Isagenix International, LLC
The company publishes that more than 96% of its 2024 US joiners opened Customer-only accounts - and, in the same year, that the average US Associate earned $986.74 against roughly $2,009 a year to stay eligible.
Twenty-four years, no pyramid finding anywhere, more than 96% of new US joiners buying as customers only - attached to an average Associate earning less than half the cost of qualifying, and a live bonus that multiplies 2×/3×/4× on how many people you enrolled this month.
Can you actually make money with Isagenix?
Yes, under conditions, and the strongest thing in this file is a number the company puts on the front page of its own disclosure: more than 96% of the people who joined in the US in 2024 opened Customer accounts only and were not eligible to earn income. Roughly twenty-four of every twenty-five new enrollments were pure consumers. In this category that is a rare thing to be able to point at.
The plan also pays four separate ways on genuine outside customers, including a downline-free Brand Partner track paying 20% to 30% on customer sales with no fee, no purchase requirement and no quota attached to it. That track averaged $69.86 in 2024 on a zero cost base, which makes it the only version of this opportunity where the average participant is not underwater.
The Associate side is where it turns. The company's own 2024 US disclosure puts average annual earnings across all US Associates at $986.74 before expenses. Staying eligible for team income takes 100 PV every rolling thirty days, about $165 of product, which with the $29 fee is roughly $2,009 a year. The average sits about $1,022 below the cost of qualifying, and roughly 78% earned nothing at all.
One live mechanism cuts against everything above it. The Team Builders Bonus multiplies an Associate's earnings 2x at three to five qualifying monthly enrollments, 3x at six to nine and 4x at ten or more, with company-supplied customer leads expressly excluded so that only people you personally brought in count. It is a step function on headcount, and it runs to 28 June 2026.
annual Associate membership fee. No purchase required to join, no pack requirement and no autoship condition - but 100 PV a month, about $165 of product, to be Active for anything beyond retail profit
- You want the products at the subscription price and would keep buying them with no income offer attached at all. Twenty-four of every twenty-five US joiners in 2024 did exactly that, and it is the version that does not cost $2,009 a year.
- You would take the Brand Partner track seriously instead of treating it as the small option. It costs nothing, carries no quota, and it is the only route here where the published average sits above the cost base.
- You can put roughly $165 of product a month through your own account, every month, indefinitely, and still be ahead. That is what Active means for team income, and it is the figure the average Associate did not clear.
- You read the re-entry rules before you build anything. Wait-outs run six, twelve and twenty-four months by prior rank, the clock resets on any prospecting activity, and you may never enroll anyone from your former organization.
That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.
Legal status
LEGAL - no court or regulator has ever found Isagenix to be a pyramid scheme, and in twenty-four years of trading no FTC complaint, consent order, civil penalty or Section 13(b) action, no state Attorney General action, no securities action and no criminal proceeding against the company or any principal could be located in any source reviewed. The file contains: an FTC warning letter dated 5 June 2020, sent as one of six in a category sweep and citing posts by field participants rather than the company, with no action following; two self-regulatory earnings-claim inquiries at BBB National Programs’ DSSRC, in 2023 and closing 5 August 2025, both administratively closed - the most favorable available disposition - with no referral to the FTC or any Attorney General; a 2012–13 stipulated consent judgment in a private California Proposition 65 citizen-enforcement suit brought by a non-profit, settled for $350,000 with an express denial of liability and a court-entered lead-testing regime, in which the California Attorney General did not sue; CFIA Class 1 food recall warnings in Canada between October 2020 and January 2021, triggered by the regulator’s own inspection activities, with reported associated illnesses and no prosecution located; and two putative US class actions filed in 2025, neither certified and neither producing any finding - one reported as a heavy-metals claim about protein powder, and one, Hodgin, a worker-misclassification claim compelled to confidential individual arbitration on 30 December 2025.
Confidence: Medium-High
Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.
Follow the money
An Arizona nutrition and meal-replacement company founded in March 2002, selling shakes, bars, supplements and multi-week systems through independent Associates on a binary compensation plan with a separate enrollment tree layered over it. Group volume accumulates in a left and a right leg; when 900 BV has banked with at least 300 on the weaker side and 600 on the stronger, the Associate earns one Cycle, worth a flat $54.
The customer evidence is real and it belongs first. The company’s own 2024 US Earnings Disclosure Statement states on its front page that more than 96% of those who joined in the US that year opened Customer accounts only and were not eligible to earn income - up from more than 89% in the 2022 edition. The plan pays four separate ways on genuine outside customers: retail profit on the spread between member and guest prices, retail-direct profit on orders through an Associate’s own site, customer volume flowing up the binary like any other volume, and a Brand Partner affiliate track paying 20-30% on customer sales with no fee, no purchase requirement, no quota and no downline at all. Autoship is expressly not a condition of participation, in three separate jurisdictional documents. Joining costs $29 a year with no purchase required, which is one of the cheapest entries in this category. And the entire price list is public, with three price tiers and the Business Volume shown for roughly 150 SKUs, so the true cost of qualifying can be calculated before signing anything.
Then the economics, from the same document. The average annual earnings across all US Associates in 2024, active and inactive, was $986.74 before expenses. Remaining eligible for anything beyond retail profit requires 100 PV every rolling thirty days - about $165 of product at subscription pricing, derived from the price list’s own consistent 0.60 BV per subscription dollar and corroborated by a distributor quoted in the self-regulatory file at "roughly $170 monthly on my own products". With the $29 fee that is about $2,009 a year. The average is below the cost of qualifying. The share earning nothing is not published but follows from the two averages that are: $986.74 across everyone against $4,594 across those who earned anything implies about 78% earned nothing at all in 2024, up from about 70% on the same derivation for 2021.
