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Forex, crypto and trading education · Subscription MLM paying flat rank stipends on group volume

International Markets Live, Inc. (IYOVIA)

A closed file rather than a live offer: a $795,763,490 stipulated federal judgment, a permanent industry ban on the founders, a receiver who describes the businesses as permanently closed - and a compensation plan whose own first rank paid less than it cost to hold.

Reviewed July 31, 2026 Founded Founded 2013 in New York as iMarketsLive; renamed IM Mastery Academy in 2019 after the CFTC order, shortened to IM Academy around 2021-22, rebranded IYOVIA in November 2024; MLM terminated 23 May 2025 Confidence: High
FGRADE
2.0/10
Weighted composite

CLOSED, BANNED, NOTHING TO JOIN

The median participant earned $0 while 21 people took $242 million of the $1.242 billion collected - and on 1 June 2026 a federal court entered a $795,763,490 judgment and banned the founders from the sector permanently.

The question you came with

Can you actually make money with Iyovia?

NO No - not on the numbers this company publishes

No, and the economics are not the reason. There is nothing left to join. A federal court entered a $795,763,490 judgment on 1 June 2026, stipulated, with the right of appeal expressly waived, and permanently barred the founders from any trading training service or investment opportunity. A receiver holds the estate and describes the businesses as permanently closed. Every IBO agreement was canceled at once on 23 May 2025 and app access was cut off the same day. Everything below this line grades an offer that no longer exists.

That still matters, because the websites are up and one of them says join. Checked on 31 July 2026, iyovia.com was a stale shell still rendering prices behind a 2024 copyright line, with a /join page returning 404 and hundreds of injected foreign-language gambling links in the footer. The other domain no longer serves the academy at all and resolves to an unrelated crypto-casino affiliate review site. Neither carries a receiver notice, a shutdown notice or a consumer warning. Somebody searching the brand today can land on something that looks alive.

The plan is worth reading for what it shows. The company's own 2022 income disclosure recorded median IBO earnings of $0 and 45% of IBOs net-negative, with nearly 80% under $500 for the year and that group averaging $77.51. The cheapest realistic year cost $2,961.10: $249.95 to enroll, one academy at $184.95 every 28 days, and the $24.95 monthly fee. The first paid rank, Platinum 150, returned roughly $1,950 a year. The first rung did not cover the cost of standing on it, and the 2018 disclosure records that 87.13% of 52,706 IBOs never advanced a rank at all.

Two things belong on the other side of this file and they are not throwaways. No participant capital was ever taken in for investment. No fund, no pool, no managed accounts, no promised return on the fee, and the FTC pleaded no securities count at all, which is a materially lower category of harm than an unregistered offering. And an income disclosure was published, including under the final brand, warning in its own text that IBO expenses may exceed the amounts earned. The figures in it were terrible. Printing them still counts for something.

What it costs to be in
$2,961.10

the cheapest realistic year one - $249.95 enrollment, $184.95 every 28 days for one academy ($2,411.75 a year at 13.04 billings), and the $24.95 monthly IBO fee. No live version of this offer exists.

What would have to change
  • A live offer to grade. There is not one. Until something is filed, priced and lawfully enrollable, no paragraph on this page describes a decision a reader is in a position to make.
  • The two abandoned domains taken down, or made to say what happened. A shutdown notice on both would stop a dead brand from collecting search traffic that still reads as a working business.
  • Rank thresholds counted in sales rather than in active members and group volume. Platinum 150 asked for 3 active members and 435 GV, while the fast start on an actual sale paid $25 against a $184.95 first payment, about a tenth of it.
  • The written income-claims rules enforced against the people hardest to enforce against. Section 11.1 banned income projections and exotic-car imagery outright. The FTC found the three-strikes policy stated but not enforced while 21 promoters took $242 million.

That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.

$795,763,490
Stipulated federal judgment, joint and several
entered 1 June 2026, announced 13 May 2026; appeal expressly waived
$0
Median IBO earnings
the company’s own 2022 income disclosure; 45% of IBOs were net-negative
19.5%
Share of all money taken in that reached 21 people
$242 million of $1.242 billion, 2018-2023
$2,411.75
Annual cost of a single academy subscription
billed every 28 days - 13.04 cycles a year, not 12

Legal status

CONTESTED, AND NOW CLOSED - and the geography has to be stated precisely, because it is not the same everywhere. In the United States there is a permanent federal industry ban and a receivership: on 1 June 2026 the District of Nevada entered Document 361 in FTC and State of Nevada v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760-CDS-EJY, a stipulated final order carrying a $795,763,490.00 joint-and-several judgment and a permanent injunction against creating, marketing or selling any "Trading Training Service or Investment Opportunity." It is stipulated - the defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations - and both sides expressly waived all rights of appeal. A stipulated order is a settlement, not a litigated finding of fact after trial, and this report treats it as such throughout. In Belgium there is something different and stronger in kind: the criminal court at Tongeren convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and fined it €60,000, with four Belgian recruiters fined €4,000 to €16,000 each. That is a criminal conviction in one jurisdiction. It is not the same thing as the US order, and the two must not be collapsed - the FTC pleaded no pyramid count at all. Elsewhere the file is open or unresolved and could not be confirmed: eight arrests in Spain in March 2022 with no verified outcome, an investigation reported in Luxembourg in 2023 with no verified outcome, and administrative warnings in France, the United Kingdom, Colombia, Luxembourg and New Zealand that are alerts rather than findings of liability. Say the obvious thing plainly: the letter grade on this page is not a legality verdict. A company banned in one jurisdiction may have been trading lawfully in others, and several of the warnings above are precisely that - a regulator saying a firm is not authorized in its market, which is a different statement from a finding that it broke the law.

Confidence: High

Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.

What this actually is

Follow the money

A subscription business selling online trading-education content - foreign exchange, binary options, digital currency, stocks and futures, plus e-commerce and social-media modules - marketed worldwide through independent affiliates called IBOs on a multi-level plan that paid flat stipends attached to maintained ranks. The operating entity, International Markets Live, Inc., was a New York corporation founded in 2013. It was not a broker, not a fund and not a licensed adviser, and its own terms said so in terms.

The good parts should be stated first, because they are real. Content genuinely existed and was delivered: live educator sessions, recorded modules, a mobile app and eight subject academies. The plan carried a written retail requirement most plans lack - a Customer Leg Rule demanding a minimum 55% retail-customer volume in every leg, a 40% cap on how much qualifying volume any single leg could supply, and a policy clause stating flatly that "IBOs are not compensated other than for sales to Customers." The IBO fee itself was low, at $15 rising to $24.95 a month across a decade, with no mandatory starter kit and no monthly autoship quota. An income disclosure statement was published, including under the final brand name, and it warned in its own text that participant costs "may exceed the amounts earned." And the written income-claims policy was among the strictest anywhere: §11.1 banned income projections, claims and guarantees outright and named cash, exotic cars and yachts as prohibited imagery.

Then the economics. From the company’s own 2022 disclosure: median IBO earnings of $0, nearly 80% earning under $500 a year and averaging $77.51 within that group, 83% at or under $500 once the IBO fee is netted, and 45% of all IBOs net-negative. The FTC’s analysis of 2020-2022 data put 99.23% under $25,000. Against that, a single academy cost $184.95 every 28 days - 13.04 billings a year, not 12 - for $2,411.75 annually, plus a $249.95 enrollment fee and a $24.95 monthly IBO fee: about $2,961 in year one at the cheapest workable configuration, and roughly $7,638 for an active builder with a bundle, one add-on tool, one event and modest advertising. The first paid rank, Platinum 150, returned about $1,950 a year. It did not cover the cost of holding it.

And then the distribution, which is the whole case in one line. Of $1.242 billion taken in from consumers since 2018, over $242 million - 19.5 cents in every dollar - went to 21 people. On 1 June 2026 the District of Nevada entered a stipulated final order carrying a $795,763,490.00 joint-and-several judgment and a permanent ban on the founders and all three corporate defendants from any trading-training service or investment opportunity. It is a settlement in which the defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations, with appeal expressly waived; it is not a litigated finding of fact. Separately, and by a different body under different law, the criminal court at Tongeren in Belgium convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and fined it €60,000 - while the FTC pleaded no pyramid count at all. Those are two different findings and a reader should not let them collapse into one.

There is nothing to join. Every IBO agreement was canceled on 23 May 2025, the direct-to-consumer pivot that replaced the MLM lasted about a week, and a permanent receiver has been in place since 10 November 2025 describing the businesses as permanently closed. Checked on 31 July 2026: im.academy no longer serves the academy at all and now resolves to an unrelated crypto-casino affiliate review site, while iyovia.com is a stale shell still displaying "Join now" and still rendering prices, with hundreds of injected foreign-language gambling spam links in its footer, a 2024 copyright line, a /join path returning 404, and no receiver notice, shutdown notice or consumer warning anywhere on it. No live, priced, enrollable offer could be confirmed. Anyone being pitched this brand in 2026 is not being pitched by the company.

Where every $100 of participant money went

Two rows are hard figures from the FTC complaint - the $242 million paid to 21 top sellers and the owners’ extraction - against total consumer intake of $1,242,000,000 since 2018. The remaining rows are this site’s modeled reconstruction of the balance and are labeled as estimates, not company disclosures.

