Investview, Inc. - the Conectiv (formerly iGenius) membership and distributor opportunity
The only company graded on this site that files audited accounts under oath - and the audited filings say 54.7 cents of every membership dollar goes to the distributor network while 2.4 cents reaches the market experts who produce the education.
Members paid in $29.2m in FY2025 and the network received $16.0m back - roughly −$747 per member for the year - and that figure exists only because this company, alone in its category, files its commission line with the SEC.
Can you actually make money with Investview?
No. And this is the one company on this site where that can be checked against audited numbers rather than argued about. In fiscal 2025 members paid $29,224,823 into the direct-selling segment and the network received $15,992,550 back, a net transfer of $13,232,273 out of the participant body, or roughly $747 per member for the year. The company's own rulebook caps commissions at 65% of revenue, so the body as a whole cannot come out level by construction.
Of every $100 of membership revenue, $54.72 went to the distributor network and $2.40 reached the market experts who produce the education. Roughly twenty-three times more paid for the selling than for the thing being sold. Every one of the fourteen ranks above entry is gated on personally enrolling other affiliates, not one is gated on selling to anybody outside the plan, and the company told the SEC under oath that members earn bonuses on sales of new memberships and on upgrades.
Look at what the plan sets as your first milestone. The Top-Up Bonus pays a fixed $175 a month to an affiliate holding four active personally enrolled members, and $175 was to the cent the monthly subscription price when it was written. Four recruits do not pay you. They cancel your own bill. Lose one and it drops to $75 against a $99 or $179 charge. Meanwhile membership revenue fell 68.8% in a single quarter, from $8,791,443 to $2,743,019.
Give it the credit it has earned, because it is unusual. This company files 10-Ks and 10-Qs on schedule and breaks the direct-selling unit out on its own line, so anyone can look up exactly how much of their money the plan pays out before joining, free, and nothing else here offers that. Its written income-claims rules are among the strictest graded, down to banning a distributor from showing their own check. And one point must be put precisely: the Polish decision is first-instance, under appeal, and not final.
upfront on the last fully documented tier schedule, then $99–$179 a month - a year-one cash cost of $1,387 to $3,647, plus an annual distributor renewal fee whose amount is nowhere published
- An income disclosure statement. This company files audited commission totals with the SEC every quarter and runs a fourteen-rank plan, so it already holds every input required. Not publishing is a choice rather than a capability gap.
- A retail-customer rule somewhere in the plan. No minimum customer count, no retail qualification before residuals unlock and no separate retail commission appears anywhere in the plan documents or the policies that could be retrieved.
- Ranks that do not turn on personally enrolling affiliates. All fourteen above entry do, two at the lower rungs and four at the higher ones, placed one per binary side, with nothing sold to an outsider counting toward any of them.
- An exit that leaves the participant something. On termination distributors waive all rights, including property rights, to their former sales organization, and reapplying under a new sponsor means rebuilding from zero.
That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.
Legal status
LEGAL BUT CONTESTED IN ONE JURISDICTION - no U.S. authority has ever found Investview, iGenius, Kuvera or Wealth Generators to be a pyramid scheme. There is no FTC action, no U.S. state securities or consumer-protection order located, no class action, no criminal charge against the company or any current officer, no receivership, no asset freeze and no going-concern qualification. Against that: Poland’s competition and consumer-protection authority, UOKiK, issued a formal administrative decision on 29 December 2025 finding that aspects of the direct-selling model as conducted in Poland breach Polish laws prohibiting pyramid-style promotional schemes, imposing a fine of PLN 14,668,589 (about USD $4m) and a cease-and-desist order. That is a first-instance administrative decision, timely appealed in February 2026 to Poland’s Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, and it is therefore NOT FINAL; the company states it "does not agree with the conclusions set forth in the decision" and has accrued $4,080,000 against it. Separately on file: a settled SEC administrative order of 17 January 2025 on Securities Act registration provisions only (Sections 5(a) and 5(c)), $375,000, consented to without admitting or denying the findings and containing no fraud charge; a settled CFTC consent order of 14 September 2018 finding the predecessor entity acted as an unregistered commodity trading advisor, $150,000, no admission; settled Canadian securities matters in Ontario and Quebec resolved by geoblocking and a CAD $15,000 fine; and public regulator warnings from France’s AMF and Belgium’s FSMA in 2019. Warnings are advisories, not adjudications. Settled orders are resolutions, not judicial findings of fact.
Confidence: Medium-High
Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.
Follow the money
Start with the thing that makes this report different from every other one on the site: the subject files audited accounts under oath. Investview, Inc. is a current SEC reporter - Form 10-K for FY2025 filed 31 March 2026, Form 10-Q for Q1 2026 filed 15 May 2026 - and the segment note inside those filings breaks the direct-selling unit out on its own line. In this category almost nothing can be checked. Revenue figures are company statements, payout ratios are reverse-engineered from leaks, and participant economics are guessed at. Here the payout ratio is a filed number, signed by officers, reviewed by auditors, and available to any prospective member for free before they hand over a dollar. That is a genuine and unusual credit and it should be taken at full value.
