350 a year. Four in five US Partners earn less in a year than this subscription costs, on the company’s own 2022 disclosure. A cheap daily multivitamin plus roughly $85 a month of actual produce costs about the same and includes the food. |
$112.50/mo · $450 per cycle 4-month cycle |
10% / 25% |
| Omega Blend Capsules $390 a year. A mainstream retail fish-oil product at $18.99 for 200 softgels works out at about $2.85 a month for a comparable omega-3 dose - roughly an eleven-fold gap. |
$32.50/mo · $130 per cycle 4-month cycle |
10% / 25% |
| Berry Blend Capsules The cheapest adult capsule line at $324 a year. Per two-capsule serving: 29 mg vitamin C and 4.0 mg vitamin E, under 1 g of fibre, 5 calories. |
$27.00/mo · $108 per cycle 4-month cycle |
10% / 25% |
| Superfood Powder Four boxes, 120 stick packs, $1,050 a year. Also in range: Super-Biome Probiotic from $49.00, Super-Biome Probiotic + Prebiotic from $87.50, shakes from $38.00, gummies from $56.00 and a cognitive-health line launched in 2024. |
$87.50/mo · $350 per cycle 4-month cycle |
10% / 25% |
| Healthy Starts (free child product, ages 4–25) Stated value up to $224. This is the one place a genuine tie exists: it requires an active qualifying adult subscription, and canceling the adult subscription cancels the child’s. Everywhere else in the range, cancellation is available at any time online or by phone provided the request lands before the next shipment processes. |
$0 product + $12 handling per shipment ships every 4 months |
— |
Who runs it, and what they ran before
A Memphis schoolteacher who built the business through fire-detection products, then home water and air filtration, then the Juice Plus+ line from 1993. Two things from that era belong in the file. In 1993 state attorneys-general addressed complaints about deceptive front-loading of distributors, with roughly 32,000 Florida distributors reported to have bought an average of about $7,000 each in water filters - complaints addressed, no reported judgment located, and the current plan requires no inventory at all. And in January 1994 the company signed O.J. Simpson to a six-figure endorsement contract; a March 1994 sales-meeting videotape had him claiming the product had cured his arthritis. The contract was canceled. Neither item is a finding against the company, and both predate the current plan by three decades.
A career direct-selling executive with more than twenty years in the sector across twenty-seven countries, most recently as president of global sales, marketing and customer success at a large US supplement direct seller, with prior senior roles at three other established nutrition direct sellers. The relevant point for a prospective participant is what happened to those businesses: all four are still operating. One of them went through a lender-led debt restructuring of its own in 2023; another has been the subject of repeated self-regulatory earnings-claim inquiries; a third is among the longest-running and least-sanctioned operators in the category. That is a mainstream industry résumé rather than a serial-collapse résumé, and the distinction is worth making. No regulatory action, fraud judgment or criminal proceeding against him could be located. He succeeded an interim chief executive and, before that, an executive who came from the beverage industry.
The company became a portfolio holding of Altamont Capital Partners, a Palo Alto middle-market private-equity firm, and is listed on Altamont’s portfolio page; the 2023 chief-executive announcement described it as an Altamont portfolio company. The acquisition date and consideration sit behind paywalled deal databases and could not be verified. Lenders are described in the 2025 restructuring coverage as having been stakeholders since 2018, which bounds the leveraged transaction at or before that year. In June 2023 Altamont injected $30 million of fresh equity and the lenders extended term-loan and revolver maturities by three years - a rescue financing, reported by Bloomberg Law as a cash lifeline against deteriorating operating cash flow.
The rescue did not hold. Effective 30 September 2025 the company completed a consensual restructuring - a debt-for-equity swap - and ownership transferred to the core lender group. Lender identities, debt quantum and the post-swap capital structure were not disclosed, and whether the private-equity sponsor retained any residual equity is unknown. Stage-label this correctly: a consensual debt-for-equity restructuring is a balance-sheet event, not a finding of wrongdoing, not an insolvency proceeding, and not an allegation against anybody. What it does mean for a participant is that the people who now own the business are creditors whose return comes out of margin, and the two largest controllable margin lines in a direct-selling company are field commissions and customer-friendly terms. One of those has already moved: the US return window was cut from six months to 30 days, unopened and resaleable only, for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026 - roughly three months after the swap.
Registered address
140 Crescent Drive, Collierville, Tennessee, USA
Privately held, publishes no accounts. Every revenue figure in this report is a trade-publication estimate rather than a company figure: BusinessForHome puts the estimated top line at roughly $693 million in 2020 falling to roughly $395 million in 2025, a decline of about 43% in five years, with the market count contracting from 27 countries in 2023 to 22 at the October 2025 restructuring announcement. The corporate directory still carries the NSA name and an internal nsai.com email domain. Manufacturing has been contracted for more than thirty years to Natural Alternatives International, a NASDAQ-listed cGMP contract manufacturer, on a new multi-year exclusive agreement announced 21 July 2025 - which is a genuine quality overlay and should be counted as one.