20% 12% 8% 9% 7% 13% 14%
Commissions to the 21 top promoters (19.5% - hard figure, $242m of $1,242m)Commissions to every other IBO combined (12.0% - estimated; median share of it was $0)Owner extraction, direct payments plus entity-held value (8.0% - estimated on ~$90m traced)Payment processing, chargebacks and merchant reserves (6.5% - estimated)Events, conventions, incentive trips and recognition (6.0% - estimated)Corporate marketing, sponsorships and brand (5.0% - estimated)Technology, platform, apps and content production (9.0% - estimated)Educator and staff compensation (7.0% - estimated)Corporate overhead, offices, legal and compliance (13.0% - estimated)Retained by the enterprise or undistributed (14.0% - estimated residual)
ProductPricePays
Foreign Exchange academy (FRX)
The core product and the one most participants bought. $2,411.75 a year at 13.04 billing cycles. The $25 fast start is about 10.6% of the first payment - deliberately small, because the plan paid on rank, not on sales.
$249.95 then $184.95
every 28 days
$25 fast start
Stocks and Crypto academy (SFX/DCX)
Same price and same commission basis as the foreign-exchange academy. Volume counted toward personal and group volume, which is what actually drove rank and therefore pay.
$249.95 then $184.95
every 28 days
$25 fast start
Transform Bundle
Any two academies plus the personal-development module and the travel product, with a four-day reward trip after twelve continuous months. $3,259.35 a year. The reward trip is a retention device attached to twelve uninterrupted billings.
$274.95 then $249.95
every 28 days
plan volume
E-Commerce academy (ECX)
$1,629.35 a year. Part of the 2023 expansion beyond trading into e-commerce, social media and personal development - breadth added to a subscription whose six-month abandonment rate was already 90%.
$149.95 then $124.95
every 28 days
plan volume
Add-on tools and strategies
About $1,304 a year per add-on, per the FTC’s stated band. Most active IBOs held more than one, which is how a $2,400 subscription became a $7,600 year.
~$100 then ~$100
every 28 days each
plan volume
IBO subscription
$299.40 a year, and it bought no product whatsoever - only the right to earn commissions and a back office. It was $15 in 2016 and $16.71 in 2020. This is the line the securities analysis turns on: a fee marketed as a stake against promised commission income.
$24.95
monthly
ALL-IN Pack and IMPowered Bundle
The top bundles. Both product pages render empty price fields and no price could be confirmed from any retrievable source; the $400-per-28-days figure used in the heaviest cost scenario is inferred from the FTC’s stated $100-$400 auto-renewal band, not read from a page.
not verified
every 28 days
plan volume
"Refer 2 and yours is free"
Refer two other retail customers onto the identical package before the next billing date and your own subscription is free. Marketed as customer generosity; economically it converts a customer into an unpaid recruiter and contaminates the 55% retail-volume rule the plan relied on to look retail.
$0 subscription
per billing cycle
Background check

Who runs it, and what they ran before

C"
Christopher "Chris" Terry
Founder, CEO and co-owner - permanently banned from the sector

Began in network marketing in the early 1990s with a household-name direct-selling company, where by his own account he acquired a mindset rather than earnings, and founded iMarketsLive in 2013. He marketed himself as a trader who had made tens of millions in forex and futures; his own site records no formal education. He is now permanently enjoined by a US federal court from creating, marketing or selling any trading-training service or investment opportunity anywhere, and is jointly and severally liable for $795,763,490.00. The FTC alleged he and his co-founder received over $20 million in direct payments on top of owning an enterprise that took in $1.242 billion. Assets surrendered jointly with his co-founder include eight homes in New York, Nevada, Florida and Dubai, thirteen residential lots near Las Vegas, nineteen vehicles including a Bentley and a Rolls-Royce, a yacht and jewelry including a 15-carat diamond ring - an FTC-stated value of nearly $90 million. No criminal charge, personal bankruptcy or prior securities or commodities action against him personally could be located, and several blogs asserting more than the court record are unsourced and are not relied on here.

IT
Isis Terry (formerly Isis De La Torre)
Co-founder, CFO and co-owner - permanently banned from the sector

Co-founder and Chief Financial Officer from 2013, and the sole officer and shareholder of both affiliates the FTC alleged commingled funds with the parent: IM Mastery Academy Ltd. in England and Assiduous, Inc. in Delaware, the entity that took cryptocurrency payments. That structure placed the UK-facing operating arm and the non-refundable crypto payment rail in one person’s hands. She carries the same permanent ban and the same joint-and-several liability. No prior venture, regulatory history or court history before 2013 could be located for her - a negative finding, recorded as one.

Tt
The top-earner tier
Governance note - the FTC sued the promoters personally, not only the company

Five field leaders were named as defendants alongside the owners, which is unusual and worth understanding. The highest-paid salesperson was alleged to have taken over $76 million and settled on 4 September 2025 for a $76,200,000 judgment with $10,000,000 paid, plus a permanent bar on taking part in any multi-level marketing of trading-training services. Two others and their Nevada LLC, which received over $33 million, settled on 7 August 2025 on a joint $36,000,000 judgment with $2,500,000 paid. A fourth settled for a $6,300,000 judgment with $500,000 paid. Relief defendants settled on 16 July 2026 for $5,580,616 joint and several with asset surrender inside ten days. All of these are stipulated, consented orders, not litigated findings. Collectively, 21 top sellers were paid over $242 million between 2018 and 2023. Notably, the highest earner had previously been a top distributor at an energy-drink MLM that the FTC shut down as an illegal pyramid targeting college students in 2015 - a promoter track record that was public and available to anyone who looked.

Tr
The receivership
Governance note - who holds the obligations now

Every consumer refund and unpaid commission obligation sits with International Markets Live, Inc. and is now administered through the receivership estate rather than by any company. The redress pool is roughly $90 million of surrendered assets plus about $13 million in cash from the earlier settling defendants, against a stated consumer harm of $1.242 billion - so any individual recovery will be pennies on the dollar. As at the date of this review no consumer claims portal had been published; the receivership page carries only an email address and a warning that responses may be slow. Whether final IBO commissions were paid after the 23 May 2025 mass termination and before the 11 August 2025 asset freeze could not be established either way.

Registered address

Tarrytown, New York and Henderson, Nevada, USA - now administered by a court-appointed receiver
The rename chain is the structural fact worth holding on to, and it is this company’s own lineage rather than a comparison with anyone else. iMarketsLive became IM Mastery Academy became IM Academy became IYOVIA. The legal entity never changed once: International Markets Live, Inc., a New York corporation formed in 2013, is the same respondent the CFTC fined in September 2018, the same firm nine foreign regulators warned about, the same defendant the FTC and the State of Nevada sued on 1 May 2025, and the same entity enjoined on 1 June 2026. Four brands, one company, one liability. The UK arm, IM Mastery Academy Ltd. (company no. 10325974, incorporated 11 August 2016), is itself a named defendant; its registered office has reverted to the Companies House default address in Cardiff and its accounts to 31 August 2025 are overdue. Thomas W. McNamara was appointed Monitor in August 2025, Temporary Receiver in October 2025 and permanent Receiver on 10 November 2025; the receivership’s own status page states that the businesses "have been permanently closed."

Compensation plan

What has to be true for you to get paid

To coverYou need
Buy the education as a customer and get value from it $2,661.70 of value in year one
$249.95 enrollment plus $2,411.75 of subscription - impossible to break even in cash, because a customer earns nothing
Cover the cost of being an IBO on front-end commissions alone 119 personally enrolled customers a year
$2,961.10 of annual cost divided by the $25 fast start - more than two new retained customers every week, against 60% one-month churn
Hold the first paid rank, Platinum 150 3 active members and 435 group volume
pays $37.50 a week, about $1,950 a year, against $2,961.10 to hold it - a loss of $1,011.10 with no new enrollments
Turn cash-positive on residual alone Platinum 600 - 12 active members and 1,740 group volume
$150 a week, $7,800 a year; the 2018 disclosure records that 87.13% of 52,706 IBOs never achieved any rank promotion at all

Read this twice

The decisive fact in this file is that the plan’s own first rank did not pay for itself, and every figure needed to see it comes from the company’s own documents. Platinum 150 required three active members and 435 group volume - three packages - and paid $37.50 a week, or $1,950 a year. Holding it cost $2,961.10 in year one: a $249.95 enrollment fee, $2,411.75 for a single academy at $184.95 every 28 days, and $299.40 for the IBO subscription. Net, at the first rank, with no new enrollments: minus $1,011.10. To clear cost on residual alone a participant had to reach Platinum 600, which meant twelve active members and 1,740 group volume, and the 2018 income disclosure records that 87.13% of 52,706 IBOs never achieved any rank promotion whatsoever. Two honest caveats belong here and both cut in the operator’s favor. The IBO fee was genuinely low - $15 in 2016, $16.71 in 2020, $24.95 by the final era - and §4.1 disclaimed any purchase obligation beyond it, so a participant who sold to real customers without buying an academy themselves faced a much smaller fixed cost than the figures above; and the 55% Customer Leg Rule meant rank could not be built purely on a downline of subscribers who were all also distributors, at least on paper. Against both: the plan sold both products to the same person and nothing stopped an IBO holding a customer subscription; "Refer 2 and yours is free" converted customers into recruiters; and the FTC found the compliance policy that was meant to police all of this "was stated but not enforced." The annualisation is also worth stating twice, because it is the quietest number here: billing every 28 days is 13.04 cycles a year, not 12, an 8.7% uplift over what a buyer reading "monthly" would assume.