Then read what the filings actually say. In FY2025 the direct-to-consumer segment took in $29,224,823 of membership revenue and paid $15,992,550 of it out in distributor commissions - 54.72 cents of every membership dollar. The same schedule carries a line called "Market experts," the third-party market professionals who deliver the trade alerts and live sessions, at $701,381, or 2.40% of segment revenue. So for every dollar a member paid, roughly twenty-three times more went to the recruiting network than to the education itself. And the closed-system arithmetic follows without a single assumption the company has not certified: members put in $29.2m and the network got $16.0m back, a net transfer of $13.2m out of the participant body - approximately −$747 per member for the year against an estimated average base of about 17,700 paying members, a headcount the company does not publish and which is derived here from its own revenue.
What the member buys is a subscription. On the last fully documented schedule - February to July 2026 - the tiers were Basic at $199 upfront and $99 a month, Core at $299 and $179, Plus at $599 and $179, and Pro at $1,499 and $179, which is a year-one cash cost of $1,387 to $3,647 before an annual distributor renewal fee whose amount is not published. Against that, the product is real: a content library, live and recorded sessions, trade alerts, debt-reduction and budgeting software, travel perks, and at the top tier an optional automated crypto-trading connector. That connector is non-custodial and the vendor’s own documentation says so - your crypto stays in your own exchange account, you choose the allocation, and "there are no guarantees." Today’s subscriber is not handing over investment capital, and that is why the securities score on this card is high. Three earlier products did take capital against promised returns, and one of them drew an SEC settlement.
The compensation plan is a binary, not a unilevel - residuals pay 10% to 20% on the weaker leg with weekly caps from $75 to $250,000, and a generational match sits on top. Every rank above entry requires personally enrolling affiliates, placed one per side; none requires selling to anyone who is not a participant, and no retail-customer rule appears anywhere in the plan or the policies. The company’s own 10-K says members earn bonuses "on sales of new memberships and on upgrades sold to their personally enrolled members." The Top-Up Bonus then guarantees $175 a month at four active personally enrolled members, which was to the cent the monthly subscription price when it was written - so the plan’s first designed objective is four recruits, not four customers, and hitting it makes your own subscription free rather than making you any money.
The direction of travel is steep and it is all disclosed. Consolidated revenue fell 30.8% in FY2025 to $36,255,669; membership revenue fell 68.8% year on year in Q1 2026 to $2,743,019; deferred revenue, which is prepaid future subscription months and the cleanest available proxy for the subscriber base, fell 69% across the year to $952,977. The parent lost $8,908,479 and cash went from $22.5m to $4.5m in fifteen months. Meanwhile the commission ratio is rising as revenue falls - 54.72% for FY2025, 61.03% in Q1 2026 - against the company’s own 65% cap rule, because the plan’s fixed-dollar guarantees do not scale down with volume. None of that is a finding of wrongdoing and this report does not present it as one. It is the question of whether the plan can keep being funded, which is a different question and a fair one.
Where $100 of membership revenue went in FY2025
From the audited FY2025 Form 10-K segment schedule for the Direct-to-Consumer Marketing Platform - the direct-selling unit - on segment revenue of $29,224,823. This is a filed number, not an estimate, and it exists because the company files.
| Product | Price | Pays |
|---|---|---|
| Basic membership Finance videos, one market-insights session, a debt-elimination service and trade ideas for one market. Year-one cash cost $1,387. The per-sale commission band is documented as a range and scales with tier; no reliable per-tier dollar figure is published, so none is asserted here. |
$199 + $99/mo upfront then monthly |
$35–$200 per sale, then $25/mo |
| Core membership Adds a second insights session, technical analysis and expanded trade ideas. Year-one cash cost $2,447. Note that the plan pays a fresh bonus on upgrades as well as on new enrollments, which builds a direct economic incentive for an upline to move a member up the ladder. |
$299 + $179/mo upfront then monthly |
$35–$200 per sale, then $25/mo |
| Plus membership Adds a third insights session and an additional market-opportunities scanner. Year-one cash cost $2,747. |
$599 + $179/mo upfront then monthly |
$35–$200 per sale, then $25/mo |
| Pro membership Adds travel and discount perks and access to the automated trading connector. Year-one cash cost $3,647 - against which the ten-day refund window on the upfront charge is the single hardest consumer term in the file. |
$1,499 + $179/mo upfront then monthly |
top of the $35–$200 band, then $25/mo |
| Cforce, now ConeqtX - automated crypto-trading connector Non-custodial. The member’s crypto stays in the member’s own exchange account and the vendor’s own FAQ states "there are no guarantees" and disclaims past performance. Explicitly not available to residents of Canada. Renamed twice inside twelve months: CoinPro, then Cforce, then ConeqtX. |
bundled at the top tier; historically about +$200 upfront and +$50/mo, or $315/yr in an earlier structure bundled or add-on |
no separate rate documented |
| Smart Finance tool and Digital Learning Platform Budgeting, savings, debt-reduction and tax-management software plus the recorded curriculum. Real deliverables; the question the accounts raise is not whether they exist but what share of the subscription pays for them. |
included included |
none documented |
| ALIVE Latte and ALIVE Black premium coffee, myLife Wellness skincare Bolt-on consumables from the 2026 pivot. Coffee produced $320,460 of revenue in Q1 2026; the wellness manufacturing segment produced $3,724,090 in FY2025 and lost $3,349,164. Prices and commission rates for both are unpublished. |
not published not published |
not published |
| Annual distributor renewal fee Required by the anniversary date under the distributor agreement; non-payment within 30 days results in automatic cancellation, and cancellation forfeits the entire sales organization. The dollar figure does not appear in any retrievable company document, which is itself the finding. |
amount not published annual |
— |
Who runs it, and what they ran before
Genuinely credentialled for this category and the report should not bury it. Per the company’s own appointment release: twelve years as Partner and Global Head of Business Development and Strategy at SkyBridge Capital, credited there with helping grow assets from $300m to $14bn and with creating that firm’s conference; four years before Investview as founder and managing partner of StageLight Group; an MBA in finance and entrepreneurship from Wharton, a master’s from Johns Hopkins SAIS and a bachelor’s from Georgetown. No regulatory action, enforcement matter, criminal charge or civil fraud judgment against him could be located anywhere. He has no enforcement history of any kind, and every reference in this report to a prison sentence concerns a different and earlier chief executive.