The veteran's checklist
Eight questions that decide whether this is a business or a transfer mechanism. Same eight, every review.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who legally owns it? |
WATCH
The Juice Plus+ Company, LLC of Collierville, Tennessee - formerly and still internally National Safety Associates. Privately held with no published accounts. Private-equity owned from on or before 2018; ownership transferred to the core lender group in a consensual debt-for-equity swap effective 30 September 2025. Lender identities and the post-swap capital structure were not disclosed.
|
| What does it really cost? |
OK
$52 for the Partner Application Fee, renewing annually - and that is the entire mandatory cost. No kit, no inventory, no minimum order, no autoship. Realistically, an active Partner who takes a personal subscription and samples spends roughly $800 to $2,500 in year one, of which $648 to $1,350 is product.
|
| Published income disclosure? |
CONCERN
Yes, and it is granular - twelve ranks, share of field at each, all-Partner and active-only averages. It shows 83.11% of US Partners in the bottom three ranks averaging $84, $222 and $717 a year before expenses. No medians, no expense guidance, no zero-earner count, and the newest verifiable edition covers 2022.
|
| Regulatory action against the company, ever? |
WATCH
No FTC complaint, consent order or civil penalty, and no court or regulator anywhere has found it to be a pyramid scheme. What exists: a €1,000,000 Italian competition-authority decision in 2019 against the corporate entities, A$37,800 in Australian TGA infringement notices in 2020, an FTC warning letter in June 2020, and three self-regulatory DSSRC proceedings closed with recommendations and no penalties.
|
| Are there ASA rulings or FDA warning letters? |
OK
No. A search of the UK Advertising Standards Authority rulings database returned zero results across rulings, informally resolved, mail order and database cases, and no FDA warning letter to the company or to National Safety Associates could be located. Both were working hypotheses when this review was commissioned and both fail on the public record. The absence is a finding and it is published as one.
|
| Is there a four-month commitment? |
OK
No. The four months is the shipping cycle and the installment billing schedule - a $216 pack ships once and bills as four payments of $54. The US terms say shipments continue until you cancel, and cancellation is available online or by phone provided the request lands before the next shipment processes. The one genuine tie is the free kids program, where canceling the adult subscription ends the child’s product.
|
| Can you get your money back? |
CONCERN
For subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026, 30 days from ship date, product unopened and resaleable only, refunded within 30 days of receipt. For subscriptions received before that date, a six-month window applied. That is a material downgrade in consumer terms, made roughly three months after the lender takeover.
|
| Merchant play or miner play? |
WATCH
Genuinely closer to merchant than most of this category, which is why the compensation score is what it is. Retail is open to anyone with no referral gate, the Customer Track reaches the 25% tier on 40 customer orders and zero recruits, and household purchases are capped. The miner elements are the Active Sponsor Reward of $50 to $500 paid on a downline’s title achievement and a 175 Commission Volume monthly floor a Partner can satisfy with their own order.
|
What has to be true for you to get paid
| To cover | You need |
|---|---|
| Hold the license for a year, buying nothing | $520 of retail sales $52 fee at the 10% entry-rank sales profit - about 2.4 four-month packs, or one customer subscribed for eight months |
| Cover the fee plus a personal subscription | ~$6,352 of customer sales $52 + $648 of own product, less $65 of sales profit on it, recovered at 10% - roughly 29 packs, or ten customers subscribed year-round |
| Reach the 25% tier without recruiting anyone | 40 customer orders 15,000 PPV from personal customers on the Customer Track - Sales Coordinator, 15% commission plus 10% sales profit, zero recruits |
| Beat the average Partner+ outcome | ~$1,500 of outlay for ~$1,950 back against a published Partner Plus average of $222 a year, or $284 for active Partners only |
Read this twice
Two arithmetics live in this file and they point in opposite directions, which is why the grade is not lower. The first is genuinely favorable. A Partner who pays the $52 fee, declines a personal subscription and simply retails the product breaks even at $520 of sales - about 2.4 four-month packs of the flagship. That is the cheapest honest entry in the direct-selling sector, the downside is bounded at $52, and nothing about it requires recruiting anybody. The Customer Track extends the same logic upward: 40 customer orders and 15,000 PPV of personal customer volume reaches Sales Coordinator and its combined 25% rate with zero recruits, plus a $500 Fast Track reward and a $500 Level 1 customer reward. Modeled fully - $52 fee, $648 personal subscription, roughly $600 of samples and $300 of tools, against $2,160 of commission on $8,640 of customer volume plus the two rewards - that is about $1,560 net for the year. Real, documented, reachable without sponsoring a single person, and reached by 12.62% of the field. The second arithmetic is the one most participants actually live. Put yourself on a personal subscription and the picture inverts: $52 plus $648 of product is $700 out, $65 of sales profit on your own buying comes back, and you now need roughly $6,352 of customer sales - about ten customers subscribed year-round - merely to return to zero. The company’s own 2022 disclosure says the average Partner earned $84. Set against the modal cost, that is roughly minus $616 for the year. Add samples at $100 to $600 and one regional event at $500 and an active Partner+ is at about $1,500 of outlay; the same disclosure puts the Partner Plus average at $222, and even a modeled scenario running far above that average - $1,950 earned against $1,500 spent - returns about $450, which at ten hours a week is $0.87 an hour before self-employment tax. The single most consequential decision a new Partner makes is whether to put themselves on autoship, and the plan is honest enough not to require it. The 175 Commission Volume monthly floor and the 600 PPV personal-or-customer floor are what push people onto it anyway.