Run your own numbers

Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.

-
Cumulative net, after costs
Total subscriptions sold -
Commission that month -
Total commissions earned -
Total you paid in -
Net -

The Fast Start bonus paid $25 for each academy subscription sold - that is the whole of what a participant earned for an actual sale, on a product priced at $234.95 to start and $174.95 a month to keep. The binary cycle and the rank stipends are excluded because they paid on organization size rather than on anything sold: 19.5% of all intake, $242 million of $1.242 billion, reached twenty-one people. Cost is the $2,411.75 annual all-in for one academy spread monthly. Note what the arithmetic says about the much-advertised "refer two and yours is free" mechanic: at $25 a sale it takes seven continuously active paying referrals to cover a single $174.95 subscription, not two. Read the whole thing as historical. All IBO agreements were canceled on 23 May 2025, a stipulated federal judgment of $795,763,490 was entered on 1 June 2026 with a permanent ban on offering any trading-training service or investment opportunity, and the present-day figure at every slider position is zero. Your own subscription cost of $201/mo is included.

Your money

What it costs to replace this yourself

The comparison that matters is not "was this a scam" but "what does the same money buy in the open market." Every replacement below is deliberately generic or non-branded, and every one of them is available to anybody without recruiting a single person. Prices were checked in July 2026. The anchor on the left is the verified subscription cost of one academy at $184.95 every 28 days.

What they sell youWhat you'd use insteadYour cost
One academy subscription - $2,411.75 a year at 13.04 billingsFree structured trading curricula published by regulated brokerages for anyone who asks$0
Live educator sessions and recorded modulesA general online-course subscription - thousands of university and industry courses, including a Nobel laureate’s course on financial markets, with certificates$399 / yr
Proprietary charting "strategies" sold as add-ons at ~$100 per 28 days eachA mainstream charting and market-data subscription - the same platform those strategies were drawn on$155.40 / yr
Trading-psychology and risk content inside the academiesThe three canonical published books on trading psychology, position sizing and expectancy, and why most active retail trading loses to an index fund~$75 for all three
Practice inside the company’s own toolsA broker paper-trading account with live data and unlimited risk-free practice$0
The "Master Trader" title, awarded internallyA recognized professional technical-analysis credential - enrollment plus exam, externally examined~$1,500 (optional)
"Education" that expressly disclaims being adviceTwo hours with a fee-only fiduciary financial planner - regulated, personally accountable advice, which is a legally different product~$600 (optional)
Proving your ability to a compensation planA proprietary-trading firm evaluation, where a funded account is won on a measured track record rather than boughtset by the firm - no price sourced in this review
$24.95 a month for the right to earn commissionsNo fee, because there is nobody to recruit$0
Total as sold
$2,411.75 a year for one academy - $2,961.10 in year one with the enrollment and IBO fees, and roughly $7,638 for an active builder
Total, built yourself
$629.40 in year one

Price-to-value

The serious-learner stack - free brokerage education, a general course subscription, a charting and data subscription, three canonical books and a paper-trading account - totals $629.40, about 21% of the cheapest year here. Add the external credential and two hours of regulated fiduciary advice and the whole professional stack still lands under $1,800, roughly 60% of that cheapest year. The sharpest line in the comparison is the credentialing one: an externally examined technical-analysis qualification costs about $1,500 and is recognized by people who hire, while the "Master Trader" title cost more per year, was awarded internally, and in the one case the FTC examined was held by someone with documented negative returns from 2018 to 2021 while the S&P 500 gained about 78%. None of the replacements auto-renews every 28 days, none excludes crypto payments from refunds, none requires you to recruit anybody, and none of them has been permanently banned by a federal court.

Odds of profit

Three operators, five horizons

Probability of cumulative net profit

Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%3 mo6 mo1 yr3 yr5 yr 2% 4% 9%
Student recruited on social media - the modal participant - buys one academy plus the IBO fee, enrols a couple of friendsPart-time promoter - 10-15 hrs/wk, two-academy bundle, one add-on tool, one event, modest advertisingFull-time builder - 40+ hrs/wk, full stack, international events, real ad spend, chasing Platinum 1000 and above

Student recruited on social media

the modal participant - buys one academy plus the IBO fee, enrols a couple of friends

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 1% −$900
6 mo 1% −$1,700
1 yr 2% −$2,900
3 yr 2% −$8,300
5 yr 2% −$13,700

Part-time promoter

10-15 hrs/wk, two-academy bundle, one add-on tool, one event, modest advertising

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 1% −$2,000
6 mo 2% −$3,900
1 yr 3% −$6,200
3 yr 4% −$17,000
5 yr 4% −$28,000

Full-time builder

40+ hrs/wk, full stack, international events, real ad spend, chasing Platinum 1000 and above

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 1% −$5,200
6 mo 2% −$10,000
1 yr 5% −$18,000
3 yr 8% −$45,000
5 yr 9% −$70,000

Methodology note. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims, not promises and not anybody’s reported results. ANCHORED to published and pleaded figures: the company’s own 2022 income disclosure showing median IBO earnings of $0, nearly 80% under $500 a year averaging $77.51, 83% at or under $500 once IBO fees are deducted and 45% net-negative; the FTC’s analysis of 2020-2022 data putting 99.23% under $25,000; the 2018 disclosure recording 52,706 IBOs, 87.13% never promoted, 40.25% earning nothing at all, 58 people at Chairman rank or above (0.11%) and full-time income at about 1 in 909; and the verified cost side - $249.95 enrollment, $184.95 every 28 days, $274.95 and $249.95 for the two-academy bundle, roughly $100 per 28 days per add-on, and the $24.95 monthly IBO fee. The published rank economics are also anchored: $37.50 a week at Platinum 150, $150 at Platinum 600, $250 at Platinum 1000, $500 at Platinum 2000, and a $25 fast start on a single-academy enrollment. MODELED by us: the cohort definitions, which the company never segmented; the share of each cohort in cumulative profit; and event, travel and advertising expense, which the disclosure lists as costs without quantifying. Read the "top" column carefully - it is roughly a ninetieth-percentile outcome within each cohort, not the Chairman tier, and the full-time builder’s best case at one year, plus $6,600, corresponds to holding Platinum 2000 with 75 active members: roughly $550 a month for what was unambiguously a full-time job. Two structural cautions apply to every horizon. First, none of these figures nets tax or self-employment cost. Second, and decisively, every horizon beyond May 2025 is hypothetical: on 23 May 2025 every IBO agreement was canceled at once and all residual income went to zero overnight, which is a risk no participant priced and no rank protected against.

Go-to-market

Where you are actually allowed to promote this

Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.

Channel
Status
Notes
Income and lifestyle claims
BANNED IN WRITING, UNENFORCED IN FACT
§11.1 prohibited income projections, claims and guarantees, and named the specifics - payment checks, bank statements, rank earnings, tax documents, trading profits, lifestyle claims, and photos of cash, exotic cars and yachts - at events and on social media, websites and video. What ran instead: "$25,000 a month," millionaire status in 60 to 90 days, "retire in your 20s," and a "Chairman 750" promoted at $750,000 a month. The FTC found the "Three Strikes" enforcement policy "was stated but not enforced" while the 21 worst offenders were paid over $242 million.
Social media selling and recruiting
PERMITTED, WITH DISCLOSURE REQUIRED ON PAPER
§14.4(c) required any profile where the company was discussed to identify the poster clearly as an independent IBO, and §14.4(h) prohibited false, misleading or deceptive postings including about an IBO’s own credentials. That is good drafting. Social was nonetheless the primary acquisition channel and the primary vector for everything the FTC and four foreign regulators objected to.
Personal websites and domain names
PROHIBITED
§14.4(a) barred IBOs from using or registering the company’s trade names, trademarks, service marks, product names or advertising phrases for any purpose, expressly including internet domain names. A participant could not own a domain, build search equity, or create a marketing asset that would survive their departure or be worth anything if sold.
Telemarketing
PLEADED AS A FEDERAL VIOLATION
The complaint pleaded Telemarketing Sales Rule counts under 16 C.F.R. Part 310, alleging misrepresentations in telemarketing about earnings and efficacy, and the final order imposes full TSR compliance on the defendants permanently. That is an allegation resolved by consent, not a litigated finding - but the injunctive obligation is real and unconditional.
Subscription billing and cancellation
PLEADED AS A ROSCA VIOLATION
The complaint pleaded ROSCA §§4-5, 15 U.S.C. §§8403-8404: undisclosed auto-renewal terms, failure to obtain express informed consent before billing, and no simple cancellation mechanism. Combine that with a 28-day cycle billing 13.04 times a year and a seven-day refund window excluding crypto and you get the 60% one-month churn and the above-1% chargeback ratio from the customer’s side of the transaction.
The "Refer 2 and yours is free" mechanic
CENTRAL TO THE PLAN
Refer two other retail customers onto an identical package before the next billing date and the referrer’s own subscription is free. It was the plan’s real answer to "how do I afford this," and it made "retail customer" a misnomer: a chunk of the 55% retail volume in each leg came from people whose reason for buying was the discount obtained by recruiting.
Live events and conventions
ENCOURAGED, PRICE NEVER PUBLISHED
International conventions in Croatia and Mexico, including the November 2024 event at which the final rebrand was announced. No ticket price for any event could be retrieved from any published page, so the $500-$3,000 event and travel figures in the cost scenarios here are estimates and are flagged as such. The income disclosure itself lists training, educational and travel expenses as IBO costs it does not deduct.
Recruiting students, minors and young adults
RECORDED BY FOUR SEPARATE AUTHORITIES
France’s market regulator flagged the targeting of "very young people, including high school students" in December 2017; Spanish police arrested eight people in March 2022 over a scheme said to have reached minors through advertising aimed at adolescents; Luxembourg’s regulator recorded in May 2023 that the company "targets especially a young audience"; and the FTC and Nevada found targeting of young people, college students and communities of color. Four independent authorities, three continents, seven years, one converged finding.
Taking your network with you when you leave
PROHIBITED FOR A YEAR
§3.6(a) barred a departing IBO for twelve months from soliciting any fellow IBO or any customer marketed to in the previous two years, while §4.9(a) let the company terminate an IBO "for any reason." One side could end the relationship at will; the other could not take the relationships they had built. On 23 May 2025 the company exercised that right against every IBO simultaneously.
The evidence

