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Adhesive “phototherapy” patches · Hybrid unilevel-and-binary MLM

LifeWave, Inc.

A $555 million patch company that publishes an unusually honest income disclosure - and the disclosure says 79% of active US Brand Partners earned zero commission in 2024, at a rank whose median annual earnings are $0.

Reviewed July 29, 2026 Founded Business started 30 December 2009 per the BBB record; the present corporation was incorporated 30 August 2023. The technology story dates to the mid-2000s Confidence: Medium-High
FGRADE
3.5/10
Weighted composite

CLAIMS TOLERATED AT SCALE, EVIDENCE THIN

Thirty adhesive discs with no active ingredient at $99.95–$149.95 a month, sold on a stem-cell story that one unregistered n=60 trial by a single author group does not support - and the company has told a self-regulator it resolved over 2,000 salesforce claim incidents.

The question you came with

Can you actually make money with LifeWave?

NO No - not on the numbers this company publishes

No. Not on the company's own disclosure, which is unusually honest and says so directly. Some 79% of active US Brand Partners earned zero commission in 2024. A further 34% earned nothing because they were inactive, and only 21% received any commission payment at all. At the rank holding 92.48% of active partners, the median annual earnings figure is $0 and the average is $23 for the year.

The cost of holding a position runs the other way. Staying Active and eligible to cycle takes 55 PV every 31 days, roughly $70 to $100 a month. Holding Manager qualification and the 25% matching bonus takes 110 PV, roughly $150 to $175 a month, or $1,800 to $2,100 a year. Average annual earnings across all US Brand Partners were $651 before expenses, so that qualification is about three times the field average.

The plan tells a sponsor exactly what to do. The Product Introduction Bonus pays $35 on the $295 Core pack, $75 on the $535 Advanced and $405 on the $1,750 Premium - 23% of the purchase price, paid in full on the act of enrolling somebody. Below Manager the binary is capped at $100 a week, and no rank above Manager is reachable without personally sponsored distributors plus 10,000 to 200,000 BV of team volume in 31 days.

Two real credits belong here rather than buried. Policy 6.4.1 states that the Monthly Subscription Order is not mandatory and is free of charge for Brand Partners, so the pressure to spend is economic rather than contractual, and that is a genuine distinction. Entry is $25 with a $25 annual renewal. The plan also carries a 60% payout ceiling, a 2:1 consumption ratio for paid-as Managers and a 110 QV cap on self-qualification.

What it costs to be in
$25

Starter Pack, then $25 a year to renew; but the Starter Pack carries zero PV, pays the sponsor nothing and contains no product

What would have to change
  • A Product Introduction Bonus that is not 23% of the pack price. As written it pays $405 the moment somebody buys the $1,750 Premium pack against $35 on the $295 one, which tells a sponsor which conversation is worth having.
  • Volume that does not reward being a Brand Partner over being a customer. X39 carries 77 BV for a partner and 43 BV for a customer at the identical $99.95, which is the internal-consumption incentive expressed as a single number.
  • A rank ladder a retailer can climb. Every rank above Manager is defined by personally sponsored distributors at specified ranks plus team volume, so no rank in this plan is reachable by selling to customers alone.
  • Enforcement that reaches the scale of the problem. The company told a self-regulator it has resolved over 2,000 salesforce claim incidents, which describes a systemic condition being managed rather than a handful of outliers.

That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.

79%
Active US Brand Partners who earned zero commission in 2024
the FTC’s characterisation of LifeWave’s own published disclosure
$0
Median annual earnings at the rank holding 92.48% of active partners
average at that same rank, $23 for the year
$3.33–$5.00
Cost per patch, per day
30 adhesive discs a month containing no active ingredient
2,000+
Salesforce claim incidents the company says it has resolved
LifeWave’s own figure, stated to DSSRC in the 2025 case

Legal status

LEGAL - no court, regulator or attorney general has found LifeWave, Inc. to be a pyramid scheme; no FDA warning letter, no FTC complaint and no state enforcement proceeding names the company itself as a respondent or defendant anywhere that could be located, and no regulatory, criminal or civil judgment against the founder personally could be located either. What the file contains is adjacent rather than direct: a federal civil complaint filed 27 April 2026 in the Southern District of Florida against two individual distributors, resolved by stipulated order with no admission and a 2–0 Commission vote, in which LifeWave was not a defendant; two DSSRC administrative closures in thirteen months, which are self-regulatory and not governmental and carry no fine and no finding of law violated; a 2021 FTC Notice of Penalty Offenses sent to roughly 1,100 recipients, which is not an allegation of wrongdoing by anyone; and a BBB record showing product claims the company was asked to substantiate on 5 February 2025 still recorded as unsubstantiated on 27 March 2025, which is a private ratings body’s position. X39 is not FDA-approved and not FDA-cleared. It is sold under general-wellness enforcement discretion.

Confidence: Medium-High

Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.

What this actually is

Follow the money

A private US company selling small adhesive discs that are stuck on the skin, through a network of independent Brand Partners on a hybrid plan - unilevel for retail and level commissions, binary for the residual engine. The flagship is X39. One sleeve is thirty patches, one per day, one month: $149.95 one-time or $99.95 on subscription. The patch contains no drug, no stimulant, no transdermal active ingredient and no electronics. The stated mechanism is that it traps the body’s own emitted infrared energy and reflects it back at specific points on the skin.

The proposition sold in the field is stem-cell activation, by way of elevating the copper tripeptide GHK-Cu. GHK-Cu is a real molecule with a genuine literature on wound healing and skin remodelling, so the question is narrow and answerable: does an adhesive disc containing no GHK-Cu, applied to intact skin, raise circulating GHK-Cu? One study addresses it properly - a double-blind randomised trial, n=60, reporting roughly a 39% rise between day 2 and day 7 in the active arm at p<0.035. The design is the right one and it deserves acknowledgement, because most companies in this category never commission anything of the kind. But every paper comes from the same two authors, both journals sit outside PubMed indexing, the trial was never registered on ClinicalTrials.gov, neither paper carries a funding statement, and nobody anywhere has replicated the finding in six years. What was measured was a peptide in blood. It was not stem cells. The distance between “GHK-Cu was higher on day 7 than on day 2” and “activates your stem cells” is not a scientific inference; it is a marketing one.

The regulatory position needs stating exactly, because almost all coverage of this company gets it wrong. X39 is not FDA-approved and it is not FDA-cleared. There is no 510(k) clearance and no premarket approval. LifeWave products appear in the FDA’s MAUDE adverse-event database under product codes KGX and OMW, which is consistent with device listing - an administrative act in which a manufacturer tells the FDA what it sells and the FDA reviews nothing. Listing is not clearance and it is not approval. The company markets the patches as general-wellness products under an FDA enforcement-discretion policy, which is a statement that the agency does not generally intend to enforce device requirements against such products, not any form of review. The product pages carry the standard disclaimer that the statements have not been evaluated by the FDA.

The participant economics come straight from the company’s own disclosure, which is genuinely good and says something brutal. Some 92.48% of active US Brand Partners sit at the bottom rank, where the median annual earnings are $0 and the average is $23. Seventy-nine percent of active partners earned zero commission in 2024; 34% earned nothing because they were inactive; only 21% received any commission at all. Average annual earnings across all Brand Partners were $651 before expenses. Against that, holding 55 PV to stay Active costs roughly $70–100 a month and holding the 110 PV needed for Manager and the 25% matching bonus costs roughly $150–175 a month, or $1,800–2,100 a year before the enrollment pack, events, tools, shipping and tax. And one plan mechanic reveals the intended direction of the volume: X39 carries 77 BV at Brand Partner wholesale but only 43 BV at the identical $99.95 Preferred Customer price. Same dollars, roughly 1.8 times the volume when a partner buys instead of a customer.

Where active US Brand Partners sat in 2024

LifeWave’s own published US Earnings Disclosure Statement. Percentages of active Brand Partners; earnings are gross, and the disclosure states in terms that they are before expenses.