Run your own numbers
Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.
A new Partner earns the 10% Sales Profit band on a customer order, so a customer on the roughly $54-a-month Fruit and Vegetable blend is worth about $5.40. Rank changes that: Partner+ pays 15% and Sales Coordinator 25%, and the genuinely good news in this plan is that Sales Coordinator is reachable on 40 customer orders with no recruits at all. The rule the slider cannot show is the one that bites first - commissions are paid only from 175 Commission Volume in a month, and below that threshold the payout is nothing regardless of rank or customer count. Cost is the de-facto floor spread monthly: a personal subscription at about $54 to sit comfortably above the volume requirements, plus the $52 Partner fee, which renews annually rather than being the one-time $50 the ranking assumed. Downline income is excluded because the plan pays a differential - the moment a leg reaches your own rank your override on it goes to zero. For calibration, from the company’s own 2022 earnings summary: 83.11% of US Partners averaged $84, $222 or $717 for the year before expenses, and no more recent edition could be obtained. Your own subscription cost of $58/mo is included.
What it costs to replace this yourself
Juice Plus+ published US prices against open-market equivalents, all from supermarkets, warehouse clubs, pharmacies and mainstream retail. Two honest framings before the table. The capsules are not a plain multivitamin - they contain real whole-food concentrate and they raise plasma folate and β-carotene in a way a synthetic tablet does differently, and that difference is worth something. But the marketing proposition is that they stand in for fruit and vegetables, and on that proposition the comparison is not close: the produce column below delivers fibre, potassium, water and satiety that 0.8 g of fibre a day cannot.
| What they sell you | What you'd use instead | Your cost |
|---|---|---|
| Fruit & Vegetable Blend Capsules - $54.00/month | Warehouse-club own-brand daily multivitamin, 500 tablets at $12.99 - vitamins A, C, E, folate and twenty-plus others at daily-value levels | $0.79/mo |
| Omega Blend Capsules - $32.50/month | Mainstream retail fish oil, 1,200 mg (360 mg omega-3), 200 softgels at $18.99 | $2.85/mo |
| The claim of standing in for five to ten servings of produce | The full federal fruit-and-vegetable recommendation in whole produce, at USDA cup-equivalent prices - plus 25–30 g/day of fibre | $76–$91/mo |
| 194.5 mg of carrot powder per capsule (~3% of a serve) | Fresh whole carrots at $0.38 per cup-equivalent | ~$11/mo |
| 61.3 mg of broccoli powder per capsule | Frozen broccoli at $0.91 per cup-equivalent | ~$27/mo |
| 0.8 g of fibre across a full day of capsules | One banana a day at roughly $0.20 each - about 3 g of fibre per banana | ~$6/mo |
| Cheapest fruit and vegetable options for volume | Watermelon at $0.24, baked white potato at $0.27, iceberg lettuce at $0.32, onions at $0.43, apples at $0.50, canned corn at $0.65 - all per cup-equivalent | $0.24–$0.65 each |
| Essentials stack - $112.50/month | The multivitamin, the fish oil and roughly $85/month of real produce together | ~$89/mo |
| Partner Application Fee - $52/year, renewing | Buying the products you want as an ordinary customer, with no license at all | $0 |
| Total as sold ~$1,402 in year one for an active Partner on the Essentials line ($1,350 + $52) |
Total, built yourself ~$1,068 a year for the multivitamin, the fish oil and the actual produce |
Price-to-value
On the measurable vitamin payload the multiple is about 68 times, and on the omega product about 11 times - those two numbers are the report in miniature. But the fairest version of the exercise is the last row but one, and it is the one to sit with: the full Essentials pack at $112.50 a month costs roughly the same as a $0.79 multivitamin plus $2.85 of fish oil plus $85 of real fruit and vegetables, and the cheaper version includes the food. The closest true like-for-like - a generic fruit-and-vegetable concentrate capsule from a mainstream retailer, typically $15 to $25 a month - could not be price-verified within scope and is deliberately not relied on in the arithmetic above.
Three operators, five horizons
Probability of cumulative net profit
Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.