Red flags and green flags

Red flags

15
1A $795,763,490.00 federal judgment and a permanent industry ban
Entered 1 June 2026 as Document 361 in FTC and State of Nevada v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760-CDS-EJY (D. Nev.), announced 13 May 2026. Joint and several against both founders and all three corporate defendants, with a permanent injunction against any "Trading Training Service or Investment Opportunity." Stage-label it precisely: stipulated, neither admit nor deny, appeal expressly waived - a settlement, not a litigated finding of fact.
2Median IBO earnings of $0
The company’s own 2022 income disclosure. Nearly 80% earned under $500 a year, that group averaging $77.51; 83% were at or under $500 once IBO fees were deducted; 45% of all IBOs were net-negative. All gross - the disclosure states that costs "may exceed the amounts earned." Against a minimum year-one cost of $2,961.10.
319.5 cents of every dollar went to 21 people
Over $242 million of the $1,242,000,000 taken in from consumers since 2018 was paid to 21 top sellers between 2018 and 2023, per the FTC complaint. The highest-paid single promoter took over $76 million. Several hundred thousand other participants shared an estimated 12 cents of that dollar, and the median share of it was zero.
4A criminal pyramid conviction in Belgium - and no US pyramid count at all
The criminal court at Tongeren convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and defrauding subscribers, fining the company €60,000 and four Belgian recruiters €4,000 to €16,000 each, holding that "setting up such a pyramid system is an unfair and misleading commercial practice." Members paid €145 a month and had to recruit to recoup. Separately and by a different body under different law, the FTC pleaded no pyramid count whatsoever; its case ran on deceptive earnings claims and negative-option billing. Two findings, two jurisdictions, two legal theories - do not collapse them.
5Rank was priced in headcount, not in sales
Platinum 150 needed 3 active members and 435 group volume; Platinum 2000 needed 75; Chairman 100 needed 5,000; Chairman 500, at $500,000 a month, needed roughly 30,000 subscriptions. Meanwhile the fast start on an actual sale paid $25, about 10.6% of the first payment. The plan paid for organization size, and everything else followed from that.
6The first paid rank did not cover the cost of holding it
Platinum 150 returned about $1,950 a year against roughly $2,961 to hold it - a structural loss of $1,011 before any expense the participant chose. Cash-positive on residual alone began at Platinum 600, and the 2018 disclosure records that 87.13% of 52,706 IBOs never achieved any rank promotion at all.
7"Refer 2 and yours is free" contaminated the retail rule
Refer two customers onto an identical package and your own subscription is free. The 55% Customer Leg Rule was the plan’s best structural feature, and this mechanic worked directly against it by converting paying customers into unpaid recruiters whose reason for buying was the discount rather than the education.
8Strong written rules the payout schedule contradicted
§11.1 banned income claims and lifestyle imagery in explicit terms. The FTC found the "Three Strikes" policy "was stated but not enforced" while the 21 worst offenders were the best-paid people in the company. A written policy contradicted by the pay table is not consumer protection; it is a liability shield, and the FTC said so functionally by suing the top promoters personally rather than accepting a rogue-distributor defense.
960% one-month churn and 90% six-month abandonment
The company’s own retention data as pleaded by the FTC. For a $2,411.75-a-year subscription that is not a content-quality problem - it is the signature of something bought to unlock an opportunity and canceled once the opportunity turns out not to pay.
10Chargebacks above 1% for three consecutive years
That is the threshold at which card networks treat a merchant as a fraud risk. Multiple payment processors terminated the accounts and banks internally flagged "unrealistic earnings claims" and "excessive chargebacks." Commercial counterparties priced this before any regulator moved.
11Instructors without verifiable trading records
One marketed "Master Trader" had documented negative results from 2018 to 2021, a period in which the S&P 500 gained about 78%. Another instructor wrote to colleagues: "I actually really suck just do teacups." Both are drawn from the FTC complaint, which is an allegation resolved by consent rather than proven at trial - but the "Master Trader" title was awarded internally by the company either way.
12Nine years of warnings answered with renames, not fixes
France 2017, Colombia 2017 and 2021, Spain 2018 and 2020 with arrests in 2022, the UK in 2018, a CFTC settled order in September 2018, a self-regulatory adverse decision in 2020, Luxembourg 2023, New Zealand 2023. The FTC put the company on written notice on 26 October 2021 and two top promoters on 9 December 2022; the complaint alleges the conduct continued and that defendants "actively instructed salespeople on evading detection."
13A 28-day billing cycle and a seven-day refund window excluding crypto
Thirteen point zero four billings a year rather than twelve - an 8.7% uplift over what a buyer reading "monthly" assumes - against a refund window that closes on day eight and, under §10.6, never applied to Bitcoin purchases at all. A Delaware affiliate existed specifically to take crypto. A payment rail engineered to be non-refundable is not an accident.
14Every IBO agreement canceled at once on 23 May 2025
Website and app access was cut off the same day, the direct-to-consumer pivot that replaced the plan lasted about a week, and every residual went to zero overnight. The company promised outstanding commissions would be paid under the plan; whether they were, before the 11 August 2025 asset freeze, could not be established. Any unpaid IBO is now an unsecured claimant against a receivership estate whose stated priority is consumer redress.
15The abandoned websites are still a hazard
Checked 31 July 2026: im.academy no longer serves the academy at all and now resolves to an unrelated crypto-casino affiliate review site, while iyovia.com is a stale shell still showing "Join now" and still rendering prices, with hundreds of injected foreign-language gambling spam links in the footer, a 2024 copyright line, /join returning 404, and no receiver notice, shutdown notice or consumer warning anywhere on the page. Someone searching the brand today can land on something that looks live. That is a mark against, not a neutral fact.

Green flags

8
1No participant capital was ever taken in for investment
No fund, no pool, no managed accounts, no profit share and no promised return on the subscription fee. The money bought a service, and the FTC pleaded no securities count. That is a materially lower category of harm than an unregistered offering or a Ponzi, and it is the single most important fair point in this file.
2The content genuinely existed and was delivered
Live educator sessions, recorded modules, a mobile app, eight subject academies and a set of charting-adjacent tools. Overpriced and oversold, and abandoned by 90% of buyers inside six months - but shipped. This was not a business with nothing behind the paywall.
3An explicit retail requirement written into every rank
The Customer Leg Rule demanded a minimum 55% retail-customer volume in each leg, alongside a 40% cap on the share of qualifying volume any single leg could supply. And §3.2(d) states plainly: "IBOs are not compensated other than for sales to Customers." Most plans contain nothing this specific, and the drafting deserves the credit even though enforcement did not follow.
4A low fee to participate, with no purchase requirement to earn
$15 a month in 2016, $16.71 in 2020, $24.95 by the final era, and §4.1 disclaimed any purchase obligation beyond it. No mandatory starter kit, no monthly autoship volume quota to stay commission-qualified. A participant who genuinely sold to customers without buying an academy faced a much smaller fixed cost than the headline scenarios.
5An income disclosure was published, including under the final brand
Dated 4 November 2024 and still live at the time of this review, and it warns in its own text that IBO expenses "may exceed the amounts earned." Many operators in this sector publish nothing at all. That the underlying numbers are dreadful does not take away the credit for publishing them.
6The written income-claims policy was among the strictest anywhere
§11.1 prohibited income projections, claims and guarantees and named cash, exotic cars and yachts as banned imagery, at events and across social media, websites and video; §14.4(c) required affiliate-status disclosure on social profiles; §14.4(h) barred deceptive claims about an IBO’s own credentials. The failure here was enforcement, not drafting, and that distinction is worth drawing honestly.
7A seven-day refund window existed, and leaving was easy
Short, and hollowed out by the crypto exclusion, but real: §10.6 gave a full refund inside seven days and §4.8 let an IBO resign by written notice or email with no exit fee, no notice period and nothing to buy back. Plenty of operators make leaving harder than joining.
8The enforcement outcome was fast, comprehensive and consumer-facing
From complaint on 1 May 2025 to final judgment on 1 June 2026 with no years of appellate litigation, because appeal was expressly waived. Roughly $90 million of assets was surrendered for redress, plus about $13 million in cash from earlier settling defendants; a permanent receiver is in place; the order also fixes the alleged facts as established for collateral-estoppel purposes in any bankruptcy non-dischargeability proceeding, so the suspended balance cannot simply be discharged. And the top promoters were pursued personally rather than only the company, which raises the cost of the "I was just a distributor" defense across the whole sector.
What would move this grade

We would like to be wrong about this

Upward

  • A machine-readable release of the November 2024 income disclosure showing a materially better distribution than the 2022 figures, or verified evidence that the final IBO commissions promised after the 23 May 2025 mass termination were in fact paid in full before the 11 August 2025 asset freeze.
  • Publication by the receiver of a consumer claims process with a stated distribution ratio, giving people who paid a real route to some part of their money rather than an email address and a warning that replies may be slow.
  • Confirmation that the Belgian pyramid conviction was overturned on appeal, which would remove the only criminal finding in the file - and, separately, an unconnected operator relaunching the education product with no affiliate layer, at a market price, with a published verified-track-record standard for instructors.