The single most damaging item in the plan is current rather than historic. The Team Builders Bonus, launched January 2024, carries a multiplier that is a step function on headcount: three to five qualifying monthly enrollments doubles the bonus, six to nine triples it, ten or more quadruples it. Each enrollment must carry 100 QV on a subscription order, about $165 a head, and enrollments supplied through the company’s own customer-referral pool are expressly excluded - only people you personally brought in count. The promotion runs to 28 June 2026. Alongside it, rank qualification above Consultant counts personally enrolled qualified Consultants (two for Manager, six for Director, ten for Executive) rather than sales, a bonus of £74/€88 is paid for each Consultant you develop up to twenty heads, and banked holdover volume flushes if Active status lapses.
The financial position is the fourth thing to understand, and it is not an allegation. There has been no company revenue figure since $958 million for 2017; the "$400 million" repeated everywhere is one trade publication’s estimate printed unchanged four years running, and a trade estimate is not a company figure. Between 2020 and 2023 the company took a downgrade citing a 23% sales decline in 2019, an S&P ‘D’ on a distressed debt exchange in April 2021, a lender forbearance in September 2022, and an out-of-court recapitalisation on 17 April 2023 that eliminated roughly $170 million of debt and moved majority ownership to four credit funds, with the founders contributing $95 million and retaining a minority. No bankruptcy was filed and commissions kept running. A restructuring is a financial event, not a finding of wrongdoing - but the Cycle is worth $54 because the owner says so, and the owner has changed.
Where US Associates landed in 2024
From the company’s own 2024 US Earnings Disclosure Statement, which publishes an average for all Associates and an average for those who earned anything. The zero-earner share is not stated by the company; it is derived here by arithmetic from those two published averages. All figures are before expenses, which the disclosure lists but does not deduct.
| Product | Price | Pays |
|---|---|---|
| Associate annual membership CA$39 for Associates without a Customer account, £/€30 in Europe. No purchase required to join, no pack condition, no autoship condition. Genuinely one of the cheapest entries in this category, and it should be said plainly. Renewal is charged to the card on file five to seven days before the anniversary unless the participant opts out by telephone. |
$29/yr (US) annual |
— |
| 100 PV Active requirement Required every rolling thirty days for anything beyond retail profit and Product Introduction Bonuses. About $1,980 a year, or roughly $2,009 with the membership fee. Satisfiable by retail-direct customer orders through the Associate’s own site as well as by personal purchase - and in Italy alone the company permits Active status on personally enrolled volume with zero personal purchase, which shows a purely retail qualification is technically possible. |
~$165/mo recurring |
— |
| IsaLean Shake (whey), 14 meals 33 BV. $3.93 to $5.21 per meal. Company specification: 240 kcal, 24 g whey, 23-24 vitamins and minerals. The $18 spread from subscription to guest is a 32.7% margin on cost, or 24.7% of the sale price - a workable retail rate. |
$55 sub / $62 preferred / $73 guest per unit |
retail spread $18 |
| 30-Day Reset system The flagship multi-week system. Works out at $11.00 to $14.63 a day. No efficacy claim of any kind is made or endorsed here; this entry records price and volume only. |
$330 sub / $439 guest one-time |
BV 201 |
| Weight Loss Ultimate Pack The largest single pack on the April 2026 price list. Nobody is required to buy a pack - but Product Introduction Bonuses are pack-triggered, which is what builds the pull toward the top of the range. |
$1,095 sub / $1,432 guest one-time |
BV 594 |
| Builder Value Pack Listed on the company’s own price list under a product category headed "Financial Wellbeing Packs" - a group of $378 to $1,095 items carrying the highest BV in the catalog and categorised by their function in the income opportunity rather than by any nutritional purpose. That is compensation-plan evidence appearing in a product catalog. |
$506 sub / $672 guest one-time |
BV 336 |
| Collagen Elixir, 30 count $4.70 to $6.30 per one-ounce shot. With the new BĒA Glow at $5.60 to $7.60 a can, these are the sharpest price lines in the catalog relative to anything on an open shelf. |
$141 sub / $189 guest per unit |
BV 87 |
| IsaPro Whey Protein, 30 servings The one genuinely competitive SKU: $1.63 a serving at subscription, $2.17 at retail, which is close to mainstream retail whey. It carries the same 0.6 BV-per-dollar ratio as everything else, so it is not a loss-leader - the meal-replacement line is simply marked up and this one is not. |
$49 sub / $65 guest per unit |
BV 30 |
Who runs it, and what they ran before
A private-label nutritional formulator and contract manufacturer who, by the company’s own account, had created more than 2,300 supplement and weight-management products before this one. He brought the product concept to the Coovers in 2001 and asked them to supply the direct-selling infrastructure. He sold out in 2005. No regulatory action, fraud judgment or criminal proceeding against him could be located in any source reviewed.
The company’s own trainer biography credits him with more than thirty years in the weight-management and nutrition industry, having "successfully led numerous network marketing companies" serving more than seven million customers. The one prior venture that can be named from the public record is an earlier very-low-calorie meal-plan direct seller of the early 1980s, which the FDA pressed into raising its calorie floor, which the agency associated with eight deaths described as "potentially linked", which filed for Chapter 11 in September 1983, and which settled a wrongful-death claim for a six-figure sum in 1985. Stage-labeling matters here more than anywhere in this report: every one of those facts attaches to that company, whose named president in the public record is someone else entirely. No public source locates Jim Coover as an officer, director or owner of it; the only source placing him there at all is a distributor blog’s retelling of Anderson’s story, and his precise role is unverified. There is no finding of any kind against him personally, and none is suggested here. The deduction on this line is for the unverifiability and the pattern, not for an allegation.
Described by her co-founder as having been "a top earner in three separate direct sales companies" before this one. Those three companies are not named in any source reviewed, which is worth recording rather than glossing: a founder track record that cannot be checked is a weaker credential than one that can. Her documented role at Isagenix was building field-facing tools and leadership development. No regulatory or criminal action against her could be located.