Already a customer
buys the product anyway, pays $52 for the 10%, sells to two or three people
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 34% | −$36 |
| 6 mo | 46% | −$14 |
| 1 yr | 55% | +$25 |
| 3 yr | 58% | +$110 |
| 5 yr | 58% | +$190 |
Customer Track retailer
10 hrs/wk, personal subscription, no recruiting, working toward 40 customer orders
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 9% | −$310 |
| 6 mo | 14% | −$540 |
| 1 yr | 21% | −$780 |
| 3 yr | 28% | −$1,300 |
| 5 yr | 30% | −$1,500 |
Team builder
30+ hrs/wk, building width across separate lines, events and travel
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 3% | −$700 |
| 6 mo | 6% | −$1,400 |
| 1 yr | 10% | −$2,500 |
| 3 yr | 14% | −$5,600 |
| 5 yr | 15% | −$8,200 |
Methodology note. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims, not predictions and not anybody’s reported results. ANCHORED to the company’s own 2022 US Earnings Summary - 39.48% of Partners at entry rank averaging $84 a year, 23.34% at Partner Plus averaging $222, 20.29% at Qualifying Sales Coordinator averaging $717, 12.62% at Sales Coordinator averaging $2,609 all-Partner and $7,139 active-only, and 0.84% at National Marketing Director or above - and to the published cost side: the $52 annual fee, subscription pricing from $324 to $1,350 a year, the 10% entry-rank sales profit, the 25% Sales Coordinator combined rate, the 175 Commission Volume monthly payment floor and the Customer Track thresholds of 40 orders and 15,000 PPV. MODELED by us: the expense side beyond the published fee and product prices, because the company publishes no expense guidance at all - sampling at $100 to $600 a year, events at $500 to $3,000 and tools at $0 to $600 are this report’s estimates; the share of each cohort in cumulative profit, which no disclosure states; and the cohort definitions themselves. Two calibrations cut in the company’s favor and are built in. The first cohort is deliberately positive at the median, because a participant who was already buying the product is not incurring the subscription as a business cost and the $52 license genuinely pays for itself on modest sales - that is the honest best case and it is common. And the top line of the second cohort reflects the Customer Track outcome as modeled from the plan document, which is reachable with no recruiting whatever. The disclosure publishes averages and not medians, so the medians here are inferred from a right-skewed distribution and should be read as directionally, not precisely, right.
Where you are actually allowed to promote this
Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.
Red flags and green flags
Red flags
15183.11% of US Partners sit in the bottom three ranks, averaging $84, $222 and $717 a year
2The published income disclosure is four years stale
3It publishes averages only - no medians, no expenses, no zero-earner count
4Ownership transferred to the lender group on 30 September 2025
5Estimated revenue is down about 43% in five years
6The consumer return window was cut from six months to 30 days, unopened only
7A €1,000,000 Italian competition-authority fine, levied on the corporate entities
8Three self-regulatory DSSRC proceedings in three years
9An FTC warning letter of 5 June 2020
10A$37,800 in Australian TGA infringement notices for the company’s own advertising
11Price-to-value is severe on the measurable payload
12The core product proposition is not supportable by mass
13The core research body is 13-to-1 interested
14The endpoints are surrogate, not clinical
15The Partner fee is recurring, not one-time
Green flags
101Anyone can buy the product at retail with no distributor
2No capital is taken against a promised return
3A genuine no-recruitment path to the 25% tier
4The plan contains explicit anti-self-purchase caps
5Entry is genuinely cheap, with no inventory risk and no lock-in
6Fifty-six years of continuous operation under one lineage
7An income disclosure exists and it is granular
8The company funds real clinical research, and some of it survives scrutiny
9Good-faith remediation, and never referred to the FTC
10The payout is funded out of product margin, not participant inflow
We would like to be wrong about this
Upward
- Publish a current income disclosure - 2025 or later - with medians alongside the averages, a stated zero-earner count, expense guidance and time-invested data. This is the cheapest, highest-impact fix available to the company and it would move the participant-economics score more than anything else on this list.
- Host the full compensation plan and the complete Policies and Procedures at a public, un-gated URL, and publish per-study funding disclosures on the research page naming which of the cited papers were company- or manufacturer-funded. For an operator whose central exposure is distributor speech and interested science, both cost almost nothing in credibility it does not already lack.
- Restore the six-month return window or extend the 30-day one to opened product, drop or qualify the fruit-and-vegetable substitution positioning in favor of an honest micronutrient-concentrate framing, and post two consecutive years with no new self-regulatory, FTC, TGA or advertising-authority matter alongside evidence of proactive rather than complaint-driven monitoring.
Downward
- Any FTC enforcement action - a complaint, consent order or civil penalty rather than a warning letter - or a first FDA warning letter, a first UK advertising-authority ruling, or a fourth self-regulatory proceeding on the same claim categories.
- Any reduction in the field payout ratio, or the introduction of a mandatory autoship, a required starter pack or monthly website and tool fees - the classic margin plays available to a creditor-owned direct seller, and the ones the 5 January 2026 returns change signals are on the table.