Downward

  • The suspension of the $795,763,490.00 judgment being lifted for concealed or misstated assets, which would establish that the sworn financial statements underpinning the settlement were false.
  • Any of the banned individuals resurfacing in a new income-opportunity venture - which would be both a fresh consumer harm and a contempt exposure under an injunction that carries no geographic limit and binds them personally wherever they are.
  • Convictions arising from the Spanish or Luxembourg proceedings, adding a second and third criminal finding; or evidence that iyovia.com is still taking payments, which would convert a stale shell into a live hazard.
The better trade

Grade is F, score 2.0. There is no live offer to grade: the plan was terminated on 23 May 2025, the businesses are in receivership and permanently closed, and both founders are permanently banned from the sector.

Start with what was genuinely true in this operator’s favor, because the rest of the report is unrelenting and the good marks have to be real. No participant capital was ever taken in for investment - no fund, no pool, no managed accounts, no profit share, no promised return on the fee - and the FTC pleaded no securities count. The content existed and was delivered. The fee to participate was low, at $15 rising to $24.95 a month over a decade, with no starter kit and no autoship quota. The plan carried a written retail requirement most plans do not have: 55% retail-customer volume in every leg and a 40% cap on any single leg. An income disclosure was published, including under the final brand, and it warned that costs could exceed earnings. And the written income-claims policy was among the strictest in this industry - it banned income projections outright and named cash, exotic cars and yachts as prohibited imagery. Somebody in that building knew what good looked like and wrote it down.

The numbers then dismantle it, and every one of them comes from the company or from the regulator’s reading of the company’s own records. Median IBO earnings: $0. Nearly 80% under $500 a year, averaging $77.51. Eighty-three per cent at or under $500 once the IBO fee is netted. Forty-five per cent net-negative. Against a cheapest realistic year one of $2,961.10 - a $249.95 enrollment, $2,411.75 for one academy at $184.95 every 28 days across 13.04 billings, and $299.40 of IBO fees - rising to about $7,638 for anyone actually working it. The plan’s own first rank, Platinum 150, paid roughly $1,950 a year and cost roughly $2,961 to hold. Advancement was denominated in active members and group volume, not in retail revenue: three members at the first rank, seventy-five at Platinum 2000, five thousand at Chairman 100, and about 30,000 subscriptions at the top. The fast start on a real sale was $25. And of $1.242 billion taken in, over $242 million - 19.5 cents in every dollar - reached 21 people.

Then the legal record, and it needs its stage labels kept straight because collapsing them would be the easiest mistake to make here. On 1 June 2026 the District of Nevada entered a stipulated final order: $795,763,490.00 joint and several, a permanent ban on any trading-training service or investment opportunity, roughly $90 million of assets surrendered, most of the balance suspended conditional on the truthfulness of sworn financial statements, and appeal expressly waived by both sides. Stipulated means the defendants neither admitted nor denied the allegations; it is a settlement, not a finding of fact after trial. Quite separately, a Belgian criminal court at Tongeren convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and fined it €60,000 - a criminal conviction in one jurisdiction, under EU unfair-commercial-practices law, on a theory the FTC never pleaded. Around both sit nine years of warnings from regulators in France, Colombia, Spain, the UK, Luxembourg and New Zealand, a settled 2018 CFTC order over a mirror-trading service affecting roughly 500 accounts, and a 2020 self-regulatory decision from the industry’s own body - which is not a government finding and carries no legal force - that was simply ignored. The practical position today: the MLM was terminated in May 2025, a receiver has held the businesses since November 2025 and calls them permanently closed, im.academy now resolves to an unrelated crypto-casino affiliate site, and iyovia.com is a spam-injected shell still displaying "Join now" with no warning on it at all. No live, priced, enrollable offer could be confirmed.

1

If someone is pitching this brand to you in 2026, walk away

There is no functioning enrollment, no compensation plan, no IBO agreement - all were canceled on 23 May 2025 - and no commissions. Both founders and all three corporate entities are permanently enjoined. Anyone still offering enrollment under any of these four names is either operating a stale artifact or running something of their own, and in neither case are they the company or authorized by it.

2

Buy the education in the open market for a fifth of the price

Regulated brokerages publish full structured curricula free to anyone who asks. A general online-course subscription is $399 a year and includes a Nobel laureate’s course on financial markets. A mainstream charting and data subscription is $155.40 a year. The three canonical books on trading psychology, position sizing and why most active retail trading loses to an index fund cost about $75 together. Paper-trading accounts are free. That is $629.40, against $2,411.75 for one academy - and nobody has to be recruited for any of it.

3

Check the promoter, not just the program

The highest-paid seller here had already come out of an energy-drink MLM the FTC shut down as an illegal pyramid targeting college students in 2015, and that history was public the whole time. Before paying anything to a trading-education program marketed on the same affiliate model, search the person pitching you against enforcement dockets and settled orders, not just the brand name. Names change; the file follows the person.

4

Prefer an examined credential and regulated advice to an internal title

An externally examined technical-analysis qualification costs about $1,500 and is recognized by people who hire. Two hours with a fee-only fiduciary planner at roughly $300 an hour buys advice someone is legally accountable for - categorically different from "education" that expressly disclaims being advice. And a proprietary-trading firm evaluation lets a measured track record earn capital, rather than a compensation plan paying you for recruiting.

Nineteen and a half cents of every dollar taken from participants reached twenty-one people, and the median participant took nothing at all.
Scorecard