92%
Brand Partner - median $0, average $23 a year (92.48%)Manager - median $820 (6.21%)Director - median $5,219 (1.04%)Senior Director and above - median $16,076 to $239,262 (0.27%)
ProductPricePays
X39 sleeve - retail customer, one-time
30 patches, one per day. $5.00 per patch. No drug, no stimulant, no transdermal active ingredient, no electronics.
$149.95
monthly supply
77 BV at wholesale
X39 sleeve - subscription or Brand Partner wholesale
$3.33 per patch per day. Note the asymmetry: identical price, but the plan credits 77 BV when a Brand Partner buys and 43 BV when a Preferred Customer buys - roughly 1.8 times the volume for the self-purchase.
$99.95
monthly
77 BV (partner) / 43 BV (customer)
Starter Pack (entry)
A genuinely low barrier and it deserves credit. It also contains no product sleeves, carries zero PV, pays the sponsor nothing and leaves the new partner unqualified for anything.
$25.00
one-time
0 PV · $0 to sponsor
Core Pack (was Silver)
Three or six sleeves. The first pack at which enrollment starts paying the person who enrolled you.
$295.00
one-time
180 PV · $35 to sponsor
Advanced Pack (was Gold)
Six or twelve sleeves. Pack pricing and PIB values are from the restructure effective 30 September 2024.
$535.00
one-time
300 PV · $75 to sponsor
Premium Pack (was Diamond)
Twenty sleeves of X39 or X49, or forty of other patches. The $405 Product Introduction Bonus is 23% of the purchase price, paid to the sponsor on the act of enrollment. This is what a sponsor is economically incentivised to sell.
$1,750.00
one-time
745 PV · $405 to sponsor
Annual renewal
Low, and it should be said. The renewal is not where the money leaves; the monthly volume requirement is.
$25.00
annual
110 PV monthly qualification
One X39 sleeve at 77 BV plus at least one further patch pack at 39 BV. Required for Manager rank and the 25% Level 1 matching bonus. Roughly $1,800–2,100 a year, against average annual earnings across all Brand Partners of $651 before expenses.
~$150–175/mo
recurring
Background check

Who runs it, and what they ran before

DS
David Schmidt
Founder; described variously as Chairman and as Chief Executive

The defining figure - the company’s story is his story, and it is told through his credentials, which is why they were checked. Begin with what cuts in his favor: no regulatory action, no enforcement proceeding, no criminal matter and no civil judgment against him personally could be located in any jurisdiction. That is a materially better starting point than the category norm and it should be said first and plainly. The concern here is inflated self-presentation, not adjudicated misconduct, and the two must not be blurred. The company biography claims 130 issued patents, of which more than seventy in regenerative science. A third-party industry site says over 200. McGill University’s Office for Science and Society recorded a claim of 94. Against primary records, LifeWave, Inc. and SOLETLUNA Holdings together account for roughly 38 US patent records - and that figure includes published applications that are not issued patents at all, plus design patents, which protect ornamental appearance and say nothing about whether a device works. A global family count including foreign counterparts may be larger; “130 issued patents” put in front of a prospective distributor is not supported by the searchable US record. McGill also reports that the claimed honorary doctorate from the “International Hall of Fame of Inventors” proved fictitious, tracing to a now-dissolved nonprofit; that is an academic institution’s published analysis, not a court or regulator finding, and no rebuttal from the company could be located. Distributors in the field routinely style him “Dr.” He holds no earned academic doctorate and no medical qualification that could be verified.

MB
Meredith Berkich
President

Named as President in Direct Selling News coverage of June 2025, in the same article that carries the company-supplied revenue trajectory from $20 million in 2018 to $555 million in 2024 across 55 countries of operation. Nothing adverse concerning her could be located. She is recorded here because the operating leadership of a private company is a material fact for anyone contracting with it, and because the distinction between the founder-figure who fronts the science story and the executive who runs the business is one a prospective participant should be able to see.

On
Ownership note
Where the assets actually sit

SOLETLUNA Holdings, Inc. holds a substantial block of the phototherapy intellectual property with Schmidt named as inventor; LifeWave Products, LLC holds trademarks; LifeWave, Inc. is the entity a Brand Partner signs with. No public share register, no directors of record and no evidence of outside capital could be retrieved, and the corporate registry filings in Delaware, Utah and California were not obtained. There is nothing improper in a holding-company-over-operating-company structure and it is entirely standard. It is listed because the participant is contracting with the operating company, has no visibility into either entity’s accounts, and should not assume the two are interchangeable.

Registered address

Draper, Utah, USA - historically San Diego, California
Private, with no audited financial statements in the public domain. Every revenue figure available is either company-supplied to trade press or a third-party estimate and should be read that way: $20 million in 2018 rising to $555 million in 2024 on the company’s own account, with an outside estimator putting 2025 at roughly $581 million. That trajectory is the fact worth holding. Growth from 2020 to 2024 was roughly 5.5x; growth from 2024 to 2025 was approximately 4.7%. In a binary plan, the move from hypergrowth to flat is exactly the point at which the volume a recruit was promised stops arriving, because the leg beneath them stops filling. Anyone joining in 2026 joins after the inflection rather than before it. Note also the corporate shape: the phototherapy patents sit with SOLETLUNA Holdings, Inc. and the trademarks with LifeWave Products, LLC, while the Brand Partner contracts with LifeWave, Inc. That is lawful and common, but the asset and the counterparty are not the same corporate person.

Compensation plan

What has to be true for you to get paid

To coverYou need
Enrol and hold the business one year $25 + $25
Starter Pack, then the annual renewal - genuinely the cheapest entry on this site
Stay Active and eligible to cycle or take a PIB ~$70-100/mo
55 PV every 31 days; one X39 sleeve at 77 BV clears it comfortably
Hold Manager qualification and the 25% matching bonus ~$150-175/mo
110 PV - one X39 sleeve plus a further pack; roughly $1,800-2,100 a year
Cover that spend from commission ~3x the field average
average annual earnings across all US Brand Partners were $651, before expenses

Read this twice

Both sides of this sum are published by the company, which is why it is short. The 2024 US Earnings Disclosure records average annual earnings across all Brand Partners of $651 before expenses, with 79% of active partners earning zero commission, 34% earning nothing because they were inactive, and only 21% receiving any commission at all. At the rank holding 92.48% of active partners, the median is $0 and the average is $23 a year. Median zero means more than half of that group earned nothing whatsoever. On the cost side, the plan requires 55 PV in a rolling 31 days simply to be Active - to cycle in the binary and to receive a Product Introduction Bonus at all - and 110 PV for Manager rank and the Level 1 matching bonus. At wholesale that is roughly $70–100 a month for the first threshold and $150–175 for the second, or $1,800–2,100 a year, before the enrollment pack, before events, before tools and before shipping and tax, which the price sheets state are excluded. So a participant serious enough to want the rank the plan is built around is spending roughly three times the field-average gross commission to stay qualified. Two honest caveats belong here and both cut in the company’s favor. The Monthly Subscription Order is contractually optional and free under policy 6.4.1, so nothing forces the spend; the compulsion is economic, not contractual. And the volume can in principle be met by genuine Preferred Customer orders rather than self-purchase - except that the plan credits 43 BV when a customer buys X39 at $99.95 and 77 BV when a partner buys it at the same $99.95, which is a standing incentive to do the opposite. Event and tools costs could not be established and are not estimated here; that is a real gap in this arithmetic and it runs against the participant, not for them.

Run your own numbers

Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.

-
Cumulative net, after costs
Retained retained retail customers -
Commission that month -
Total commissions earned -
Total you paid in -
Net -

Commission on a customer holding a monthly X39 sleeve at $99.95, against the roughly $150 to $175 a month of personal volume needed to stay commission-qualified. Autoship itself is optional and free, which is a real credit - the cost here is volume, not a fee. Note the plan mechanic the model cannot show: the same $99.95 sleeve carries 77 BV bought at partner wholesale and 43 BV bought by a customer, so the plan pays about 1.8 times more when a partner buys than when a customer does. 79% of active US Brand Partners earned nothing in 2024. Your own subscription cost of $160/mo is included.