- Evidence that the Customer Track has been quietly de-emphasized or made harder, any move to gate retail purchase behind a Partner referral ID, withdrawal of the income disclosure altogether, or further restructuring and market exits taking the count below 20 countries.
Grade is D+, score 5.27. Cleaner than almost anything else in this category on structure and entry cost - and the operator’s own disclosure puts 83.11% of Partners on $84, $222 and $717 a year before expenses.
Start with what is genuinely good here, because a great deal of it is. Anyone can buy this product at retail on the public website with no distributor, no referral code and no gate, which is the single strongest structural fact in the file and the direct answer to the question a pyramid analysis actually asks. Entry costs $52 a year with no kit, no inventory, no minimum order and no mandatory autoship, and there is no four-month lock-in - that is the shipping and billing cycle, not a contract. The plan contains a documented no-recruitment route to the 25% pay tier on 40 customer orders, and it caps household purchases at 1,300 and 2,700 PPV specifically to stop qualification being satisfied by your own family. It publishes a twelve-rank income disclosure when many competitors publish nothing. It has traded continuously for fifty-six years. Its capsules are made by a NASDAQ-listed contract manufacturer and they raise plasma folate and β-carotene, replicably. It funds real research at real universities. And it has remediated in good faith at every self-regulatory inquiry, never once being referred to the FTC. None of that is faint praise.
The economics are where it lands. On the company’s own 2022 Earnings Summary - the most recent edition anyone could verify, four years stale - 39.48% of US Partners were at entry rank averaging $84 a year, 23.34% at Partner Plus averaging $222 and 20.29% at Qualifying Sales Coordinator averaging $717. That is 83.11% of the field, before expenses the document says it has not deducted, against a realistic active cost of roughly $800 to $2,500. The disclosure carries no medians, no expense guidance and no zero-earner count, though the gap between the all-Partner and active-only columns implies roughly 43% inactive at entry rank. And the product side is priced against a payload it does not carry: $54 a month of capsules against $0.79 a month for a warehouse-club multivitamin covering the same measurable vitamins, on the order of 68 times; $32.50 for the omega line against about $2.85 of mainstream retail fish oil, roughly 11 times; 0.8 g of fibre across a full day against the 25 to 30 g a produce diet supplies, at about 194.5 mg of carrot per capsule. The research that underwrites the positioning is 7 manufacturer-funded, 4 company-funded, 2 distributor-funded and 1 independent in the core body - and company-funded research is not independent research, whichever university hosted it.
The third element is the balance sheet, and it has to be stated carefully because nothing here is an allegation. The business was leveraged under private-equity ownership from on or before 2018. In June 2023 the sponsor put in $30 million of fresh equity and lenders extended maturities by three years, reported against deteriorating operating cash flow. Effective 30 September 2025 a consensual restructuring transferred ownership to the core lender group in a debt-for-equity swap. That is a balance-sheet event and nothing more - not an insolvency proceeding, not a finding of wrongdoing, not a charge against any individual. But a Partner is an uncontracted supplier of sales effort, and in a creditor-owned business the two largest controllable margin lines are field commissions and customer-friendly terms. One has already moved: the return window went from six months to 30 days, unopened only, for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026 - within about three months of the swap. Trade estimates put revenue down roughly 43% since 2020 and markets down from 27 countries to 22. A 42% payout ratio is the right structure; it is being applied to a shrinking base.
If you like the capsules, be a customer
You can buy every product on the public storefront at exactly the same price with no Partner, no license and no obligation, and the terms make assignment to a local Partner optional and post-purchase. Before subscribing, note the change that matters: for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026 the return window is 30 days and the product must be unopened and resaleable, down from six months. Cancellation is available at any time online or by phone, provided the request lands before the next shipment processes.
If you do join, do not put yourself on autoship
This is the single most consequential decision in the file and the arithmetic is not close. A Partner who pays $52 and simply retails breaks even at $520 of sales - about 2.4 four-month packs. A Partner who adds a personal $648 subscription needs roughly $6,352 of customer sales, about ten customers subscribed year-round, merely to return to zero. The plan does not require a personal subscription; the 175 Commission Volume monthly floor is what makes it feel required.
Work the Customer Track and ignore everything else
Forty customer orders and 15,000 PPV of personal customer volume reaches Sales Coordinator and its combined 25% rate with zero recruits, plus $500 and $500 in rewards. Modeled fully against $1,600 of outlay, that is roughly $1,560 net for the year. It is the only route in this plan that reliably produces a positive year, it is reached by 12.62% of the field, and it is honest work - a part-time retail job, priced as one.
Do not build the business on your health story
The most persuasive thing you can say is the thing three consecutive self-regulatory proceedings have ordered off the internet: disease treatment and prevention claims, "brain fog" and mood claims, skin and hair claims, unqualified inflammation claims, and the Health Start Study figures. What you may say - bridging the gap as part of a healthy diet, immune support alongside a produce-rich diet, cardiovascular wellness in a dietary context - converts far worse. That is a structural conflict, not a training gap, and no upline resolves it for you.