Nine dimensions, weighted

Comp structure & KoscotDoes the plan pay for recruitment or for sales to real customers?
20%
1.0
Ranks were priced in headcount, not in sales. The plan’s own qualification table asks for active members and group volume: Platinum 150 needed 3 active members and 435 GV; Platinum 600 needed 12; Platinum 1000 needed 30; Platinum 2000 needed 75; Chairman 100 needed 5,000; and Chairman 500, at $500,000 a month, needed roughly 4,350,000 GV - approximately 30,000 subscriptions. Against that, the fast start on an actual sale paid $25 for a $184.95-per-28-days academy, about 10.6% of the first payment. The money was never in selling the product; it was in rank stipends bought with organization size. There is one genuinely good structural provision and it should be named: a Customer Leg Rule requiring a minimum 55% retail-customer volume in every leg, alongside a 40% single-leg cap, both of which many plans omit entirely. But the "Refer 2 and yours is free" mechanic contaminates the 55% rule at source by converting a paying customer into a non-paying participant whose motive for buying is the discount obtained by recruiting, and the FTC found the parallel compliance policy "was stated but not enforced." Stage-label the two adverse findings separately, because they come from different bodies under different law: the criminal court at Tongeren in Belgium convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and fined it €60,000, while the FTC pleaded no pyramid count at all - the US case ran on deceptive earnings claims and negative-option billing, and no US court has adjudicated the structural question either way.
Securities exposureAny passive return on capital? Howey, staking, tokens, withdrawal friction.
15%
8.0
Say this plainly first: the asset class is never the answer, and this dimension is not a judgment on forex, crypto or trading as a category. The only test applied here is whether capital was taken in from the participant against a promised or implied return. It was not. The participant bought a subscription to an educational service. There was no pooled fund, no managed account, no profit share, no token and no promised return on the subscription fee, and the FTC pleaded no securities count in 2:25-cv-00760. The money a participant lost was spent, not invested, which is a categorically different risk from an investment contract and it is this operator’s single strongest defensive point. Two things dock it from a clean top mark. First, the September 2018 CFTC settled administrative order, Docket 18-24, found that between March 2017 and March 2018 the company ran a service in which approximately 500 customers automatically mirrored its trades in their own forex accounts, amounting to unregistered commodity trading advice and de facto discretionary authority over non-eligible-contract-participant accounts; the respondent neither admitted nor denied the findings and paid a $150,000 penalty. That is investment-adjacent conduct, on the record. Second, the IBO fee - $15 in 2016, $16.71 in 2020, $24.95 by the FTC era - bought no product at all. It bought the right to earn, and it was marketed as a stake placed against promised commission income.
Ownership & track recordWho runs it, what did they run before, and what happened to it.
15%
0.0
This is the floor and the file earns it. Both founders are permanently banned by US federal court order from creating, marketing or selling any trading-training service or investment opportunity, are jointly and severally liable for $795,763,490.00, and have surrendered assets the FTC values at approximately $90 million - eight homes, thirteen residential lots, nineteen vehicles, a yacht and jewelry. Behind the judgment sits nine years of ignored warnings across multiple regulators on three continents: France in December 2017 flagging the targeting of high-school students, Colombia in 2017 and 2021, Spain in 2018 and again in 2020, the UK in May 2018, the CFTC order in September 2018, a self-regulatory adverse decision in September 2020, arrests in Spain in March 2022, Luxembourg in May 2023, New Zealand in September 2023. Most damning of all, the FTC sent the company its written synopses on money-making opportunities and on testimonials and endorsements on 26 October 2021, and the same synopses to two top promoters on 9 December 2022; the complaint alleges the conduct continued and that defendants "actively instructed salespeople on evading detection." The response to each regulatory hit was a rename, not a fix. Stage-label the judgment precisely, because it matters: it is stipulated, neither-admit-nor-deny, with appeal expressly waived. It is a settlement, not a litigated finding of fact after trial. The money is largely suspended conditional on the truthfulness of sworn financial statements; the ban is not suspended at all.
Product reality & demandWould a rational buyer purchase this if no income offer existed?
12%
2.0
Content genuinely existed and some of it was competently produced, and that should be said before anything else. There were live educator sessions, recorded modules, a mobile app, eight subject academies covering foreign exchange, binary options, digital currency, stocks and futures, e-commerce and social media, and a set of charting-adjacent tools. Things were shipped; people logged in. Against that stands the market’s own verdict, taken from the company’s own retention data as pleaded by the FTC: roughly 60% of purchasers quit within one month and 90% abandoned within six. No standalone education product priced at $2,411.75 a year survives that, and a churn profile like this is the signature of something bought to unlock a business opportunity rather than for the teaching. The credentialing evidence is worse. One marketed "Master Trader" had documented negative trading results across 2018 to 2021, a period in which the S&P 500 gained about 78%; another instructor wrote to colleagues, "I actually really suck just do teacups." And commercial counterparties priced the risk before any regulator did: chargeback ratios exceeded 1% for three consecutive years, the threshold at which card networks treat a merchant as a fraud risk, multiple payment processors terminated the accounts, and banks internally flagged unrealistic earnings claims. When acquiring banks fire you, that is a market judgment arrived at without any regulatory prompting.
Participant economicsReal cost in, realistic money out, and whether they publish the numbers.
10%
1.0
The company published the numbers itself, and they are the reason for the grade. From its own 2022 income disclosure: median IBO earnings of $0; nearly 80% earning under $500 a year, and that group averaging $77.51; 83% at or under $500 once IBO fees are deducted; and 45% of all IBOs net-negative. The FTC’s analysis of aggregated 2020-2022 data put 99.23% under $25,000 a year and 80.48% under $500. All of it is gross - the disclosure states in terms that IBO costs "may exceed the amounts earned." Now set that against the cost of holding the first paid rank. Platinum 150 paid $37.50 a week, or about $1,950 a year. Holding it cost roughly $2,961 in year one - one academy subscription, the enrollment fee and the IBO fee. The first rank in this plan did not cover the cost of the first rank. A participant had to reach the second rank, Platinum 600, at 12 active members and 1,740 group volume, before residual alone turned cash-positive, and the 2018 disclosure records that 87.13% of 52,706 IBOs never achieved any rank promotion at all.
Price-to-valueWhat the same capability costs on the open market.
8%
1.0
A single academy cost $184.95 every 28 days - 13.04 billing cycles a year, not 12, which is an 8.7% uplift over what a buyer reading "monthly" assumes - for $2,411.75 a year, on top of a $149.95 to $274.95 enrollment fee. The open-market replacement for the same subject matter costs $629.40 in year one and requires nothing of anybody: the free structured education that regulated brokerages publish for anyone who asks, a general online-course subscription at $399 a year giving access to thousands of university and industry courses including a Nobel laureate’s course on financial markets, a charting and market-data subscription at $155.40 a year, and the three canonical books on trading psychology, position sizing and why most active retail trading loses to an index fund at roughly $75 for all three. Add a broker paper-trading account at $0. For readers who want an evidenced credential rather than an internal title, a recognized technical-analysis qualification runs to about $1,500 including enrollment and exam, and two hours with a fee-only fiduciary planner at roughly $300 an hour buys regulated, legally accountable advice - which is a categorically different product from "education." The whole professional stack lands under $1,800, roughly 60% of the cheapest configuration here, and the serious-learner stack at $629.40 is about 21% of it.
Payout sustainabilityCan the company fund the plan out of margin, or only out of inflow?
8%
1.0
The distribution is the finding. Of $1,242,000,000 taken in from consumers since 2018, over $242,000,000 - 19.5 cents of every dollar - was paid to 21 people between 2018 and 2023. The founders received over $20 million in direct payments on top of that, with roughly $90 million of value ultimately traced and surrendered from entities they controlled. Everyone else, several hundred thousand participants, shared an estimated 12 cents of that dollar, and the median share of it was zero. Note also what the pay actually was: not retail margin on a sale, but a flat stipend attached to a maintained rank, running from $150 to $500,000 a month by rank, funded by a subscriber base with 60% one-month churn that therefore had to be continuously replaced simply to stand still. A pool fed by perpetual replacement of churned subscribers and concentrated 19.5% into 21 hands is not a durable structure, and it did in fact collapse - the plan was terminated on 23 May 2025 and every residual went to zero overnight.
Marketing conductIncome claims, regulator run-ins, hype, deadline stacking.
7%
0.0
The written policy was strong, and pretending otherwise would be unfair. Section 11.1 of the April 2022 Statement of Policies and Procedures flatly prohibits income projections, claims and guarantees, and it names the specifics - payment checks, bank statements, rank earnings, tax documents, trading profits, lifestyle claims, and photos of cash, exotic cars and yachts - and applies the ban at events and on social media, websites and video. Section 14.4(c) requires social profiles to identify the poster as an independent IBO. Very few operators write it that tightly. It sat unenforced. The FTC found the parallel "Three Strikes" policy "was stated but not enforced" while 21 top sellers repeatedly made deceptive claims and were paid over $242 million for it - the company paid the twenty-one worst offenders the most money. What actually ran: "$25,000 a month," millionaire status in 60 to 90 days, "retire in your 20s," "make money in your sleep," and a "Chairman 750" promoted at $750,000 a month, against a median of $0. A Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council decision of 9 September 2020 found improper income claims and recommended training and monitoring - that is a self-regulatory finding by the industry’s own body, not a government one, and it carries no legal force - and the FTC alleges the claims continued for five more years regardless. Four separate authorities recorded the targeting of students and minors: France in 2017, Spain in 2022, Luxembourg in 2023 and the FTC and Nevada in 2025-26. A policy contradicted by the payout schedule is not a policy; it is a liability shield.
Operator terms & exitWho owns the customer, what you forfeit, how hard it is to leave.
5%
2.0
The refund window was seven days under §10.6 - real, and worth a mark, but short, and it expressly excluded Bitcoin purchases at a company that maintained a Delaware affiliate specifically to accept cryptocurrency. A payment rail engineered to be non-refundable is not an accident. Against the participant: §4.9(a) permits the company to suspend or terminate an IBO "for any reason"; §9.3(a) deducts commissions from the IBO when a downstream customer refunds, which with 60% one-month churn is a structural rather than incidental risk; §3.6(a) bars a departing IBO from soliciting any fellow IBO or customer for a year; and §8.2(b) compels arbitration in Las Vegas, Nevada under the Federal Arbitration Act, imposed on a salesforce spread across the world, which effectively forecloses individual redress. Set against that, §4.1 disclaims any purchase obligation beyond the monthly administrative fee, and §3.2(d) states that "IBOs are not compensated other than for sales to Customers" - the best clause in the document. Then the exit that actually happened: on 23 May 2025 every IBO agreement was canceled at once and website and app access was cut off, with a promise that outstanding commissions would be paid under the plan. Whether they were, before the 11 August 2025 asset freeze, could not be established.
Weighted composite
2.00
F

Dimension profile

Further from center is better. Hover any point.

Comp structure& Koscot 1.0 Securitiesexposure 8.0 Ownership &track record 0.0 Product reality& demand 2.0 Participanteconomics 1.0 Price-to-value 1.0 Payoutsustainability 1.0 Marketingconduct 0.0 Operator terms& exit 2.0

Hard caps that bind here

Ceiling at F - non-binding, and recorded for the record only the nine dimension scores earned the F on their own arithmetic. The weighted composite is 2.00, already deep in the F band, so a "cap at F" is meaningless as a binding instrument - there is nothing above it for the cap to hold down. It is recorded here only to name what this grade could never have risen past, whatever the plan documents said: a permanent US federal industry ban on the founders and every corporate entity, entered 1 June 2026 and unappealable by express waiver; a separate criminal conviction for operating a pyramid scheme in a foreign court, in Belgium, at Tongeren; and, decisively for a site that exists to answer "should I join this," no live, priced, enrollable offer left to grade at all. The MLM was terminated on 23 May 2025, the receiver describes the businesses as permanently closed, and the two consumer-facing domains have decayed into a crypto-casino affiliate site and a spam-injected shell. The numbers produced the grade; the ceiling merely describes the roof they were never going to reach.