Your money

What it costs to replace this yourself

X39 is sold on one mechanism: that it elevates circulating GHK-Cu. GHK-Cu is a real copper tripeptide with a genuine literature, and it can be bought directly. So the honest comparison is not against a different patch - it is against the compound the patch is claimed to raise, which anyone can purchase in a form that actually contains it. Comparators are given as bands because concentrations and volumes differ.

What they sell youWhat you'd use insteadYour cost
X39 sleeve - $99.95–$149.95 a month, 30 patches, no GHK-Cu in the productTopical serum that actually contains GHK-Cu copper peptide~$30-60/mo
$3.33–$5.00 per patch, per day, indefinitelyPer-use cost of a copper-peptide serum at label directions~$1-2/day
Second patch pack bought only to reach 110 PV - $49.95–$74.95No volume requirement, so nothing is bought to qualify for anything$0
Premium enrollment pack - $1,750 for 20 sleevesBuying one month at a time and stopping when it does not work$0
Annual product spend to hold Manager qualification - ~$1,800-2,100Twelve months of an actual copper-peptide serum~$360-720
Claims of better sleep, energy, pain and recoveryA GP appointment about the symptom that made you look$0-150
Convention and regional event attendance, sector normNo events, no travel, no ticket$0
Total as sold
~$2,100-2,400 in year one
Total, built yourself
~$360-870 of the actual compound, plus a doctor

Price-to-value

The premium is not two or three times, which would be arguable for a branded consumable. It is a patch containing none of the molecule it is sold on, priced two to five times above a serum that contains it, supported by a single unregistered trial that measured the molecule in blood rather than any clinical outcome. Even taken at its most generous - accept the n=60 result entirely - what has been shown is a biomarker moving in one small unreplicated study. Nothing in that literature supports a claim about sleep, energy, pain, healing, aging or any disease. If the copper-peptide hypothesis is what attracted you, buy the copper peptide.

Odds of profit

Three operators, five horizons

Probability of cumulative net profit

Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%3 mo6 mo1 yr3 yr5 yr 8% 11% 12%
Patch buyer who took the $25 entry - joined for wholesale pricing, uses X39, no real intention to buildPart-time Brand Partner - 10 hrs/wk, Core or Advanced pack, holds 110 PV, some recruitingFull-time builder - 30+ hrs/wk, Premium pack, events, driving both binary legs

Patch buyer who took the $25 entry

joined for wholesale pricing, uses X39, no real intention to build

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 6% −$330
6 mo 7% −$640
1 yr 8% −$1,270
3 yr 8% −$3,800
5 yr 8% −$6,300

Part-time Brand Partner

10 hrs/wk, Core or Advanced pack, holds 110 PV, some recruiting

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 4% −$800
6 mo 6% −$1,400
1 yr 8% −$2,500
3 yr 10% −$6,800
5 yr 11% −$10,500

Full-time builder

30+ hrs/wk, Premium pack, events, driving both binary legs

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 2% −$2,600
6 mo 4% −$4,300
1 yr 7% −$7,400
3 yr 11% −$17,000
5 yr 12% −$25,000

Methodology note. ANCHORED to LifeWave’s own 2024 US Earnings Disclosure Statement: that 92.48% of active Brand Partners sit at the bottom rank with a median of $0 and an average of $23 a year; that 79% of active partners earned zero commission; that 34% earned nothing through inactivity and only 21% received any commission payment; that average annual earnings across all Brand Partners were $651 before expenses; and that time-to-rank runs 4 months to Manager, 9 to Director, 13 to Senior Director, 19 to Executive Director, 23 to Presidential Director and 27 to Senior Presidential Director. Those are the reasons no cohort here shows a majority in cumulative profit at any horizon, and why the medians stay negative where a rank table would look encouraging. Anchored also to the published cost side: the $25 Starter Pack and $25 renewal, the $295 / $535 / $1,750 packs, the 55 PV and 110 PV thresholds, the $99.95 wholesale sleeve at 77 BV, the $50 binary cycle value, the $100 weekly cycle cap below Manager and the 60% payout ceiling. MODELED by us: every dollar of expense beyond those published items, because event and tools costs could not be retrieved at all; the share of each cohort in cumulative profit; and the cohort definitions, which the company does not segment. Two calibration notes that cut in the company’s favor. Autoship is contractually optional and free under policy 6.4.1, so the monthly spend is a choice rather than a contractual obligation, and a partner who genuinely stops buying stops losing. And the 110 PV can be met by real Preferred Customer orders, so a partner with an established customer base sits materially better than these medians. The medians describe the typical participant, and the disclosure says the typical participant earned nothing.

Go-to-market

Where you are actually allowed to promote this

Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.

Channel
Status
Notes
Amazon, eBay and other online marketplaces
PROHIBITED FOR DISTRIBUTORS - WHILE THE COMPANY SELLS THERE
§4.18.2 bars Brand Partners from retail establishments and online marketplaces. LifeWave itself lists X39 on Amazon. The company may therefore compete for the same buyer in a channel from which its own field is contractually excluded, and a partner holding $1,750 of Premium-pack inventory has no marketplace route to liquidate it.
Disease and health claims
PROHIBITED ON PAPER, PERVASIVE IN THE FIELD
§4.8.1 forbids any statement that the products diagnose, treat, cure, prevent or mitigate disease and §4.8.2 restricts partners to Official LifeWave Literature. Two DSSRC cases in thirteen months document posts claiming increased strength, reduced inflammation and rapid wound healing, and then Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer. The company told DSSRC it had resolved over 2,000 such incidents.
Income and lifestyle claims
PROHIBITED OUTRIGHT
§4.9.2.2 bars express or implied income and lifestyle claims to prospective or current Brand Partners, and §4.9.2.1 bars imagery of large homes, luxury cars and exotic vacations. As written this goes further than many peers and it is a genuine credit. As enforced, the FTC complaint of April 2026 quotes the company’s two most senior distributors on “$25,000 a week or more” and “unlimited income.”
Responsibility for what you say
ASSIGNED TO THE PARTNER
§4.8.3 places full responsibility for all verbal and written statements on the Brand Partner. Read plainly, the compliance risk created by a marketing culture the company has been managing at the scale of 2,000-plus incidents is contractually borne by the person whose published median income is $0.
Ownership of the customer
THE COMPANY’S, NOT YOURS
§5.1.1 states that Brand Partners, sponsors and upline have no ownership, rights or authorization to access, control or act on behalf of any other account. The customer relationship sits with LifeWave. Nothing built here is an asset a participant can sell, move or take with them.
Working after you leave
RESTRICTED FOR TWELVE MONTHS
§4.7.2 bars a former Brand Partner, for twelve months after termination, from recruiting any other Brand Partner or Customer to another direct-selling company. §4.7.1 prohibits cross-sponsoring while active, and §4.6.2.2 requires any other direct-sales business to be kept on an entirely separate social media account.
Monthly subscription order (autoship)
OPTIONAL AND FREE
§6.4.1 states in terms that the Monthly Subscription Order is not mandatory and is free of charge for Brand Partners. There is no forced autoship anywhere in this agreement, which is better than a great deal of this sector. The compulsion to spend is economic - you cannot cycle without volume - not contractual, and that distinction is worth real credit.
Paid advertising and keyword bidding
NOT ESTABLISHED
No paid-search, PPC or brand-keyword provision could be located in the retrieved policy text. That is not a permission. Given the strictness of the claims rules elsewhere in the document, a participant should assume restriction and get any advertising plan approved in writing before spending money on it.
The evidence