In the February 2023 restructuring support agreement the Coovers contributed $95 million of value through new cash plus forgiveness of debt they were personally owed, rather than walking away. That is the single most creditable fact in the ownership file and it is not a small one. It was not enough: on 17 April 2023 majority ownership passed to Arbour Lane, Cerberus, Crescent and Summit House through a debt-for-equity conversion on a defaulted capital structure, with the founders retaining a minority. Three chief executives in seven years - Jim Coover to January 2018, Travis Ogden to September 2020, Sharron Walsh since - and a rating agency citing "senior management turnover" as a reason to doubt a turnaround. A commentator quoted in the trade press framed the buyer group’s thesis as having previously bought a large graded competitor in the same category out of bankruptcy and built it back over twelve years. Whether any Coover holds a seat on the post-2023 board could not be established.
Registered address
Gilbert, Arizona, USA
Not an SEC registrant. No filed accounts, no audited public financials, and no company revenue figure of any kind since 2017 - which is itself the central fact about this file. The last company-stated global revenue is $958 million for 2017 ($700M US, $258M international). The company then declined to submit financials to the trade rankings, and the widely repeated "$400 million" is a single trade publication’s estimate printed unchanged for 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025. A trade estimate is not a company figure. Between 2020 and 2023 the business went through a rating downgrade citing a 23% sales decline in 2019, an S&P ‘D’ rating in April 2021 on a distressed debt exchange, a lender forbearance agreement in September 2022, and an out-of-court recapitalisation completed 17 April 2023 that eliminated roughly $170 million of debt and transferred majority ownership to four credit funds. No bankruptcy petition was ever filed, no receivership, no wind-down, and commissions were paid throughout. None of that is a finding of wrongdoing - a restructuring is a financial event - but it is a fact about who now sets the value of a Cycle.
The veteran's checklist
Eight questions that decide whether this is a business or a transfer mechanism. Same eight, every review.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who legally owns it? |
WATCH
Isagenix International, LLC, an Arizona company in Gilbert. Majority-owned since 17 April 2023 by four credit managers - Arbour Lane, Cerberus, Crescent and Summit House - through a debt-for-equity conversion; the founding Coover family holds a minority after contributing $95 million. Not an SEC filer; no audited public accounts.
|
| What does it really cost? |
WATCH
$29 a year for the license, with no purchase required and no autoship condition - genuinely low. Staying Active for team income costs 100 PV a month, about $165 at subscription pricing, so roughly $2,009 a year all in.
|
| Published income disclosure? |
CONCERN
Yes, and a better one than most: paired medians at three bands, an inclusive denominator, a Legacy Club count. It shows a 2024 average of $986.74 across all US Associates, $4,594 across those who earned anything - from which roughly 78% earning nothing follows arithmetically. No overall median and no headcount are published.
|
| Does the plan pay on sales to real outside customers? |
OK
Yes, four ways - retail profit, retail-direct profit, customer volume flowing up the binary, and a fee-free Brand Partner track at 20-30%. And the company publishes that more than 96% of 2024 US joiners opened Customer-only accounts. That figure counts joins, not volume, and the household boundary is undefined.
|
| Does anything pay on recruitment? |
RED
The Team Builders Bonus multiplies earnings 2×, 3× or 4× on three-to-five, six-to-nine or ten-plus qualifying enrollments in a month, excluding company-supplied leads - live to 28 June 2026. Ranks above Consultant count personally enrolled qualified Consultants, and £74/€88 is paid per Consultant developed up to twenty.
|
| Regulatory action against the company, ever? |
OK
None located in twenty-four years. The June 2020 FTC item was a warning letter sent in a category sweep, which is not an allegation, charge or finding against any recipient, and nothing followed. The 2023 and 2025 DSSRC matters are self-regulatory, both administratively closed with no referral. No state AG action, no securities action, no criminal proceeding, no pyramid adjudication.
|
| Did the company go bankrupt? |
WATCH
No. There was an S&P ‘D’ rating in April 2021 on a distressed debt exchange, a lender forbearance in September 2022, and an out-of-court recapitalisation on 17 April 2023 eliminating roughly $170 million of debt. No Chapter 11, no receivership, no missed commission run. A restructuring is a financial event, not a finding of wrongdoing.
|
| Can you get your money back, and can you leave? |
CONCERN
Buyback at 90% on marketable inventory bought within twelve months of termination, above category baseline, plus a 30-day guarantee. Leaving is harder: confidential Arizona arbitration, re-entry wait-outs up to twenty-four months with the clock resetting on prospecting, a one-year non-solicit covering social posts, and customer identities owned by the company after you go.
|
What has to be true for you to get paid
| To cover | You need |
|---|---|
| Hold an Associate license for a year | $29 annual membership fee, no purchase required, no autoship condition |
| Stay Active for team income every month | ~$165/mo 100 PV in a rolling 30 days at the published 0.60 BV per subscription dollar - about $2,009 a year with the fee |
| Cover that $2,009 from Cycles alone | ~37 Cycles a year $54 a Cycle, each consuming 900 BV - roughly $4,590 of monthly organizational volume, split 600/300 across two legs |
| Fund your own qualification from a downline | ~27 members at $165/mo correctly split across both legs and sustained; the company-published average Associate earned $986.74, about 0.35 Cycles a week |
Read this twice
Every input here comes from the company’s own documents. The Associate fee is $29 and the compensation plan says in terms that no purchase is required to enrol - genuinely low, and it should be said before anything else. What costs money is staying eligible. Active status requires 100 personal volume in the prior thirty days, every thirty days, or you receive nothing beyond retail profit and Product Introduction Bonuses. The published price list runs at a strikingly consistent 0.60 BV per subscription dollar across the catalog - 33 BV on a $55 shake, 201 BV on a $330 system, 52 BV on an $85 daily pack - so 100 PV is about $165 at subscription pricing, roughly $180 at preferred-customer pricing and about $195 at guest retail. That derivation is corroborated from outside the price list: a distributor quoted in the 2025 self-regulatory file described spending "roughly $170 monthly on my own products". Annualised with the fee, about $2,009. Two honest caveats cut in the company’s favor. The 100 PV can be satisfied by retail-direct customer orders placed through the Associate’s own website rather than by personal purchase, and in Italy the company already permits Active status with zero personal volume, which proves a purely retail qualification is technically possible. Someone with a genuine customer base is not spending that money at all. Against that, the Cycle arithmetic is unforgiving: one Cycle pays a flat $54 on 900 BV of group volume, which is 6.0% of the volume it consumes and about 3.6% of the dollars, so covering $165 a month takes just over three Cycles, which takes roughly $4,590 of monthly organizational volume correctly split across two legs - about 27 other people each buying $165 a month, of which only your own $165 is yours. And the banked holdover volume that gets you there flushes if Active status lapses. The company’s own 2024 disclosure closes the loop: the average Associate earned $986.74, about $1,022 short of the cost of qualifying, and roughly 78% earned nothing at all.