The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.

Sources consulted

What we read

Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.

  1. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Judgment and Other Relief - FTC and State of Nevada v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760 (D. Nev.) (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission / U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada · 2026-05-13archived copy

    Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Judgment and Other Relief, Doc. 361, filed 1 June 2026 - FTC and State of Nevada v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760-CDS-EJY (D. Nev.), Judge Cristina D. Silva: $795,763,490.00 joint and several, permanent ban on any "Trading Training Service or Investment Opportunity," neither-admit-nor-deny, express appeal waiver, suspension conditional on sworn financial statements, 10-year record retention

    Not established by this document: The FTC posts the stipulated order as filed 13 May 2026; the docket entry number cited in the prose (Doc. 361, 1 June 2026) is the court-entered version and was not separately retrievable outside PACER.

  2. Federal Trade Commission v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760 - full docket
    Court recordTier 1CourtListener (Free Law Project)archived copy
  3. FTC case page: IM Mastery - index of every filed complaint and settlement order
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commissionarchived copy
  4. Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Judgment and Other Relief (redacted), filed 1 May 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission and State of Nevada · 2025-05-01archived copy

    FTC complaint, filed 1 May 2025 and published unredacted 29 May 2025 - $1.242 billion consumer intake since 2018; over $242 million to 21 top sellers 2018-2023; over $20 million in direct payments to the owners; median IBO earnings $0 and 45% net-negative from the 2022 disclosure; 99.23% under $25,000 and 80.48% under $500 across 2020-2022; 60% one-month and 90% six-month churn; chargebacks above 1% for three years; FTC written synopses served 26 October 2021 and 9 December 2022; FTC Act §5, ROSCA §§4-5, Telemarketing Sales Rule and Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act counts, and no pyramid count

  5. Complaint for Permanent Injunction, Monetary Judgment and Other Relief (unredacted), published 29 May 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission and State of Nevada · 2025-05-29archived copy
  6. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 29 May 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission and State of Nevada · 2025-05-29archived copy
  7. FTC, State of Nevada Take Action Against IM Mastery Academy for Deceiving Consumers - press release
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission · 2025-05-01archived copy
  8. Lead Defendants in the IM Mastery Academy MLM Scheme to Turn Over Tens of Millions of Dollars in Assets to Settle FTC Charges - press release, 13 May 2026
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission · 2026-05-13archived copy

    FTC press release, 13 May 2026, and Nevada Attorney General release - settlement announcement, nearly $90 million of assets surrendered including eight homes, thirteen residential lots, nineteen vehicles, a yacht and jewelry; over 5,000 Nevada consumers affected and approximately $9 million in Nevada losses

  9. Attorney General Ford Announces Defendants in IM Mastery Scam Will Turn Over Nearly $90 Million in Assets to Compensate Victims - 5,000+ Nevada consumers, ~$9 million Nevada losses, $795.8 million judgment
    RegulatorTier 1Office of the Nevada Attorney General · 2026-05-14archived copy
  10. Stipulated Order as to Global Dynasty Network, LLC, Jason Brown and Matthew Rosa, 7 August 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (posted by the FTC) · 2025-08-07archived copy

    Stipulated orders against the field leaders - 7 August 2025 ($36,000,000 joint, $2,500,000 paid), 4 September 2025 ($76,200,000 with $10,000,000 paid, and $6,300,000 with $500,000 paid), and the relief-defendant order of 16 July 2026 ($5,580,616 joint and several); all consented, none litigated

  11. Stipulated Order as to Alex Morton, 4 September 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (posted by the FTC) · 2025-09-04archived copy
  12. Stipulated Order as to Brandon Boyd, 4 September 2025 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (posted by the FTC) · 2025-09-04archived copy
  13. Relief-defendant Stipulated Order, Doc. 379, filed 16 July 2026 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (posted by the FTC) · 2026-07-16archived copy
  14. Three Defendants in the IM Mastery Academy Scheme Agree to Pay $2.5 Million to Settle FTC Allegations - press release
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission · 2025-08-07archived copy
  15. Defendants in IM Mastery Academy Scheme to Pay $10.5 Million to Settle FTC Allegations - press release
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Federal Trade Commission · 2025-09-04archived copy
  16. Order Instituting Proceedings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions - In re International Markets Live, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 18-24 (PDF)
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission · 2018-09-14archived copy

    CFTC Order, Docket No. 18-24, 14 September 2018 - settled administrative order, offer of settlement without admitting or denying: approximately 500 customers automatically mirrored trades in their forex accounts between March 2017 and March 2018; unregistered commodity trading advisor findings under CEA §2(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I)(bb), §4m(1) and Regulation 5.3(a)(3); $150,000 civil monetary penalty plus cease and desist

  17. CFTC Charges Multiple Forex and Binary Options Dealers with Registration Violations - press release covering the 14 September 2018 orders
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission · 2018-09-14archived copy
  18. iMarketsLive Compensation Plan, © 2016 International Markets Live (PDF)
    Compensation planTier 1International Markets Live, Inc. (copy archived by Truth in Advertising, Inc.) · 2016archived copy

    iMarketsLive Compensation Plan 2016 and IM Mastery Academy Compensation Plan v2020.03.31 - rank qualification table (3, 12, 30, 75, 225, 500, 1,250, 2,500, 5,000 active members; 435 to 4,350,000 group volume), weekly residual schedule $37.50 to $500,000 a month, $25 and $50 fast start, Rank Achievement Bonus schedule, Chairman Infinity Bonus with per-leg caps of $1,000 to $40,000, 40% Leg Rule, 55% Customer Leg Rule, "refer two and yours is free," IBO fee at $15 and $16.71

  19. IM Mastery Academy Compensation Plan, version 2020.03.31 - rank table, Chairman Infinity Bonus per-leg caps $1,000–$40,000 (PDF)
    Compensation planTier 1IM Mastery Academy (International Markets Live, Inc.) · 2020-03-31archived copy
  20. IM Academy Statement of Policies and Procedures, 21 April 2022 (PDF)
    Policies & proceduresTier 1International Markets Live, Inc. (IM Academy) · 2022-04-21archived copy

    IM Academy Statement of Policies and Procedures, 21 April 2022 - §3.2(d) compensation only on sales to Customers, §3.6(a) one-year non-solicitation, §4.1 no purchase requirement, §4.9(a) termination "for any reason," §8.2(b) Las Vegas arbitration, §9.3(a) commission clawback on refunds, §10.6 seven-day refund excluding Bitcoin, §11.1 income and lifestyle claim ban, §14.4(a) domain and trademark prohibition, §14.4(c) affiliate disclosure

  21. IM Academy policies landing page (host of the Statement of Policies and Procedures)
    Company documentTier 1International Markets Live, Inc. (IM Academy)archived copy
  22. International Markets Live Inc. Income Disclosure Statement, dated 4 November 2024 (PDF)
    Income disclosureTier 1International Markets Live, Inc. (IYOVIA) · 2024-11-04archived copy

    International Markets Live Inc. Income Disclosure Statement, 4 November 2024, and third-party analysis of the 2018 and 2020 statements - 52,706 IBOs in 2018, 87.13% never promoted, 40.25% earning nothing, entry-level average $52, 58 people (0.11%) at Chairman rank or above, full-time income about 1 in 909; 99.21% under $25,000 in 2020; Massachusetts and Wyoming excluded; costs stated as not deducted

  23. IM Academy Income Disclosure Statement 2022 (PDF)
    Income disclosureTier 1International Markets Live, Inc. (IM Academy) · 2022archived copy
  24. iMarketsLive Financial Document Debunks Income Claims - analysis of the 2018 income disclosure (52,706 IBOs, 87.13% never promoted)
    ReportingTier 3Truth in Advertising, Inc.archived copy
  25. IYOVIA / IMMA / IML income-claims evidence database
    ReportingTier 3Truth in Advertising, Inc.archived copy
  26. US crypto trading platform iMarketsLive convicted of fraud in Belgium - criminal court at Tongeren, €60,000 company fine
    ReportingTier 3Belga News Agencyarchived copy

    Belga News Agency reporting on the criminal court at Tongeren - conviction of the predecessor entity and four Belgian recruiters for operating a pyramid scheme and defrauding subscribers, €60,000 company fine and €4,000-€16,000 individual fines, members paying €145 a month and required to recruit to recoup; plus the FSMA determination that the company was not authorized in Belgium

  27. Warning issued by the Belgian FSMA regarding the activities of International Markets Live LTD (iMarketsLive) - relayed determination that the firm was not authorized
    RegulatorTier 1Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (Luxembourg), relaying the Belgian FSMAarchived copy
  28. AMF warns the public against International Markets Live LTD (iMarketsLive) - news release
    RegulatorTier 1Autorité des marchés financiers (France) · 2017-12archived copy

    Regulator and watchdog file - France AMF December 2017, Colombia SFC October 2017 and December 2021, Spain CNMV January 2018 and March 2020 with eight arrests in March 2022, UK FCA May 2018, Luxembourg CSSF 24 May 2023, New Zealand FMA 21 September 2023; Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council decision 9 September 2020 and Case #211-2025 administratively closed on 1 May 2025; receivership status page (Thomas W. McNamara, businesses "permanently closed"); Companies House record for company no. 10325974; im.academy and iyovia.com as they stood on 31 July 2026

    Not established by this document: The DSSRC decision of 9 September 2020 and the Colombia SFC notices of October 2017 and December 2021 could not be located at a stable primary URL; only the 2025 DSSRC administrative closure is linked here.