Red flags and green flags

Red flags

15
179% of active US Brand Partners earned zero commission in 2024
From the company’s own published earnings disclosure, as characterised in the FTC’s April 2026 complaint. A further 34% earned nothing because they were inactive, and only 21% received any commission payment at all.
2The rank holding 92.48% of active partners has a median of $0
Average at that rank is $23 for the year. Median zero means more than half of the people in the group that contains almost everybody earned nothing whatsoever. Average annual earnings across all Brand Partners were $651, before expenses.
3$3.33 to $5.00 per patch, per day, for a disc with no active ingredient
$99.95–$149.95 a month for thirty adhesive discs containing no drug, no stimulant, no transdermal active and no electronics. A topical serum that actually contains the GHK-Cu the patch is sold on costs roughly $30–60 a month.
4The entire evidence base is one author group, unregistered and unreplicated
M. and C. Connor appear on every paper. Two journals, neither indexed in PubMed. No ClinicalTrials.gov registration for LifeWave or X39. No funding statement and no conflict disclosure in either paper. No independent replication in six years.
5What was measured was a peptide, not stem cells
The n=60 trial reported circulating GHK-Cu rising from 28.11 to 39.09 ng/ml between day 2 and day 7 in the active arm. It did not measure stem cells. The step from that result to “stem cell activator” - which is the product’s own URL - is a marketing inference, not a scientific one.
6X39 is not FDA-cleared and not FDA-approved
There is no 510(k) clearance and no premarket approval. MAUDE product codes KGX and OMW are consistent with device listing, which is an administrative act in which the FDA reviews nothing. The patches are sold under general-wellness enforcement discretion, which is a decision not to enforce, not a review.
7The company says it has resolved over 2,000 salesforce claim incidents
LifeWave’s own figure, given to DSSRC in case #199-2025. This is the number that reframes everything else: not a handful of rogue distributors but a systemic condition being managed at industrial scale by a compliance function that removes posts after they have done their work.
8Two DSSRC administrative closures in thirteen months
#199-2025 closed 3 March 2025 over seven earnings posts and two product posts; #254-2026 closed 1 April 2026 over “ABILITY TO MAKE $25,000 A WEEK” and posts claiming the patches helped with Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer. Self-regulatory, not governmental: no fine, no order, no finding that any law was violated.
9The FTC sued the company’s two most senior distributors
FTC v. Steven and Gina Merritt, complaint filed 27 April 2026 in the Southern District of Florida against Elite Senior Presidential Directors with roughly 250,000 Brand Partners beneath them, over representations including “$25,000 a week or more.” Resolved by stipulated order. LifeWave was not a defendant, there is no admission of liability, and the Commission vote was 2–0.
10X39 carries 77 BV for a partner and 43 BV for a customer at the same $99.95
Identical dollars, roughly 1.8 times the volume when a Brand Partner buys rather than a Preferred Customer. That is the internal-consumption incentive in a single number, and it sits directly against the 2:1 consumption ratio the plan claims elsewhere.
11The Premium pack pays the sponsor $405 on $1,750
23% of the purchase price paid out on the act of enrolling somebody. Against $35 on the $295 Core pack and $75 on the $535 Advanced pack. The plan tells a sponsor exactly which conversation is worth having.
12No rank above Manager is reachable without recruiting
Every rank from Director upward is defined by personally sponsored distributors at specified ranks plus team volume of 10,000 to 200,000 BV in 31 days. Below Manager the binary is capped at $100 a week. The plan is explicitly a funnel toward recruitment-driven rank.
13Founder credential inflation across three incompatible patent counts
130 on the company’s own site, over 200 on an industry profile, 94 as recorded by McGill - against roughly 38 verifiable US records across two assignees, a count that itself includes unissued applications and design patents. The claimed honorary doctorate traces, per McGill, to a now-dissolved nonprofit. No adjudicated misconduct of any kind against him, which is a separate matter and is recorded as such.
14Growth has flattened sharply after four years of hypergrowth
Roughly 5.5x from 2020 to 2024 on the available figures, then approximately 4.7% from 2024 to 2025 on a third-party estimate. In a binary plan that transition is precisely when the volume a recruit was promised stops arriving. There are no audited accounts against which to check any of it.
15The BBB asked for substantiation and did not get it
The BBB requested substantiation of product claims on 5 February 2025 and recorded them as still unsubstantiated on 27 March 2025, alongside a non-accredited listing and a failure to respond to one complaint. A private ratings body’s position, not a regulator’s finding - recorded at that weight and no higher.

Green flags

6
1Autoship is contractually optional and free
Policy 6.4.1 states that the Monthly Subscription Order is not mandatory and is free of charge for Brand Partners. There is no forced monthly order anywhere in the agreement. The pressure to spend is economic rather than contractual, and a participant who stops buying stops losing money - which is not true of every plan graded on this site.
2A $25 entry and a $25 annual renewal
The floor cost of trying this is genuinely low, and low entry costs are a real consumer protection because they limit the damage of a bad decision. The caveat belongs in the same sentence: the Starter Pack carries zero PV, contains no product and pays the sponsor nothing, so the plan’s own economics push hard toward the $295, $535 and $1,750 packs.
3The income disclosure is unusually good
Published annually for the US market, with medians set alongside averages, an explicit statement that the figures are before expenses, and the zero-earner and inactive rates given directly. Many companies in this sector publish nothing at all, and several that do publish averages without medians. The numbers are terrible; disclosing them this clearly is a real credit and is recorded as one.
4The rank distribution and time-to-rank are both published
The disclosure gives the share of partners at every rank - down to the 0.05% at the top - and how long the median person took to reach each: 4 months to Manager, 9 to Director, 13 to Senior Director, 19 to Executive Director, 23 to Presidential Director, 27 to Senior Presidential Director. That lets a prospect check the timeline they were sold against the company’s own data before signing anything.
5A 2:1 consumption ratio and a 110 QV cap on self-qualification
The plan requires a 2:1 ratio for all paid-as Managers and above, and caps at 110 Qualifying Volume the amount of a Brand Partner’s personal purchase that can count toward Personal Volume. Both are real anti-pyramid controls on their face, alongside a hard payout ceiling of 60% of total BV per commission week. Whether the ratio is audited or enforced could not be established, and an untested safeguard is worth less than a tested one.
6No adjudicated misconduct against the founder or the company
No regulatory action, enforcement proceeding, criminal matter or civil judgment against David Schmidt personally could be located in any jurisdiction, and no FDA warning letter, FTC complaint or state attorney general action names LifeWave, Inc. itself as a respondent or defendant. The credential findings in this report are about inflated self-presentation. They are not a legal history and must not be read as one.
What would move this grade

We would like to be wrong about this

Upward

  • An independent replication of the GHK-Cu finding by a university group with no commercial relationship to the company, prospectively registered on ClinicalTrials.gov and published in a PubMed-indexed journal with a full funding declaration - and dropping the stem-cell framing, including the product URL, until there is evidence about stem cells rather than about a peptide.
  • Publishing the customer-to-distributor ratio and the share of revenue coming from non-participant customers, equalising the 77-versus-43 BV gap between the Brand Partner and Preferred Customer prices for X39, and publishing the enforcement record for the 2:1 consumption ratio - how many Managers were tested, how many failed and what happened to them.
  • Two consecutive years with no new self-regulatory case and no enforcement action against any senior distributor, alongside income disclosures for every market of operation and a prominently published buyback percentage and window rather than a truncated appendix.

Downward

  • Any FDA warning letter, FTC action or state attorney general proceeding naming LifeWave, Inc. itself rather than its distributors - a step change that would take this to the floor and keep it there.
  • A third DSSRC case, which would establish that the remediation process does not prevent recurrence, or a further enforcement action against senior field leadership on the same claim categories.
  • A retraction, expression of concern or demonstrated failure to replicate on the Connor GHK-Cu paper, evidence that the company funded the studies without disclosing it, or a revenue decline that forces cycle-cap compression and rank collapse from the bottom of the organization upward.
The better trade

Grade is F against arithmetic of 3.46, which is D−. A cap binds, it is printed in full above, and it rests on a pattern of tolerated claims rather than on any finding against the company.