Nine dimensions, weighted
Dimension profile
Further from center is better. Hover any point.
Hard caps that bind here
The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.
What we read
Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.
- Juice Plus+ 2022 U.S. Earnings Summary (PDF, company document archived by Truth in Advertising, Inc.) - 39.48% of Partners at entry rank averaging $84, 23.34% at Partner Plus averaging $222, 20.29% at QSC averaging $717, 12.62% at Sales Coordinator averaging $2,609
Juice Plus+ US 2022 Earnings Summary (via Truth in Advertising archive) - 39.48% of Partners at entry rank averaging $84, 23.34% at Partner Plus averaging $222, 20.29% at Qualifying Sales Coordinator averaging $717, 12.62% at Sales Coordinator averaging $2,609, 0.84% at National Marketing Director or above, 0.08% at the top title; all-Partner and active-only columns; expenses stated as not deducted
- Juice Plus+ Earnings Summary - company-hosted edition (Mexico/English mirror of the US Earnings Summary format)
- Truth in Advertising, Inc. - Juice Plus+ brand file, including the 2017, 2020 and 2023 income-claims databases and the chronology of TINA.org's complaints
- Juice Plus+ Compensation Plan E-Book 2025 - Phase One (field-distributed PDF): Partner, Partner+, QSC and Sales Coordinator qualifications, PPV thresholds, household caps, Title and Active Sponsor Rewards, and the Customer Track at 5,000 PPV / 12 orders and 15,000 PPV / 40 orders
Juice Plus+ US Compensation Plan E-Book 2025, Phase One and Phase Two (field-distributed PDFs) - 900 PPV from two distinct customers for Partner rank, 3,600 PPV qualification with 1,300 PPV household caps at Partner+ and QSC, 10,800 PPV and 2,700 PPV household cap at Sales Coordinator, 175 Commission Volume payment floor, the differential override table, 3% Performance Bonus and 3% Promote Out Bonus pools, Express and Fast Track rewards, Active Sponsor Rewards of $50/$300/$300/$500, and the Customer Track at 5,000 PPV / 12 orders and 15,000 PPV / 40 orders
- Juice Plus+ Compensation Plan E-Book 2025 - Phase Two (field-distributed PDF): the differential override table, 3% Performance Bonus and 3% Promote Out Bonus pools, and the senior-title requirements
- Juice Plus+ US Compensation Plan E-Book 2025, Phase 1 (alternate field-distributed filename) - DEAD, and duplicative
DEAD LINK, confirmed 10 September 2026: 404 with no Wayback capture. Nothing is lost by it. It was always an alternate filename for a document this report cites twice over - the Phase One and Phase Two E-Book PDFs are both held in this archive, captured from the working teamjp.net library URL cited below, and every figure this report draws from the 2025 plan comes from those. Downgraded to tier 4 and retained only so a future reader is not left wondering whether a third document once existed.
- Juice Plus+ field distributor library - "Price & Earnings Information," the page from which the Phase 1 and Phase 2 compensation-plan PDFs are served
- us.juiceplus.com - "Become A Partner" (the $52 Partner Application Fee, the open public storefront with no referral gate, and the income-disclosure link)
us.juiceplus.com product, terms, become-a-partner and healthy-starts pages, 2026 - $52 Partner Application Fee renewing annually, open public storefront with no referral gate, four-month cycle pricing at $54.00, $80.00, $112.50, $87.50, $82.50, $32.50, $27.00 and $14.50 a month, cancellation until you cancel, and the return window cut from six months to 30 days unopened-only for subscriptions received on or after 5 January 2026
Not established by this document: The us.juiceplus.com terms-and-conditions page and the healthy-starts (free kids program) page could not be retrieved: the US storefront is a Shopify-hosted single-page application that returns no static content to an automated fetcher, and the four-month cycle pricing table ($54.00 / $80.00 / $112.50 / $87.50 / $82.50 / $32.50 / $27.00 / $14.50 a month) and the 5 January 2026 return-window change are visible only in the rendered cart and terms overlay. Only the Become A Partner page and the storefront root are linked.