Run your own numbers
Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.
Six dollars a month is derived from the plan’s own unit of account rather than from a retail percentage: one Cycle pays a flat $54 on 900 business volume, which is 6.0% of volume, and a customer subscribing at about $165 a month generates roughly 99 BV at the company’s corroborated 0.60 volume-per-dollar ratio. The cost line is that same $165, being the 100 personal volume a month required to stay Active - the figure is corroborated by a distributor quoted at "$170 monthly" in the self-regulatory file. The Team Builders Bonus is excluded from the slider even though it is the plan’s most lucrative mechanic, because its 2×, 3× and 4× multipliers are keyed purely to how many people you enrol in a calendar month rather than to anything sold. The genuine strength here goes in the other direction and belongs on the page rather than the slider: the company reports that more than 96% of its 2024 United States joiners opened customer-only accounts. Break-even needs roughly 27 people subscribing at $165 a month. For calibration, the company’s own 2024 disclosure puts average annual earnings for all United States Associates at $986.74, before expenses, against roughly $2,009 a year to stay Active. Your own subscription cost of $165/mo is included.
What it costs to replace this yourself
Isagenix’s own April 2026 US price list against named mainstream alternatives at real 2026 prices. Comparators are given as bands because formulations and pack sizes differ, and because the fair like-for-like matters: IsaLean is a fortified meal replacement carrying 23-24 micronutrients, so the meal-replacement brands are the right benchmark and bare whey is the harsher one. Both are shown. Nothing here is a statement about what any product does - only about what a comparable serving costs.
| What they sell you | What you'd use instead | Your cost |
|---|---|---|
| IsaLean Shake - $3.93 subscription, $5.21 guest, per meal | Huel Powder v3 or Huel Black Edition on subscription | $2.21-$2.65 |
| IsaLean PRO - $4.50-$6.00 per meal | Soylent powder, or Orgain Organic powder | $1.90-$2.90 |
| IsaPro Whey - $1.63-$2.17 per serving | Optimum Nutrition Gold Standard (5 lb) or Kirkland Signature whey at Costco | $1.00-$1.06 |
| 30-Day Reset system - $11.00-$14.63 a day | Two Huel Essential meals a day plus an own-brand pharmacy multivitamin | ~$3.15/day |
| Collagen Elixir - $4.70-$6.30 per one-ounce shot | Bulk collagen peptides from a mainstream retailer or grocery own-brand | ~$0.50-$1.00 |
| BĒA Glow - $5.60-$7.60 per can | A mainstream ready-to-drink energy can plus a bulk collagen serving | ~$3.00 |
| Ready-to-drink protein and meal shakes | Premier Protein or Ensure at grocery and warehouse-club prices | $1.25-$2.00 |
| 100 PV Active requirement - about $1,980 a year | No requirement, no rank, no flush: buy what you actually use | $0 |
| Total as sold ~$2,009 in year one before a single pack, and ~$3,300-$4,400 with a mid-range entry pack |
Total, built yourself ~$800-$1,100 of comparable named-brand nutrition for a full year |
Price-to-value
On individual products the premium is roughly 1.5× to 3.4× against named fortified meal replacements and 3.7× to 4.9× against named mainstream whey - real, but not absurd for a premium direct-to-consumer position, and the company earns genuine credit for publishing every price tier and the BV so that a buyer can do this arithmetic before joining. Two comparator-side caveats belong here in fairness: the court-ordered lead-testing regime on covered products is a quality obligation the shelf brands do not carry, and IsaPro whey at $1.63 a serving is competitive with retail. What decides the exercise is not the per-serving gap but the structural one. A customer who simply likes the shakes can buy them at the subscription price with a free account, no fee and no quota - and more than 96% of 2024 US joiners did exactly that. The Associate is the only person paying about $2,009 a year for the right to be paid on other people’s volume, and the company’s own disclosure says the average one collected $986.74.
Three operators, five horizons
Probability of cumulative net profit
Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.