Say the good parts properly, because they are not decoration. LifeWave publishes an annual US earnings disclosure with medians beside averages, the full rank distribution, time-to-rank for every rank and an explicit “before expenses” note. That is better than most of this sector manages and it is why the participant-economics score is a 3 rather than a 1 - the company is telling you the truth about what happens to people. Autoship is contractually optional and free under policy 6.4.1. Entry is $25 and renewal is $25. The plan carries a 60% payout ceiling, a 2:1 consumption ratio for paid-as Managers and above, and a 110 QV cap on how much of your own purchasing can qualify you. There is a real Preferred Customer program with its own price list and its own compensation document. And no regulator has ever brought an action against the company or its founder. A report that skipped all of that in order to reach its conclusion faster would not be worth reading.

Now the two spines. The product: thirty adhesive discs a month at $99.95–$149.95, containing no drug, no stimulant, no transdermal active ingredient and no electronics, sold on the proposition that they activate stem cells by elevating GHK-Cu. One study addresses that properly - a double-blind randomised trial, n=60, reporting roughly a 39% within-arm rise between day 2 and day 7 at p<0.035 - and the design deserves acknowledgement because most of this category never commissions anything comparable. Everything around it fails. One author group on every paper. Two journals outside PubMed indexing. No ClinicalTrials.gov registration, so outcome-switching cannot be checked. No funding statement in either paper, with the sole commercial beneficiary obvious. No independent replication in six years, for a result that would be genuinely remarkable if true. And the thing measured was a peptide in blood, not stem cells. That distinction is the whole difference between the evidence and the marketing, and the product’s own URL is x39stemcellactivator.

The second spine is the claims pattern, and it must be read exactly as written. The company’s own copy is careful: no stem-cell claim on the science page, the FDA disclaimer on product pages, a flat prohibition on disease claims at 4.8.1 and on income and lifestyle claims at 4.9.2.2. What the field says is documented by a self-regulator and a federal agency. Two DSSRC administrative closures in thirteen months, the second covering posts claiming the patches addressed Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer - self-regulatory, no fine, no finding of law violated. An FTC civil complaint filed 27 April 2026 against the company’s two most senior distributors, with a downline of roughly 250,000, resolved by stipulated order with no admission and a 2–0 vote, in which LifeWave was not a defendant. A BBB request for substantiation on 5 February 2025 still unsatisfied on 27 March 2025 - a private ratings body, not a regulator. And the company’s own statement to DSSRC that it had resolved over 2,000 similar incidents. No one of those is a finding against the company. Together they describe a compliance function that documents violations at scale rather than preventing them, with §4.8.3 assigning full responsibility for every statement to the partner whose published median income is $0. That pattern is what the cap rests on, and it is the reason the grade sits one band below its arithmetic.

1

Buy the copper peptide instead of the patch

If the GHK-Cu hypothesis is what interested you, it is buyable. A topical serum that actually contains the compound costs roughly $30–60 a month against $99.95–$149.95 for a patch that contains none of it. You are not giving anything up: the single study underpinning X39 measured the peptide in blood and reported no clinical outcome at all, so there is nothing in that literature about sleep, energy, pain, healing or aging to forgo.

2

Read the earnings disclosure before the presentation, not after

The company publishes it and it is short. Find the rank holding 92.48% of active partners, note that the median is $0 and the average is $23, note that 79% of active partners earned zero commission and that the all-partner average of $651 is stated as before expenses. Then ask the person recruiting you which of those numbers they think does not apply to you, and why. If the answer is about effort rather than evidence, you have your answer.

3

Price the 110 PV before you price the opportunity

Staying Active takes 55 PV every 31 days; Manager rank and the 25% matching bonus take 110 PV. At wholesale that is roughly $150–175 a month, or $1,800–2,100 a year, before the enrollment pack, events, tools, shipping and tax. Autoship is genuinely optional and free, so nothing forces it - but nothing pays without it either. Write the annual figure down and compare it to $651.

4

If you want to sell wellness, own the customer

Under §5.1.1 the customer relationship belongs to LifeWave, §4.18.2 bars you from Amazon and every other marketplace while the company sells X39 there itself, and §4.7.2 restricts you for twelve months after you leave. A retail or content business in the same category - where you hold the customer list, choose the products, keep the margin and can say what the evidence actually shows - requires no pack, no rank, no volume threshold and no permission to speak.

Seventy-nine percent of active US Brand Partners earned zero commission in 2024, and the company told a self-regulator it had resolved over 2,000 salesforce claim incidents. Both numbers are LifeWave’s own.
Scorecard

Nine dimensions, weighted

Comp structure & KoscotDoes the plan pay for recruitment or for sales to real customers?
20%
3.0
A hybrid plan: unilevel for retail and level commissions, binary for the residual engine. The Product Introduction Bonus is paid in full to the sponsor when a recruit buys an enrollment pack, and it scales with the pack - $35 on the $295 Core, $75 on the $535 Advanced, $405 on the $1,750 Premium. That last figure is 23% of the purchase price paid out on the act of enrolling somebody. Below Manager the binary is capped at $100 a week, which funnels every serious participant toward rank, and every rank above Manager is defined by personally sponsored distributors at specified ranks plus team volume of 10,000 to 200,000 BV. No rank in this plan is reachable by retail selling alone. There are real counterweights - a 60% payout ceiling, a 2:1 consumption ratio for paid-as Managers, a 110 QV cap on self-qualification - and they are why this is a 3 and not a 1.
Securities exposureAny passive return on capital? Howey, staking, tokens, withdrawal friction.
15%
8.0
No investment contract, no passive return on capital, no token, no staking, no lock-up and no withdrawal friction of any kind could be located. Compensation is paid on product movement and nothing else, and no securities regulator in any jurisdiction has been involved. On structure this is a plain product-sales plan and it scores near the top of the range. The deduction is conduct rather than architecture. The FTC complaint of 27 April 2026 against the company’s two most senior distributors quotes them marketing the plan as a passive return - “the money keeps coming, even if you don’t show up, and you can’t stop it” - with six recruits framed as $500 a week and 300 as $25,000 a week. Selling a commission structure as if it were an income-producing asset is how a lawful plan gets sold as something it is not. LifeWave was not a defendant and there is no admission.
Ownership & track recordWho runs it, what did they run before, and what happened to it.
15%
3.0
Start with the credit, because it is real: no regulatory action, no enforcement proceeding, no criminal matter and no civil judgment against David Schmidt personally could be located anywhere. This is credential inflation, not a legal history, and the difference matters. But the credentials are the product’s main non-scientific support and they do not hold. The patent claim is 130 on the company’s own site, over 200 on an industry profile and 94 as recorded by McGill - three numbers for one man - against roughly 38 verifiable US records across two assignees, a count that itself includes unissued applications and design patents. The honorary doctorate traces, per McGill, to a now-dissolved nonprofit and was described as fictitious. The claimed defense-sector work at Advanced Applications Group, General Dynamics and a Navy mini-sub program appears only in company-controlled or sympathetic material and could not be corroborated.
Product reality & demandWould a rational buyer purchase this if no income offer existed?
12%
2.0
An adhesive disc with no drug, no stimulant, no transdermal active ingredient and no electronics, whose stated mechanism is that it reflects the body’s own infrared emission back at the skin. The entire scientific proposition rests on one double-blind randomised trial, n=60, reporting a roughly 39% rise in circulating GHK-Cu between day 2 and day 7 in the active arm at p<0.035. The design is genuinely appropriate for the question and most companies in this category never commission anything of the sort. Everything around it fails: one author group on every paper, two journals not indexed in PubMed, no ClinicalTrials.gov registration, no funding statement, no conflict declaration, and no independent replication in six years. And what was measured was a peptide in blood, not stem cells. The gap between the finding and the marketing is the whole of the case.
Participant economicsReal cost in, realistic money out, and whether they publish the numbers.
10%
3.0
The disclosure itself deserves credit in the same breath as its contents. LifeWave publishes a US earnings statement annually, with medians alongside averages, the full rank distribution, time-to-rank by rank, and an explicit statement that figures are before expenses. That is above the sector norm and several peers publish nothing at all. Now the numbers. The rank holding 92.48% of active Brand Partners has a median of $0 and an average of $23 a year. Some 79% of active partners earned zero commission in 2024, 34% earned nothing because they were inactive, and only 21% received any commission payment. Average annual earnings across all Brand Partners were $651 before expenses. Holding 110 PV - the threshold for Manager and the 25% matching bonus - costs roughly $150–175 a month, or $1,800–2,100 a year.
Price-to-valueWhat the same capability costs on the open market.
8%
1.0
One sleeve is thirty patches, one month, at $149.95 one-time or $99.95 on subscription - $3.33 to $5.00 per patch, per day, indefinitely, for an adhesive disc containing no active ingredient. The proposition is that it elevates the copper tripeptide GHK-Cu. GHK-Cu is a real molecule with a real literature, and a topical serum that actually contains it retails at roughly $30–60 a month on the open market. So the participant is paying two to five times the price of the actual compound for a patch that does not contain it, on the strength of a single unreplicated biomarker paper. There is no version of this arithmetic that works for the buyer. This is the clearest single number in the report and it is the reason the dimension scores at the floor.
Payout sustainabilityCan the company fund the plan out of margin, or only out of inflow?
8%
4.0
No audited accounts exist, so solvency cannot be assessed directly. What can be read is the shape. Company-supplied figures put revenue at $20 million in 2018 and $555 million in 2024; a third-party estimator puts 2025 at roughly $581 million, which is growth of about 4.7% after four years of roughly 5.5x. The plan carries a hard ceiling of 60% of total BV per commission week, which is a genuine structural discipline and is why this is not lower. Against it: the Product Introduction Bonus front-loads payout onto enrollment rather than repeat sale, and a binary under flattening volume compresses cycles from the bottom of the organization upward. Late entrants inherit the saturated structure without the growth story that was sold to the people above them.
Marketing conductIncome claims, regulator run-ins, hype, deadline stacking.
7%
1.0
This is the number the cap rests on. The company’s own copy is careful: the X39 science page makes no stem-cell claim, cites no clinical study and carries the FDA disclaimer, and the Policies & Procedures forbid disease claims at 4.8.1 and forbid express or implied income and lifestyle claims outright at 4.9.2.2. What the field says is documented by a self-regulator and a federal agency, not by anecdote - “financial freedom,” “passive income,” “7 figures per year,” and posts claiming the patches helped with Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer. The product URL is x39stemcellactivator while McGill reports the company instructs sellers to remove all references to scientific studies. And LifeWave told DSSRC it had resolved over 2,000 similar incidents. A compliance function operating at that volume is cataloguing the problem, not stopping it.
Operator terms & exitWho owns the customer, what you forfeit, how hard it is to leave.
5%
4.0
Two genuine credits at the top. Policy 6.4.1 states that the Monthly Subscription Order is not mandatory and is free of charge for Brand Partners - there is no forced autoship in the contract, and the compulsion is economic rather than contractual, which is a real distinction. Entry is $25 and renewal is $25. Against that: §4.18.2 bars distributors from retail establishments and online marketplaces, meaning no Amazon and no eBay, while LifeWave itself lists X39 on Amazon - the company may compete in a channel its field is barred from. §4.7.2 imposes a twelve-month post-termination bar on recruiting any Brand Partner or Customer to another direct-selling company. §5.1.1 places the customer relationship with LifeWave, not the partner. §4.8.3 assigns full responsibility for all statements to the person whose median income is $0.
Weighted composite
3.50
F