- juiceplus.com - corporate storefront and product catalog
- FTC Warning Letter to The Juice Plus+ Company, 5 June 2020 (PDF) - coronavirus prevention/treatment claims and "make $500 a month, $1,000 a month or more… There's no ceiling on this," reply required within 48 hours
FTC warning letter to The Juice Plus+ Company, 5 June 2020, and the associated FTC press release on the second round of COVID-era letters to multi-level marketers - unsubstantiated coronavirus and earnings claims, attributed in the letter to business-opportunity participants, 48-hour response required, no complaint, no penalty, no consent order
- FTC Legal Library - Warning Letter to The Juice Plus+ Company (case page)
- "FTC Sends Second Round of Warning Letters to Multi-Level Marketers Regarding Coronavirus-Related Health and Earnings Claims" - press release, 5 June 2020
- FTC Consumer Alert - "FTC letters target more unproven MLM health and earnings claims," 5 June 2020
- DSSRC Case #115-2023: NGO Inquiry - The Juice Plus+ Company, LLC (closed 12 May 2023; 71 of 112 posts removed, the Health Start Study found to be anecdotal evidence)
BBB National Programs DSSRC Case #115-2023 (closed 12 May 2023), Case #128-2023 (closed 27 August 2023) and Case #227-2025 (administrative closure, 18 August 2025) - over 100 documented claims, the Health Start Study found to be anecdotal evidence, the permitted-claims carve-outs, 71 of 112 then 27 links and 9 blog posts then 22 of 27 posts removed, good-faith findings, no referral to the FTC
- DSSRC Case #128-2023: Compliance Report - The Juice Plus+ Company, LLC (closed 27 August 2023; 27 links and nine blog posts removed or modified)
- DSSRC Case #227-2025: Administrative Closure - The Juice Plus+ Company, LLC (closed 18 August 2025; earnings claims on Facebook, YouTube, TikTok and Pinterest) - archived copy of the BBB National Programs decision page
- DSSRC Case #128-2023 Compliance Report - archived copy of the BBB National Programs decision page
- TINA.org complaint to DSSRC re repeated deceptive marketing by Juice Plus, 7 September 2022 - the NGO submission that opened Case #115-2023
- AGCM decision PS11050 - "Gruppi segreti Facebook-prodotti Juice Plus, sanzioni da un milione di euro per pratica commerciale scorretta" (proceeding concluded 27 March 2019; €1,000,000 against The Juice PLUS+ Company Srl, Ltd, Europe GmbH and LLC)
Italian AGCM decision of 27 March 2019, published 25 April 2019 (via NutraIngredients) - €1,000,000 fine on The Juice PLUS+ Company Ltd/LLC, The Juice PLUS+ Company Srl and The Juice Plus+ Company Europe GmbH for hidden marketing through secret Facebook groups, sellers posing as consumers, false health and weight-loss claims and failure of professional diligence; 60 days to appeal, outcome not located
Not established by this document: The outcome of any appeal against the AGCM decision could not be located; no subsequent TAR Lazio or Consiglio di Stato judgment naming The Juice Plus+ companies was found.
- NutraIngredients - "Juice Plus + fined €1m for illegal supplement selling on 'secret' Facebook groups," 25 April 2019 (60 days to appeal)
- Therapeutic Goods Administration media release - "Multi-level marketing company fined $37,800 for alleged advertising breaches" (three infringement notices to The Juice Plus Company Australia Pty Ltd; promoting for a condition not permitted and health-professional endorsement)
Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration media release, February 2020 - A$37,800 across three infringement notices to The Juice Plus Company Australia Pty Ltd for promoting for a condition not permitted and health-professional endorsement, no admission of liability
- NutraIngredients - "'Errant products': TGA fines Caruso, Juice Plus, and bars HK weight loss capsules from entering," 10 March 2020
- Direct Selling News - "Juice Plus+ Completes Consensual Restructuring to Fuel Brand Growth," 3 October 2025 (ownership transferred to the core lender group, effective 30 September 2025; 22 countries)
Direct Selling News, 3 October 2025; Bloomberg Law, 2023; Debtwire / ION Analytics - the June 2023 $30 million rescue equity injection and three-year maturity extension, and the consensual restructuring transferring ownership to the core lender group effective 30 September 2025; Altamont Capital Partners portfolio listing; PR Newswire chief-executive appointment release, 10 July 2023
Not established by this document: The 10 July 2023 PR Newswire release announcing Travis Garza's appointment as global CEO could not be retrieved at a stable URL; the appointment is corroborated in the Direct Selling News restructuring report cited above and in Memphis Business Journal coverage of the same date.