Brand Partner
the free affiliate track - no fee, no purchase, no quota, no downline, 20-30% on customer sales
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 54% | +$8 |
| 6 mo | 54% | +$18 |
| 1 yr | 54% | +$35 |
| 3 yr | 52% | +$95 |
| 5 yr | 50% | +$150 |
Part-time Associate
$29 fee, holds 100 PV a month, a handful of customers, some sponsoring
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 6% | −$520 |
| 6 mo | 8% | −$1,010 |
| 1 yr | 10% | −$1,900 |
| 3 yr | 12% | −$5,400 |
| 5 yr | 13% | −$8,700 |
Full-time builder
30+ hrs/wk, entry pack, events, driving Cycles and the Team Builders multiplier
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 3% | −$1,400 |
| 6 mo | 6% | −$2,700 |
| 1 yr | 9% | −$4,900 |
| 3 yr | 13% | −$11,000 |
| 5 yr | 15% | −$16,500 |
Methodology note. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims, and not company figures. ANCHORED to what Isagenix publishes: the 2024 US average across all Associates of $986.74 before expenses; the $4,594 average across those who earned anything, from which the roughly 78% zero-earner share is derived arithmetically; the top-1% average of $245,581 with a $121,351 median, the top-10% pair at $37,765 and $10,906, the top-50% pair at $8,921 and $1,686; the Brand Partner all-participant average of $69.86 with a top-50% median of $468 and a top-1% figure where average and median are identical at $17,327, which is the statistical signature of a very small population; the $29 fee; the 100 PV Active requirement at about $165 a month from the published 0.60 BV-per-dollar ratio; and the flat $54 Cycle on 900 BV. MODELED by us: the cohort definitions, which the company does not segment; the share of each cohort in cumulative profit at each horizon; and the expense side beyond the published qualification cost, because the disclosure lists advertising, training, rent, travel, telephone and internet as costs it has not deducted without putting a figure on any of them. The Brand Partner row is the one that deserves a second look, and it cuts in the company’s favor: because that track costs nothing at all, an average of $69.86 is a positive return, which makes it the only version of this opportunity where the typical participant is not underwater. The Associate rows are negative at every horizon for the arithmetic reason set out above - the published average is below the published cost of qualifying - and not because any cohort is assumed to fail.
Where you are actually allowed to promote this
Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.
Red flags and green flags
Red flags
151The average US Associate earned less than half of what it costs to stay eligible
2Roughly 78% of US Associates earned nothing at all in 2024
3A live bonus that multiplies 2×/3×/4× purely on monthly enrollment count
4Rank above Consultant is a headcount, not a sales figure
5The plan document itself prints "Prime Minister — 112 Cycles — CA$347,400"
6No company revenue figure of any kind since 2017
7Majority control now sits with credit funds after a debt-for-equity conversion
8A credit default in 2021 and a covenant event in 2022
9CFIA Class 1 recalls with reported illnesses - and the usual mitigation does not apply
10Holdover volume flushes when Active status lapses
11A product category on the official price list headed "Financial Wellbeing Packs"
12Confidential Arizona arbitration, enforced across state lines
13Re-entry wait-outs of up to 24 months, with a clock that resets on prospecting
14The company owns the customer, and the obligation survives termination
15Field income claims have been cataloged by four separate bodies across nine years
Green flags
101It publishes the customer split, in plain English, on the front page of the disclosure
2The plan pays four separate ways on genuine outside customers
3A genuinely free retail-only track where the average participant is not underwater
4Autoship is genuinely not a condition of anything, and three documents say so
5Medians are published alongside averages, including unflattering ones
6The entire price list is public, with three tiers and the BV for every SKU
7A 90% buyback for twelve months after termination
8A specific, operational anti-manipulation policy
9Prompt, documented cooperation with the self-regulator, twice
10Twenty-four years with no pyramid adjudication and no government enforcement action anywhere
We would like to be wrong about this
Upward
- Retiring the Team Builders Bonus enrollment-count multiplier and re-basing the bonus on customer sales volume, and letting retail-direct customer sales alone satisfy Active status everywhere - which the company already permits in Italy, so it knows the mechanism works.
- Publishing an overall median, an Associate headcount and the percentage earning nothing outright rather than leaving it to be derived from two averages - plus an actual company revenue figure for 2024 or 2025, audited or not, ending a four-year vacuum in which the only public number is one trade publication’s estimate.
- Removing the "Prime Minister — 112 Cycles" and "residual value equals $9,360,000 of capital" slides from the official plan document, dropping the confidentiality requirement from the arbitration clause, and cutting the Director-and-above re-entry wait-out from twenty-four months to twelve with no reset on prospecting activity.
Downward
- Any FTC complaint, consent order or civil penalty, as distinct from the 2020 warning letter, or a self-regulatory referral to the FTC or a state Attorney General on the next inquiry.
- Class certification in the 2025 heavy-metals matter or any finding on tested product, or a further Class 1 recall with reported illnesses.
- Introduction of any minimum autoship or entry-pack purchase as a condition of commission eligibility, a reduction in the $54 Cycle value or a narrowing of the 90% buyback, or a second credit event at the operating company.
Grade is C−. The strongest published customer evidence in this category, attached to an average Associate earning $986.74 against roughly $2,009 a year to qualify.
Start with what is real, because it genuinely is. The company publishes, on the front page of its own earnings disclosure, that more than 96% of those who joined in the US in 2024 opened Customer accounts only - twenty-four in twenty-five new enrollments taking no income offer at all, up from more than 89% two years earlier. It pays four separate ways on genuine outside customers, including a Brand Partner track with no fee, no purchase requirement, no quota and no downline. It states in terms that nothing is earned from the mere act of sponsoring. It publishes medians beside averages, an inclusive denominator that counts people who did nothing all year, and a complete price list with three tiers and the volume value of every SKU - which is why the arithmetic in this report could be done from the company’s own documents rather than guessed. Autoship is not a condition of anything and $29 buys the license. And in twenty-four years there is no pyramid finding, no FTC enforcement action, no consent order, no state Attorney General action and no criminal proceeding against anyone. Those are not decorations. They are the reason this file grades in the C band rather than lower.
The economics are where it turns. The average across all US Associates in 2024 was $986.74 before expenses. Staying eligible for team income costs about $165 a month - 100 PV at the price list’s own consistent 0.60 BV per subscription dollar, corroborated by a distributor quoted in the self-regulatory file at "roughly $170 monthly" - or about $2,009 a year with the fee. The average is below the cost of qualifying, by roughly $1,022. The company does not publish how many earned nothing, but the two averages it does publish imply about 78% did, up from about 70% three years earlier. One Cycle pays a flat $54 on 900 BV, which is 6.0% of the volume it consumes; covering your own qualification takes just over three Cycles a month, which takes roughly $4,590 of organizational volume - about twenty-seven other people each buying $165 a month, split correctly across two legs, with the banked volume flushing if you ever fall out of Active status. And the live Team Builders Bonus multiplies earnings 2×, 3× or 4× purely on how many people you enrolled that month, excluding the customer leads the company supplies. That is a headcount incentive, it is on the company’s own promotion terms, and it runs to 28 June 2026.