Dimension profile

Further from center is better. Hover any point.

Comp structure& Koscot 3.0 Securitiesexposure 8.0 Ownership &track record 3.0 Product reality& demand 2.0 Participanteconomics 3.0 Price-to-value 1.0 Payoutsustainability 4.0 Marketingconduct 1.0 Operator terms& exit 4.0

Hard caps that bind here

Cap at F a documented pattern of tolerated claims, at a scale the company itself has quantified. State the limits of this first, because they are the point. No FDA warning letter, no FTC complaint and no state attorney general proceeding names LifeWave, Inc. as a respondent or defendant, and this cap rests on no finding of liability against the company, because there is none. What exists is a pattern. The FTC filed a civil complaint on 27 April 2026 in the Southern District of Florida against Steven and Gina Merritt, the company’s Elite Senior Presidential Directors with a downline of roughly 250,000, over earnings representations including $25,000 a week; it resolved by stipulated order, LifeWave was not a defendant, there is no admission of liability and the Commission vote was 2–0. Two DSSRC administrative closures landed in thirteen months, #199-2025 and #254-2026, the second covering posts claiming the patches addressed Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer; both are self-regulatory rather than governmental, and neither carried a fine or a finding that any law was violated. The BBB asked for substantiation of product claims on 5 February 2025 and recorded them as still unsubstantiated on 27 March 2025 - a private ratings body’s position, not a regulator’s. And the load-bearing fact, supplied by the company itself: in the 2025 DSSRC file LifeWave stated it had resolved over 2,000 similar incidents. A compliance function that documents violations at that scale is one that processes the problem rather than prevents it. The weighted arithmetic is 3.46, which is the D− band. This cap takes the published grade one band lower to F, and it is printed here rather than buried so a reader can weigh it and disagree with it.
Cap at D- the evidence base cannot carry the product’s price or its promise. X39 is sold at $99.95–$149.95 a month on the proposition that it activates stem cells. The supporting literature is one unregistered double-blind trial, n=60, by a single author group - M. and C. Connor appear on every paper - published in journals not indexed in PubMed, with no ClinicalTrials.gov registration, no funding statement and no conflict-of-interest disclosure, and with no independent replication in the six years since. The reported result was a within-arm day 2 to day 7 change in a circulating peptide, which is a weaker analysis than the randomised design would have permitted. And the thing measured was GHK-Cu, not stem cells. A 39% elevation of a circulating peptide from a non-transdermal adhesive disc would be a remarkable biological result; it has been reported once, by a group with no institutional independence from the seller, and nobody has reproduced it. That is preliminary, low-confidence evidence for a biomarker effect and no evidence whatever for a clinical benefit. This cap matches the arithmetic band rather than binding below it.

The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.

Sources consulted

What we read

Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.

  1. LifeWave 2024 U.S. Earnings Disclosure - “Participating in LifeWave®” (PDF)
    Income disclosureTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2024archived copy

    LifeWave 2024 US Earnings Disclosure Statement - 92.48% of active Brand Partners at the base rank with a median of $0 and an average of $23; 34% earning nothing through inactivity; 21% receiving any commission; all-partner average of $651 stated as before expenses; full rank distribution and time-to-rank of 4, 9, 13, 19, 23 and 27 months

  2. LifeWave 2023 U.S. Earnings Disclosure Statement (PDF) - prior-year comparator
    Income disclosureTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2023archived copy
  3. LifeWave Policies & Procedures, United States of America, revised 15 April 2025 / effective 1 May 2025 (PDF, file reference PnP_US_EN_16Apr2025)
    Policies & proceduresTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2025-04archived copy

    LifeWave US Policies & Procedures, 16 April 2025 - §4.7.1 and §4.7.2 cross-sponsoring and the twelve-month post-termination bar, §4.8.1 and §4.8.2 disease-claim prohibition and Official Literature restriction, §4.8.3 assignment of responsibility to the Brand Partner, §4.9.2.1 and §4.9.2.2 lifestyle and income-claim prohibitions, §4.18.2 marketplace and retail-establishment ban, §5.1.1 company ownership of the customer account, §6.4.1 optional and free Monthly Subscription Order, §9.5 termination for cause

  4. LifeWave Compensation Plan - Commissions and Bonuses, revision R05 (PDF)
    Compensation planTier 1LifeWave, Inc.archived copy