- Debtwire / ION Analytics - "Juice Plus+ lenders poised to take the keys," 22 April 2025 (Altamont Capital Partners-backed; debt-for-equity swap in negotiation)
- GLC Advisors - Juice Plus+ transaction announcement (the June 2023 out-of-court recapitalisation: ~$320m of $675m debt eliminated, $30m sponsor equity infusion, maturities extended)
- businessforhome.org - Juice Plus+ company profile (estimated revenue $395m for 2024 and 2025, ~42% commission-payout estimate, roughly 800,000 monthly autoships, and the stale chief-executive field naming Michael Lohner)
BusinessForHome company profile - estimated revenue of $693m (2020), $580m, $495m, $400m, $395m (2024) and $395m (2025), an estimated ~42% commission payout at roughly $13.83 million a month, and roughly 800,000 monthly autoships. Trade-publication estimates, not company figures, and the same page carries a stale chief-executive field
- USDA Economic Research Service - Fruit and Vegetable Prices data product (average retail price and price per edible cup equivalent for more than 150 fresh and processed fruits and vegetables)
Product composition and open-market pricing - US supplement facts panels via a third-party nutrition breakdown (Vitamin A, C, E and folate per two-capsule serving, under 1 g fibre, 5 calories); an Australian dietitian’s produce-mass breakdown (carrot 194.5 mg, broccoli 61.3 mg, spinach 50 mg, tomato 20 mg, ~0.8 g fibre a day); Costco Kirkland Signature Daily Multi 500 tablets at $12.99; Nature Made Fish Oil 1200 mg, 200 softgels at $18.99 via Walmart; USDA Economic Research Service cup-equivalent produce prices and the under-$3-a-day analysis; FRED banana price series
Not established by this document: The US supplement-facts breakdown via a third-party nutrition site, the Australian dietitian's produce-mass breakdown, the Costco Kirkland Signature Daily Multi and Walmart Nature Made price captures and the FRED banana series are point-in-time retail captures rather than documents; the one durable primary source behind the under-$3-a-day produce analysis is linked instead.
- USDA ERS - Fruit and Vegetable Prices: Highlights and Interactive Charts (2023 cup-equivalent costs, e.g. fresh apples $0.50, baby carrots $0.40, onions $0.42)
What we could not get
- DISPROVED - the entry cost. The Partner fee is $52.00 and it renews annually; it is not a one-time $50. The widely circulated "$10 to join" is a promotional price tied to a qualifying order during 2026 windows, not the standing cost of holding the license.
- DISPROVED - the four-month lock-in. There is no contractual four-month commitment. The four months is the shipping cycle and the installment billing structure: a $216 pack ships as one box and bills as four payments of $54. The US terms say shipments continue until you cancel, and cancellation is available online or by phone at any time provided the request lands before the next shipment processes. The only genuine four-month tie is the free kids program, where canceling the adult subscription cancels the child’s product.
- DISPROVED - the UK and FDA hypotheses. No UK Advertising Standards Authority ruling against this company exists on the public record: a search of the ASA rulings database returned zero results across rulings, informally resolved cases, mail-order cases and database cases. No FDA warning letter to The Juice Plus+ Company, NSA or National Safety Associates could be located in the FDA warning-letter database or in secondary coverage - the June 2020 letter was FTC-only, where some operators in the same sweep received joint letters. Both were prompt hypotheses and both fail. Two honest caveats: the ASA database does not surface every historically informally-resolved case, and absence of a record is not proof of absence.
- The Trustpilot picture. The 3.7 out of 5 TrustScore is confirmed via search-engine indexing, but the review count of 3,706 is unverified and appears inconsistent with the roughly 72 pages of pagination observed, which at the platform default implies closer to 1,400 reviews. Trustpilot returns 403 to automated retrieval, so the star distribution and the product-versus-opportunity split of reviews could not be obtained at all.
- A US income disclosure more recent than 2022, and any income disclosure for the UK, Germany or Canada. None located. Non-US domains geo-redirect to the US storefront for automated fetches, so absence outside the US is weak evidence. The only non-US disclosure found is a 2017 Australian franchisee statement, via secondary analysis, in which 0.9% reached National Marketing Director earning over $100,000 a year.
- The full text of the Policies and Procedures, and the PV-to-dollar conversion ratio. Neither is publicly hosted. Every dollar commission figure in this report is a price proxy and will differ from actual PV-based payouts; the advertising and social-media rules are reconstructed from self-regulatory recommendations the company accepted rather than from the primary document.
- The debt quantum, lender identities and post-swap capital structure following the 30 September 2025 restructuring, whether the private-equity sponsor retained any residual equity, and the acquisition date and consideration of the original leveraged transaction. Deal databases and the specialist debt coverage are paywalled. The lender group is described as having been stakeholders since 2018, which bounds the transaction at or before that year.
- Funding sources for the post-2015 research tranche, whether the 2019 Italian decision was appealed and with what outcome, current Partner headcount (the 200,000 figure dates to July 2023 and predates both the revenue decline and the restructuring), BBB complaint counts for the trailing 12 and 36 months, whether any state attorney-general matter is currently open, and the price of the closest true like-for-like product - a generic fruit-and-vegetable concentrate capsule from a mainstream retailer - which is typically $15 to $25 a month but was not price-verified and is not relied on here.
Not advice
This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.
Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.
Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.
- Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
- The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
- Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
- No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Juice Plus+ - frequently asked
QIs Juice Plus+ a pyramid scheme?
QHow much do Juice Plus+ Partners actually earn?
QHow much does it cost to join Juice Plus+, and is there a four-month commitment?
QIs the Juice Plus+ research independent?
QAre the capsules worth the price?
Author, editor and publisher
This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - Juice Plus+’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.
Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.
The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.
Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.
About the author and our conflicts · Contact the editor · Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com
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Corrections
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