The last thing to weigh is the payer, and it must be said carefully because none of it is wrongdoing. There has been no company revenue figure since $958 million for 2017; the "$400 million" everyone quotes is a single trade estimate printed unchanged four years running. In between came a 23% sales decline in 2019, an S&P ‘D’ in April 2021 on a distressed debt exchange, a covenant and liquidity event with a lender forbearance in September 2022, and an out-of-court recapitalisation on 17 April 2023 that eliminated roughly $170 million of debt and handed majority ownership to four credit funds. No bankruptcy was filed, no receivership, no wind-down, and the commission runs never stopped - a materially better outcome for the field than the alternative, and the founders put $95 million of their own money into making it happen. A debt restructuring is a financial event, not a finding of wrongdoing, and nothing here alleges otherwise. What it changes is who decides what a Cycle is worth. Every plan value, the buyback included, is reserved to the company’s discretion, and the company is now controlled by managers of distressed credit with an exit horizon rather than by founders talking about a legacy.
Be a customer, which is what almost everyone already is
A Preferred Customer account is free, requires no autoship and gets you within a few dollars of the best price in the catalog. More than 96% of 2024 US joiners took exactly that route. If you like the shakes, buy the shakes. It costs nothing, commits you to nothing, and leaves you free to price them against Huel, Soylent, Orgain or a grocery own-brand any month you feel like it.
If you want to earn, take the Brand Partner track first
No fee, no purchase requirement, no quota, no downline, 20-30% on customer sales paid weekly with recurring commission on reorders. The 2024 average was $69.86, which is small - but on a zero cost base it is positive, and it is the only version of this opportunity in which the typical participant is not underwater. If you cannot make retail work there, the Associate side will not fix it; it will only add about $2,009 a year of cost.
Do the $986.74-against-$2,009 sum before you sign anything
Both numbers come from the company: the average from its own disclosure, the cost from its own price list at 100 PV a month plus the $29 fee. Then ask your sponsor the two questions the documents do not answer - what share of your group volume comes from people who are not Associates, and what your own Active requirement has cost you over the last twelve months. If the answer to either is vague, that is the answer.
Sell nutrition without the flush, the wait-out or the domain clause
The category is enormous and the search intent around meal replacement, protein per dollar and ingredient comparison is genuine. Honest, sourced comparison content - cost per serving, protein per dollar, third-party heavy-metals testing - is a merchant business with real demand and no counterparty. It requires no $29 license, no 100 PV a month, no prior written approval for your own marketing, no twenty-four-month wait-out, and it does not end with you handing over a domain you built.
Nine dimensions, weighted
Dimension profile
Further from center is better. Hover any point.
Hard caps that bind here
The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.
What we read
Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.
- Isagenix Earnings Disclosure Statement - 2024 data (current live document): $986.74 average across all US Associates, $4,594 across those who earned, top 1% / 10% / 50% at $245,581/$121,351, $37,765/$10,906 and $8,921/$1,686
Isagenix US Earnings Disclosure Statement, 2024 data (doc 3513_102025) - $986.74 average across all US Associates and $4,594 across those who earned; top 1% / 10% / 50% averages and medians at $245,581/$121,351, $37,765/$10,906 and $8,921/$1,686; Brand Partner average of $69.86; Legacy Club at 434 global and 305 US; "over 96% of those Members who joined Isagenix in the U.S. in 2024, opened Customer accounts only"; and the 2022 edition at "over 89%"
- Isagenix Earnings Disclosure Statement - 2022 edition (PDF, company CDN): $892 average across all US Associates, $3,994 across those who earned
- Isagenix Earnings Disclosure Statement, 2022 edition (archived copy, Sequence Inc. Fraud Files)
- Isagenix - "How to Make Compliant Earnings Claims" (EU compliance guidance, 2024), citing the 2023 all-Associate average of US$787 before expenses and directing readers to IsagenixEarnings.com
- Isagenix Team Compensation Plan (PDF, company CDN) - Cycle mechanics, the $54 Cycle, and the "Possible Residual Value of an Isagenix Business" / "What is your time worth?" tables
Isagenix Team Compensation Plan, US/Canada, UK/EU and ANZ editions - the binary structure and enrollment tree, 100 PV Active status, the Consultant gate, rank qualifications at two/six/ten personally enrolled Consultants, the $54 Cycle on 900 BV split 600/300, the 10% Executive match, Product Introduction Bonuses, the CA$11,709 Rank Advancement schedule, the £74/€88 per-Consultant-developed bonus, and the "What is your time worth? / Prime Minister — 112 Cycles — CA$347,400" and residual-value slides
Not established by this document: The separately branded US/Canada, UK/EU and ANZ editions are not published at distinguishable public URLs; the three company-CDN documents above are the retrievable plan documents and between them carry the binary/enrollment-tree structure, the Cycle and the rank schedule.