    LifeWave compensation documents - bonuses and qualification summaries - $50 binary cycle value, 660 BV power leg and 330 BV profit leg, 55 PV Active and 110 PV Manager thresholds, weekly cycle caps of $100 below Manager rising to $25,000 at Senior Presidential Director, 25%/20%/20% matching bonus generations, 60% weekly payout ceiling, 2:1 consumption ratio for paid-as Managers and above

  5. LifeWave Compensation Plan Bonuses, revision R01 (PDF) - earlier revision
    Compensation planTier 1LifeWave, Inc.archived copy
  6. LifeWave U.S.A. Compensation Plan, document LW0052-US-EN R01 (PDF, copy served by LifeWave Korea)
    Compensation planTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2025-10-23archived copy
  7. LifeWave Enrollment Packs 2024 - New Pack Structure Effective September 30, 2024 (corporate PDF, distributor-hosted copy)
    Company documentTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2024-09-30archived copy

    LifeWave enrollment pack schedule effective 30 September 2024 - Starter $25 at 0 PV and $0 PIB, Core $295 at 180 PV and $35 PIB, Advanced $535 at 300 PV and $75 PIB, Premium $1,750 at 745 PV and $405 PIB; product and Preferred Customer price sheets showing X39 at $149.95 retail and $99.95 wholesale at 77 BV against $99.95 Preferred Customer at 43 BV

    Not established by this document: The company-served US enrollment-pack price sheet (an ENROL-PRICING-USA-EN equivalent to the euro-zone ENROL-PRICING-EUR-EN R04) could not be located on secure.lifewave.com; the pack schedule is evidenced by the corporate “Enrollment Packs 2024” sheet above, which carries all four pack prices, PV and PIB figures. The X39 retail $149.95 / wholesale $99.95 at 77 BV line is not on the Preferred Customer sheet, which prints only the $99.95 / 43 BV preferred price; no separate US retail/wholesale BV sheet was found.

  8. LifeWave USA Preferred Customer Price List, PREF-PRICING-USA-EN R01 (PDF) - X39 at $99.95 / 43 BV
    Company documentTier 1LifeWave, Inc.archived copy
  9. LifeWave New Enrollment Pack Brand Partner FAQ, August 2024 (PDF)
    Company documentTier 1LifeWave, Inc. (distributor-hosted copy) · 2024-08archived copy
  10. FTC v. Steven Merritt and Gina Merritt - case page, FTC Matter No. 2523134
    RegulatorTier 1United States Federal Trade Commission · 2026-04archived copy

    FTC v. Steven Merritt and Gina Merritt, complaint filed 27 April 2026, US District Court for the Southern District of Florida - Elite Senior Presidential Directors with a downline of roughly 250,000; representations including “$25,000 a week or more,” “unlimited income” and “the money keeps coming, even if you don’t show up”; resolved by stipulated order, no admission of liability, LifeWave not a defendant, Commission vote 2–0; complaint cites LifeWave’s disclosure for the 79% zero-commission figure and for fewer than 0.035% reaching $25,000 in a week

  11. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, FTC v. Merritt, S.D. Fla., filed 27 April 2026 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1United States Federal Trade Commission · 2026-04-27archived copy
  12. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, FTC v. Merritt (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1United States Federal Trade Commission · 2026archived copy
  13. FTC press release, “FTC Takes Action Against High-Level MLM Participants Who Deceived Workers About the Amount of Money They Can Earn,” April 2026
    RegulatorTier 1United States Federal Trade Commission · 2026-04archived copy
  14. DSSRC Case #199-2025: Administrative Closure - LifeWave, Inc., closed 3 March 2025
    Self-regulatoryTier 2BBB National Programs, Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council · 2025-03-03archived copy

    BBB National Programs DSSRC administrative closures - case #199-2025 closed 3 March 2025 covering seven earnings posts and two product posts, in which LifeWave stated it had resolved over 2,000 similar incidents; case #254-2026 closed 1 April 2026 covering “ABILITY TO MAKE $25,000 A WEEK” and product posts referencing Alzheimer’s disease, autoimmune disease and cancer. Self-regulatory; no fine, no order, no finding of law violated

  15. DSSRC Case #254-2026: Administrative Closure - LifeWave, Inc., closed 1 April 2026
    Self-regulatoryTier 2BBB National Programs, Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council · 2026-04-01archived copy
  16. Connor CA et al., “Double-Blind Testing of the LifeWave X39 Patch to Determine GHK-Cu Production Levels,” Internal Medicine Research – Open Journal 6(1), 2021 (PDF)
    AcademicTier 3Internal Medicine Research – Open Journal (Research Open World) · 2021-03-07archived copy

    Connor CA, Connor MH, Yue D, Eickhoff J, Wagner S, Chang A, “Double-Blind Testing of the LifeWave X39 Patch to Determine GHK-Cu Production Levels,” Internal Medicine Research – Open Journal 6(1), 7 March 2021 - n=60 enrolled, active arm GHK-Cu 28.11 ng/ml at day 2 to 39.09 ng/ml at day 7 (p<0.035), total GHK-Cu 47.43 to 66.51 ng (p<0.03), no funding statement; and Connor MH et al., International Journal of Healing and Caring 2020;20(2), n=15, uncontrolled and unblinded, ethics approval from the National Foundation for Energy Healing rather than an institutional review board

  17. Journal landing page for the same X39 GHK-Cu double-blind paper
    AcademicTier 3Internal Medicine Research – Open Journal (Research Open World) · 2021archived copy
  18. Connor MH et al., “LifeWave X39 Pilot Demonstrates Light Triggered Changes,” International Journal of Healing and Caring 20(2), 2020 (PDF)
    AcademicTier 3International Journal of Healing and Caring · 2020-05archived copy
  19. IJHC article page for the 2020 X39 pilot (n=15, uncontrolled, unblinded)
    AcademicTier 3International Journal of Healing and Caring · 2020-04-20archived copy
  20. LifeWave’s own hosted copy of the 2020 IJHC tripeptide study (PDF)
    Company documentTier 1LifeWave, Inc. · 2020-05archived copy
  21. FDA guidance, “General Wellness: Policy for Low Risk Devices” (Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff, CDRH)
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health · 2026-01archived copy

    FDA General Wellness: Policy for Low Risk Devices guidance, and FDA MAUDE records under manufacturer “LIFEWAVE, INC.” with product codes KGX (tape and bandage, adhesive) and OMW (adhesive backed thermal skin patches) - consistent with device listing, which is not clearance and not approval; MAUDE entries are unverified voluntary reports establishing no causation

    Not established by this document: MAUDE returns results only from a POST-driven search form; there is no stable per-manufacturer permalink for the “LIFEWAVE, INC.” / KGX / OMW result set, so the database entry point is cited rather than a query URL. FDA establishment-registration and device-listing records were not separately located (this is also flagged in the report’s own unverified list).

  22. MAUDE - Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience database search (search by manufacturer “LIFEWAVE, INC.”)
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Food and Drug Administrationarchived copy
  23. FDA, “About the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) Database” - limitations of voluntary adverse-event reports
    RegulatorTier 1U.S. Food and Drug Administrationarchived copy
  24. Jonathan Jarry, “Patchy Science on LifeWave’s Mysterious Patches,” McGill Office for Science and Society
    AcademicTier 3McGill University, Office for Science and Societyarchived copy

    McGill University Office for Science and Society analysis of LifeWave - the 94-patent figure, the honorary doctorate traced to a dissolved nonprofit, inconsistent descriptions of patch contents across company publications, and the instruction to sellers to remove references to scientific studies; Paul Knoepfler (UC Davis), The Niche, February 2023 - no ClinicalTrials.gov registration for LifeWave or X39 and no PubMed indexing for the journals; USPTO records via Justia for LifeWave, Inc. and SOLETLUNA Holdings, Inc. - roughly 38 records across both assignees including unissued applications and design patents; BBB business profile recording the 5 February 2025 substantiation request unsatisfied as of 27 March 2025

    Not established by this document: No stable public URL was found for a ClinicalTrials.gov “no results” query for LifeWave/X39 (a null search result has no permalink). The trademark side of the USPTO record is indexed by Justia’s patent assignee pages cited above; no single USPTO TSDR page covers the ~38-record figure, and no serial number is given in the prose from which a TSDR statusview URL could be constructed.