  29. International Markets Live Ltd (iMarkets Live LTD) - AMF blacklist entry
    RegulatorTier 1Autorité des marchés financiers (France)archived copy
  30. CNMV issues warning to the public on unregistered firm - International Markets Live, 23 March 2020 (English text, PDF)
    RegulatorTier 1Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (Spain), copy hosted by Truth in Advertising, Inc. · 2020-03-23archived copy
  31. International Markets Live Limited trading as iMarketsLive - FCA warning list entry
    RegulatorTier 1Financial Conduct Authority (United Kingdom) · 2018-05archived copy
  32. Warning regarding International Markets Live Inc (IM Mastery Academy), 24 May 2023
    RegulatorTier 1Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (Luxembourg) · 2023-05-24archived copy
  33. IM Academy - overseas warnings listing
    RegulatorTier 1Financial Markets Authority (New Zealand) · 2023-09-21archived copy
  34. Beware of solicitations by IM Academy (International Markets Live Inc.)
    RegulatorTier 1Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec)archived copy
  35. DSSRC Case #211-2025: Administrative Closure - IYOVIA, closed 1 May 2025
    Self-regulatoryTier 2Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council, BBB National Programs · 2025-05-01archived copy
  36. IML Receivership status page - Thomas W. McNamara, court-appointed receiver
    Court recordTier 1Regulatory Resolutions (Office of the Receiver, Thomas W. McNamara)archived copy
  37. IM MASTERY ACADEMY LTD (formerly INTERNATIONAL MARKETS LIVE LTD), company no. 10325974 - Companies House record
    Corporate registryTier 1Companies House (United Kingdom)archived copy
Unable to verify

What we could not get

  • The November 2024 income disclosure table. The PDF is live and dated 4 November 2024, but the numerical table is an image rather than text and could not be transcribed. Every income figure in this report therefore comes from the FTC’s analysis of the 2022 statement or from third-party analysis of the 2018 and 2020 statements, and none of it is drawn from the current-brand document.
  • Any official 2024 or 2025 compensation plan document. The only indexed copy sits behind a JavaScript paywall and returned no content. All plan mechanics here come from the 2016 and 2020 documents; the newer rank names introduced at the November 2024 rebrand, and the "Chairman 750 at $750,000 a month" claim, are sourced from a watchdog and from the FTC complaint rather than from any plan document.
  • The prices of the two top bundles, the ALL-IN Pack and the IMPowered Bundle. Both product pages render empty price fields and no price could be confirmed anywhere. The $400-per-28-days figure used in the heaviest cost scenario is inferred from the FTC’s stated $100-$400 auto-renewal band, not read from a page.
  • Event and convention ticket prices. No published price for any event was retrievable; the ticket subdomain redirects and the November 2024 event page shows no pricing. The $500-$3,000 event and travel figures used in the cost scenarios are estimates and are flagged as such wherever they appear.
  • The exact date of the Belgian criminal conviction and whether it was appealed. Reporting confirms the court, the convicted parties, the €60,000 company fine, the individual fines and the pyramid finding - but not the judgment date and not the appeal status, so the conviction is not stated here as final.
  • The outcomes of the Spanish and Luxembourg proceedings. Eight arrests in Spain in March 2022 and an investigation reported in Luxembourg in 2023 are documented; no conviction, acquittal or discontinuance could be located for either. They are recorded as open, not as findings.
  • Whether the final IBO commissions promised at the 23 May 2025 mass termination were ever paid, before the asset freeze of 11 August 2025. No filing addressing the point could be found, and no consumer claims portal has been published by the receivership.
  • Whether any successor program exists. Claims that the top promoters moved on to named ventures could not be verified - the one source returned an access error and is a low-quality reputation blog rather than a reporting outlet - so no program is described here as a successor to this one. What is verifiable is that four of those promoters carry permanent court-ordered restrictions.

Not advice

This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.

Who writes this

Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.

Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.

  • Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
  • The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
  • Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
  • No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Common questions

Iyovia - frequently asked

QCan I still join Iyovia or IM Academy?
No. The multi-level plan was terminated on 23 May 2025, when every IBO agreement was canceled at once and website and app access was cut off; the direct-to-consumer model that briefly replaced it lasted about a week. A permanent receiver has held the businesses since 10 November 2025 and the receivership’s own status page states that they "have been permanently closed." Both founders and all three corporate entities are permanently enjoined by a US federal court from creating, marketing or selling any trading-training service or investment opportunity, and that injunction carries no geographic limit - it binds them personally wherever they are. Be careful of what is still online: checked on 31 July 2026, iyovia.com serves a stale marketing shell that still displays "Join now" and still renders prices, with hundreds of injected foreign-language gambling spam links in its footer and no receiver notice, shutdown notice or consumer warning anywhere on it, while im.academy no longer serves the academy at all and now resolves to an unrelated crypto-casino affiliate review site. If someone is pitching this brand to you today, it is not the company.
QWhat is the $795 million judgment, and is it final?
The exact figure is $795,763,490.00, entered jointly and severally against International Markets Live, Inc., IM Mastery Academy Ltd., Assiduous, Inc., Christopher Terry and Isis Terry in FTC and State of Nevada v. International Markets Live, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00760-CDS-EJY (D. Nev.). The FTC announced the settlement on 13 May 2026; Judge Cristina D. Silva entered it as Document 361 on 1 June 2026. Stage-label it carefully, because most coverage does not. It is a stipulated order - the defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations except as to jurisdiction - which makes it a settlement rather than a litigated finding of fact after trial. It is final and unappealable: both sides expressly waived all rights to appeal or contest its validity. Most of the money is suspended after roughly $90 million of assets is surrendered, but the suspension collapses if the sworn financial statements prove false, and the order fixes the alleged facts as established for collateral-estoppel purposes in any bankruptcy non-dischargeability proceeding. The permanent ban is not suspended at all.
QWas Iyovia a pyramid scheme?
That depends on the jurisdiction, and the distinction is important enough that it should not be collapsed. A Belgian criminal court at Tongeren convicted the predecessor entity of operating a pyramid scheme and defrauding subscribers, fined the company €60,000 and four Belgian recruiters between €4,000 and €16,000 each, and held that "setting up such a pyramid system is an unfair and misleading commercial practice." That is a criminal conviction, in one country, under EU unfair-commercial-practices law. The FTC pleaded no pyramid count whatsoever: its case was built on deceptive earnings claims under FTC Act §5, illegal negative-option billing under ROSCA, the Telemarketing Sales Rule and Nevada’s deceptive trade practices act. So no US court has adjudicated the structural question either way. What is not in dispute is the plan’s shape - ranks denominated in active members and group volume, from 3 members at the first rank to roughly 30,000 subscriptions at the top - and the earnings distribution: a median of $0, nearly 80% under $500 a year, and 45% of participants net-negative.
QWhat did it cost, and what did people actually earn?
The cheapest realistic year one was $2,961.10: a $249.95 enrollment fee, then $184.95 every 28 days for a single academy - which is 13.04 billing cycles a year rather than 12, an 8.7% uplift over what a buyer reading "monthly" assumes, for $2,411.75 annually - plus $24.95 a month for the IBO subscription, which bought no product at all and only the right to earn. An active builder with a two-academy bundle, one add-on tool, one event and modest advertising was at roughly $7,638. Against that, from the company’s own 2022 income disclosure: median earnings of $0, nearly 80% earning under $500 a year and averaging $77.51 within that group, 83% at or under $500 once IBO fees were deducted, and 45% net-negative. The FTC’s analysis of 2020-2022 data put 99.23% under $25,000. All of it is gross; the disclosure states that costs "may exceed the amounts earned." Even the first paid rank, Platinum 150, returned about $1,950 a year against roughly $2,961 to hold it.
QWhat should someone learning to trade buy instead?
Nothing from this sector at this price, and the open-market replacement is not close. Regulated brokerages publish complete structured curricula on foreign exchange, options, futures and portfolio construction free to anyone who asks. A general online-course subscription is about $399 a year and includes thousands of university and industry courses, among them a Nobel laureate’s course on financial markets that can be audited for nothing. A mainstream charting and market-data subscription - the same class of platform the proprietary "strategies" were drawn on - is $155.40 a year at the entry tier. The three canonical published books on trading psychology, position sizing and expectancy, and on why most active retail trading loses to an index fund, come to about $75 for all three. A broker paper-trading account is free. That stack totals $629.40, roughly 21% of the cheapest year here. If you want a credential rather than an internal title, an externally examined technical-analysis qualification runs to about $1,500, and two hours with a fee-only fiduciary planner at roughly $300 an hour buys regulated advice someone is legally accountable for - which is a categorically different product from "education" that expressly disclaims being advice.
Who wrote this report

Author, editor and publisher

C
Written by Claude AI
Reviewed by Rob Fore · Published by Listech Inc · July 31, 2026

This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - Iyovia’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.

Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.

The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.

Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.

About the author and our conflicts  ·  Contact the editor  ·  Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com

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