- "Welcome To The Isagenix Team Compensation Plan" (PDF, company CDN) - international edition covering rank qualifications, the Isagenix Millionaire pin and the Legacy Club
- Isagenix Compensation Plan (PDF, company CDN) - full plan overview edition
- Isagenix Policies and Procedures (PDF, company CDN) - §4.5 sales-channel restrictions, §4.8 buy-back at 90% for twelve months, §5.2 customer identities, §5.4 non-solicit, §6.1–6.2 domain and prior-approval regime, ¶9.10 confidential AAA arbitration under Arizona law
Isagenix Policies and Procedures, Terms and Conditions, UK/EU Rules of Membership and Subscription Rewards terms - the optional-autoship statements, §4.5 sales-channel restrictions, §4.8 buyback at 90% for twelve months, §5.2 customer identities as trade secret, §5.4 one-year non-solicit, §6.1 domain transfer surviving termination, §6.2 prior-approval regime, §3.5 re-entry wait-outs, and ¶9.10 confidential AAA arbitration under Arizona law
- Isagenix Terms and Conditions (PDF, company CDN)
- Isagenix Independent Associate Rules of Membership - UK/EU edition (April 2025)
- Isagenix Independent Associate Application & Agreement (PDF, company CDN)
- FTC Warning Letter to Isagenix International LLC, 5 June 2020 (PDF) - health and earnings claims by business-opportunity participants, reply required within 48 hours
FTC warning letter to Isagenix International LLC, 5 June 2020, and the FTC press release and business blog for that second round of MLM warning letters - one of six letters in a category sweep, citing posts by business-opportunity participants; no complaint, consent order or civil penalty against the company located in the FTC press releases, cases-and-proceedings database or legal library
Not established by this document: The negative finding (no FTC complaint, consent order, stipulated judgment or civil penalty against Isagenix in 24 years) rests on searches of the FTC press-release archive, the cases-and-proceedings database and the legal library, all of which returned only the 5 June 2020 warning letter. A null result cannot be evidenced by a document; the search surfaces are linked instead.
- FTC Legal Library - Warning Letter to Isagenix International LLC (case page)
- "FTC Sends Second Round of Warning Letters to Multi-Level Marketers Regarding Coronavirus-Related Health and Earnings Claims" - press release naming the six recipients, 5 June 2020
- FTC Business Blog - "FTC again warns multi-level marketers about unproven health and earnings claims," quoting the Isagenix claims at issue
- FTC Legal Library - cases and proceedings search interface, the database in which no complaint, consent order or civil penalty against Isagenix was found
- DSSRC Case #226-2025: Administrative Closure - Isagenix International, LLC (closed 5 August 2025; thirteen posts revised or removed)
BBB National Programs DSSRC Case #226-2025, closed 5 August 2025, and the 2023 and 2025 year-end activity reports - thirteen posts revised or removed, administrative closure, no referral to the FTC or any Attorney General; DSSRC Policies and Procedures §V on participation not constituting an admission and determinations not constituting legal findings
- DSSRC 2025 Year-End Activity Report (PDF)
- DSSRC 2023 Year-End Activity Report (PDF)
- Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council program page - when an inquiry results in an administrative closure, and the status of participation and determinations
- Isagenix Int'l LLC v. Hodgin, No. CV-25-01587-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.) - Order of 30 December 2025 compelling individual arbitration and denying the motion to dismiss (Doc. 50, PDF)
Isagenix Int’l v. Hodgin, No. CV-25-01587-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.), order of 30 December 2025 compelling individual arbitration of a worker-misclassification claim; Hodgin v. Isagenix International LLC, No. 8:25-cv-00616 (C.D. Cal.); Stephenson v. Isagenix International, LLC, No. 4:25-cv-02372 (N.D. Cal., filed 7 March 2025), reported as a heavy-metals claim, complaint not retrievable
Not established by this document: The Stephenson complaint itself (Dkt. 1) is not posted publicly; only the docket entry is retrievable, so the heavy-metals characterisation could not be verified from the pleading.
- Isagenix International LLC et al v. Hodgin, No. 2:25-cv-01587 (D. Ariz.) - docket, filed 8 May 2025, terminated 30 December 2025
- Noah Hodgin v. Isagenix International LLC et al, No. 8:25-cv-00616 (C.D. Cal.) - docket, removed from Orange County Superior Court, stayed pending the Ninth Circuit appeal
- Stephenson v. Isagenix International, LLC, No. 4:25-cv-02372 (N.D. Cal., filed 7 March 2025) - docket report
- Stephenson v. Isagenix International, LLC, No. 4:25-cv-02372 (N.D. Cal.) - docket, terminated 17 June 2025
- Isagenix International, LLC, et al. v. Hodgin, No. 26-307 (9th Cir., docketed 15 January 2026) - appeal from the order compelling arbitration
- CFIA Food Recall Warning, 31 October 2020 - "Certain Isagenix brand Isalean Bars may be unsafe due to over fortification of vitamins" (Class 1, reference number 14054, triggered by CFIA inspection activities, reported associated illnesses)
Canadian Food Inspection Agency food recall warnings of 31 October, 7 November and 24 November 2020 and the advisory of 29 January 2021 (Class 1, vitamin over-fortification, triggered by CFIA inspection activities, reported associated illnesses); Environmental Research Center v. Isagenix International, LLC, California Proposition 65 notice 2010-00743 and the stipulated consent judgment - $350,000, express denial of liability, 0.5 µg/day lead threshold and four years of annual third-party testing
- CFIA Updated Food Recall Warning, 7 November 2020 - "Certain Isagenix brand Isalean products may be unsafe due to over-fortification of vitamins" (Class 1, reference number 14085)
- CFIA Updated Food Recall Warning, 24 November 2020 - recalled product found still on sale up to and including 16 November 2020
- CFIA Food Safety Warning, 29 January 2021 - recalled Isagenix products still being sold through internet sites not affiliated with the company
- Environmental Research Center v. Isagenix International, LLC - stipulated consent judgment, Proposition 65 notice 2010-00743 (PDF): $350,000 total payments, express denial of liability, 0.5 µg/day lead reformulation threshold, four years of annual third-party testing
- California Attorney General - Proposition 65 60-Day Notice 2010-00743, Environmental Research Center v. Isagenix International, LLC (settlement summary, $350,000 total)
- "Isagenix Completes Recapitalization Transaction and Transition to New Ownership" - company press release, 17 April 2023 (~$170m of debt eliminated; $95m contributed by the Coovers; Arbour Lane, Cerberus, Crescent and Summit House taking majority ownership)
Moody’s downgrades of February 2020 (23% sales decline in 2019) and September 2022 (capital structure "unsustainable," $19M cash against $29M revolver borrowings); S&P ‘D’ rating of April 2021 on the $65 million term-loan repurchase at ~65 cents; company press releases of 23 September 2022 (forbearance), 27 February 2023 (restructuring support agreement) and 17 April 2023 (recapitalisation completed, ~$170M debt eliminated, $95M from the founders, four credit managers taking the majority)
Not established by this document: The Moody's downgrades of February 2020 and September 2022 and the S&P 'D' rating of April 2021 sit behind rating-agency paywalls and no free primary copy could be located; likewise the 23 September 2022 forbearance press release could not be retrieved. Only the February and April 2023 company releases are linked.