  25. Paul Knoepfler, “LifeWave X39 stem cell patch story has holes,” The Niche, February 2023
    AcademicTier 3The Niche (Paul Knoepfler, University of California, Davis) · 2023-02archived copy
  26. Patents assigned to SOLETLUNA Holdings, Inc. - Justia Patents
    Trademark recordTier 3Justia (indexing USPTO records)archived copy
  27. LifeWave, Inc. - BBB Business Profile, Draper, Utah (file 1166-90049728)
    Self-regulatoryTier 2Better Business Bureauarchived copy
Unable to verify

What we could not get

  • Whether the patches are CE-marked or placed on the EU market as medical devices under Regulation (EU) 2017/745, as cosmetics, or as general consumer goods - no EUDAMED entry could be located, and given a European footprint across a 55-country operation this is a material gap rather than a technicality
  • LifeWave’s FDA establishment registration number and its formal device listing record. The MAUDE product codes are consistent with listing but listing was not confirmed directly - and listing is neither clearance nor approval in any event
  • Audited financial statements, which do not exist publicly. Every revenue figure in this report is either company-supplied to trade press or a third-party estimate with undisclosed methodology, including the $555 million for 2024 and the roughly $581 million for 2025
  • Whether the 2:1 consumption ratio for paid-as Managers is actually audited or enforced, and what happens to a Manager who fails it. The compensation documents state the ratio; no verification, testing or clawback mechanism could be located, and a safeguard that is never tested is not yet a safeguard
  • The buyback and return percentage and time window. Appendix B of the Policies & Procedures truncated before the operative terms, which matters a great deal to anyone holding $1,750 of Premium-pack inventory in a plan that also bars marketplace resale
  • Event and tools costs - convention tickets, regional event pricing, replicated-website and back-office fees. No current published schedule could be retrieved, so no figure is estimated and the cost picture in this report is incomplete on the low side
  • The customer-to-distributor ratio, total Brand Partner headcount and the share of revenue from non-participant customers. This is the decisive number for the internal-consumption question and the company does not publish it
  • Who funded the Connor studies - neither paper carries a funding statement; whether David Schmidt was conferred any degree by Pace University, the biography claiming “formal education in” rather than a degree; and the claimed Advanced Applications Group, General Dynamics and US Navy mini-sub work, for which no independent corroboration could be found

Not advice

This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.

Who writes this

Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.

Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.

  • Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
  • The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
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Common questions

LifeWave - frequently asked

QIs LifeWave a pyramid scheme?
No court, regulator or attorney general has found it to be one, and no FDA warning letter, FTC complaint or state enforcement proceeding names LifeWave, Inc. itself as a respondent or defendant. The plan also carries genuine anti-pyramid controls: a hard payout ceiling of 60% of total BV per commission week, a 2:1 consumption ratio for all paid-as Managers and above, a 110 QV cap on how much personal purchasing can count toward Personal Volume, and a real Preferred Customer program with its own price list. The structural criticisms are specific rather than categorical. Every rank above Manager is defined by personally sponsored distributors at named ranks plus team volume of 10,000 to 200,000 BV, so no rank is reachable by retail selling alone. The binary caps at $100 a week below Manager. The Product Introduction Bonus pays a sponsor up to $405 on a $1,750 pack - 23% of the price, on the act of enrollment. And X39 credits 77 BV when a Brand Partner buys it at $99.95 but only 43 BV when a customer buys it at the same $99.95.
QHow much do LifeWave Brand Partners actually earn?
The company publishes this itself, annually, and the disclosure is better constructed than most in the sector - medians beside averages, the full rank distribution, time-to-rank, and an explicit statement that everything is before expenses. In 2024, 92.48% of active US Brand Partners sat at the base rank, where the median annual earnings were $0 and the average was $23. Median zero means more than half of that group earned nothing at all. Some 79% of active Brand Partners earned zero commission for the year, 34% earned nothing because they were inactive, and only 21% received any commission payment. Average annual earnings across all Brand Partners were $651, before expenses. Set that against the cost of staying qualified: 55 PV a month to be Active is roughly $70–100 of product, and the 110 PV needed for Manager rank and the 25% matching bonus is roughly $150–175 a month, or $1,800–2,100 a year.
QIs the LifeWave X39 patch FDA-approved?
No, and the wording matters because almost all coverage of this company blurs it. X39 is not FDA-approved: there is no premarket approval application. X39 is not FDA-cleared: there is no 510(k) clearance finding it substantially equivalent to a predicate device. What is verifiable is that LifeWave products appear in the FDA’s MAUDE adverse-event database under product codes KGX and OMW, which is consistent with device listing. Listing and registration are administrative acts in which a manufacturer tells the FDA that it exists and what it sells; the FDA reviews nothing, and neither is an endorsement, an evaluation, or a finding of safety or efficacy. The company markets the patches as general-wellness products under an FDA enforcement-discretion policy, which is a statement that the agency does not generally intend to enforce device requirements against low-risk products of that kind. That is not review, clearance or approval. Product pages carry the standard disclaimer that the statements have not been evaluated by the FDA.
QDoes the science behind X39 actually show stem cell activation?
No. The proposition is that the patch elevates GHK-Cu, a copper tripeptide with a real and well-documented literature on wound healing and skin remodelling. One study addresses the question with an appropriate design: a double-blind randomised trial, n=60, reporting circulating GHK-Cu rising from 28.11 to 39.09 ng/ml between day 2 and day 7 in the active arm at p<0.035. Acknowledge that honestly - most companies in this category never commission a randomised trial at all. Then the problems. Every paper comes from the same author group. Neither journal is indexed in PubMed. There is no ClinicalTrials.gov registration, so the analysis cannot be checked for outcome-switching, and the reported result is a within-arm day 2 to day 7 comparison rather than a between-arms test at a prespecified timepoint. Neither paper carries a funding statement. And no independent group has replicated it in six years. Most importantly, what was measured was a peptide in blood. Stem cells were not measured. Nothing in that literature supports a claim about disease, healing, energy, sleep, pain or aging.
QWhat did the FTC case against LifeWave distributors actually decide?
Stage-labeling matters here more than anywhere else in this report. On 27 April 2026 the FTC filed a civil complaint in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Steven and Gina Merritt, LifeWave’s Elite Senior Presidential Directors, with roughly 250,000 Brand Partners beneath them. The complaint quoted representations including “$25,000 a week or more,” “unlimited income” and “the money keeps coming, even if you don’t show up, and you can’t stop it,” and it cited LifeWave’s own disclosure for the finding that 79% of active Brand Partners earned zero commission and fewer than 0.035% reached $25,000 in a week. The matter resolved by stipulated order. A stipulated order is a settlement: there is no admission of liability and no adjudication of the allegations. The Commission vote was 2–0. LifeWave, Inc. was not named as a defendant and nothing was found against the company. Separately, two DSSRC administrative closures in thirteen months are self-regulatory rather than governmental and carry no fine, no order and no finding that any law was violated.
Who wrote this report

Author, editor and publisher

C
Written by Claude AI
Reviewed by Rob Fore · Published by Listech Inc · July 29, 2026

This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - LifeWave’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.

Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.

The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.

Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.

About the author and our conflicts  ·  Contact the editor  ·  Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com

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Corrections

Every factual claim on this page is sourced, and the ones we could not stand up are named in the unable to verify list above. If something here is wrong, we want to know, and we would rather hear it from LifeWave than from a reader.

Write to corrections@opportunitygrade.com. Point at the specific sentence and send the document that contradicts it - a plan document, a filing, an income disclosure, a policy page. We will check it against the primary source, correct the page if it is wrong, and say in the report that it was corrected and when. A grade moves if the evidence moves it.

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Other published reports

Every report is written to stand alone. Graded on the same nine weighted dimensions and the same six legal tests. Twelve of 107, spread across the grade bands.

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