- "Isagenix Reaches Agreement with Financial Stakeholders" - company press release announcing the Restructuring Support Agreement, 27 February 2023
- Phoenix Business Journal - "Gilbert-based Isagenix completes recapitalization, has new owners," 20 April 2023
- AZ Big Media - "Isagenix completes transition to new ownership," 18 April 2023
- Huel Black Edition product page - comparative per-meal subscription pricing (Essential $1.52, Powder v3 $2.21, Black Edition $2.65 per 400-calorie meal)
Comparator pricing, 2026 - Huel product pages (Essential $1.52, Powder v3 $2.21, Black Edition $2.65 per meal on subscription), Soylent cost-per-meal analyzes ($1.91-$2.60 powder), Forbes Health "Best Protein Powders of 2026," verified Optimum Nutrition Gold Standard per-serving pricing ($1.06 at 5 lb, $1.72 at 2 lb), Kirkland Signature whey at Costco (~$1.00 per 25 g), Nutricost (from $0.87), Premier Protein and Ensure ready-to-drink retail surveys, and Orgain and Ka’Chava per-serving surveys
Not established by this document: The Soylent cost-per-meal analyzes, the Forbes Health "Best Protein Powders of 2026" list, and the Optimum Nutrition, Kirkland Signature, Nutricost, Premier Protein, Ensure, Orgain and Ka'Chava per-serving surveys are open-market price captures rather than single retrievable documents; one good primary comparator (Huel's own published per-meal pricing) is linked rather than several weak ones.
- Huel meal-replacement powder collection - per-meal price list across the range
What we could not get
- THE WATCHLIST PREMISE, OVERTURNED - and both figures belong side by side. The premise was "declining but durable search demand; risk sits in historic income-claim actions." Neither half survives contact with the record. On durability: the last company-stated revenue is $958 million for 2017, and the "$400 million" cited everywhere since is a single trade publication’s estimate printed unchanged for 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025. A trade estimate is not a company figure, and four identical years is evidence that nobody outside the company has a current one, not evidence of a plateau. On the income-claim file: it is current, not historic - a self-regulatory inquiry closed on 5 August 2025, two years after the previous one, on the same category of claims, five years after the FTC warning letter.
- Whether the ">96% Customer-only" figure counts Preferred Customer accounts opened by Associates’ own households. The disclosure does not define the boundary, and it is the single most load-bearing unverified assumption in this report - both the compensation-structure and product scores lean on it. It also counts joins rather than volume: the share of dollars moving to non-participants is not published in any year.
- The Supplement to the Policies and Procedures on Internet Advertising and Social Media, referenced in the policies but hosted behind the company’s compliance portal, which could not be reached. The operative rules on paid social advertising, lead buying and paid-search bidding on the company’s own trademarks are in that document. Nothing is asserted here about whether any of those is permitted, restricted or banned - this is a "could not retrieve," not a "does not exist."
- The absence of any company revenue or headcount figure after 2017. No revenue figure, no net profit or loss figure in any year, no Associate or Brand Partner headcount, no active-versus-inactive split and no attrition rate have been published since 2017. Aggregator numbers in the $1bn-$2bn range and a "3,634 employees" figure circulate widely and are contradicted by the company’s own 2017 peak of $958 million; a separate modeled revenue series is internally incoherent against a $375 million term loan. No US layoff announcement or WARN filing could be located either, which given a contraction from twenty-six markets to twenty-three is an absence of evidence rather than evidence of absence.
- Whether an Earnings Disclosure Statement covering 2023 data was ever published, and whether a 2025-data edition exists. The current document covers 2024 and was produced in October 2025; the edition before it covers 2022. No 2023-data edition surfaced in any search.
- The pleading in the 2025 heavy-metals class action, which sits behind PACER - the heavy-metals characterisation rests on secondary reporting only, the class is putative rather than certified, and there is no finding. Separately, the final outcome of the 2021 British Columbia civil claim is unknown; the only ruling of record is the February 2022 procedural refusal of a stay in favor of arbitration. And note a correction that matters: the Hodgin matter is a worker-misclassification case compelled to individual arbitration on 30 December 2025, not a heavy-metals case - secondary sources conflate the two, and they are different proceedings about different things.
- Jim Coover’s exact role at the earlier meal-plan company, which only a distributor blog’s retelling places him at; the names of Kathy Coover’s three prior direct-selling companies, unnamed in every source located; and the composition of the post-2023 board, including whether any Coover holds a seat. The company said a new board would be announced "in the coming weeks" after April 2023 and no announcement could be found.
- The MegaCycle mechanics, referenced in the compensation plan on a page that did not render in any version retrieved; the Manager and Director-and-Above bonus-pool percentages, which are back-office only; and the ticket and travel cost of the company’s annual events, which is not published externally. Also unverified: advertising self-regulatory decisions outside the US, searched generally with nothing found but without querying each national case database directly.
Not advice
This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.
Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.
Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.
- Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
- The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
- Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
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Isagenix - frequently asked
QIs Isagenix a pyramid scheme?
QHow much do Isagenix Associates actually earn?
QHow much does it cost to join Isagenix?
QDid Isagenix go bankrupt or get taken over?
QHas Isagenix been in trouble with the FTC or any regulator?
Author, editor and publisher
This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - Isagenix’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.
Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.
The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.
Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.
About the author and our conflicts · Contact the editor · Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com
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