Convicted by a jury of mail and wire fraud conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering, and sentenced in June 2023 to 120 months - ten years - plus restitution of $31,275,832, a $250,000 fine and an $800 assessment. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence in February 2025 and vacated and remanded the restitution order for recalculation, so the conviction is final and the restitution is not. A parallel SEC civil case produced summary judgment reported at over $50.4 million: a civil-standard judgment, not a criminal one. A separate tax-fraud indictment returned in New Jersey in late 2022 is an accusation and not a finding. Two qualifiers matter and both must be stated. The conduct was carried out through Alpha Plus Recovery, LLC, an entity unaffiliated with Investview, and iGenius formed no part of the criminal charges. But he was sitting in this company’s chief executive chair while running it, the board did not find out, federal prosecutors did - and that is a governance fact about the company. He also holds a disputed $1,550,000 convertible note; the FY2025 10-K discloses that he "could receive up to approximately 203 million shares of our common stock upon conversion," roughly 11% of the shares outstanding, and that his incarceration has prevented the dispute being resolved.
No regulatory action, criminal charge or civil judgment against any of the four could be located in searches by name against the SEC, the CFTC and general fraud and indictment terms. That is a real negative finding and it is reported as one. All four have left day-to-day roles; Romano and Raynor were separated in January 2022 and bought out in October 2023 for 302,919,223 shares at $0.00964739 apiece - $2,922,380 - plus a $250,000 expense allowance, with a three-year non-compete and a five-year non-solicit. The item that matters structurally is a Founder Revenue Agreement filed as an SEC exhibit, granting each founder "three-quarters of one percent (0.75%) of the Company’s top-line revenue," described as permanent and irrevocable, transferable, surviving into the founder’s estate and expressly unconnected to employment. Four times 0.75% is 3% of gross revenue, a first charge ahead of everybody including the distributors - roughly $1.09m on FY2025 revenue. Whether it still runs for all four after the 2023 buyout could not be confirmed from the FY2025 filings, so it is presented here as documented history with the uncertainty attached, not as a live skim.
Wealth Generators, LLC became Kuvera, LLC in February 2018, traded as Kuvera Global, became iGenius in early 2021 and Conectiv in Q1 2026 - while the automated-trading product itself went CoinPro to Cforce to ConeqtX inside twelve months. Each consumer-brand rename followed within roughly twelve to twenty-four months of an adverse regulatory event attaching to the prior name: the CFTC order landed on Wealth Generators, the French and Belgian warnings on Kuvera, the Canadian settlements and the Polish decision on iGenius. That is correlation and this report does not assert causation - no document says regulatory pressure drove a rename, and the company’s stated reason for the Conectiv change is a wellness pivot. Beneath all of it sits a dormant Utah shell incorporated in 1946 as Uintah Mountain Copper Mining Company and recycled through five corporate names before the MLM was dropped into it in 2017. Any pitch that treats 1946 as company heritage is traceable to a registration and substantively misleading; no live instance of such a pitch was found, so this is flagged as a risk and not as an instance. Chad Garner is identified across sources as president of the direct-selling subsidiary; no regulatory or criminal matter naming him personally was located.
Registered address
Haverford, Pennsylvania, USA
This is the one entry in the category where the numbers are not company statements, trade-press estimates or leaks. Investview, Inc. is a current Exchange Act reporter: it filed its FY2025 Form 10-K on 31 March 2026 and its Q1 2026 Form 10-Q on 15 May 2026, and the payout ratio, the revenue trend, the litigation reserves and the balance sheet are all in those documents, signed and audited. Read that as a genuine advantage before reading anything else here - almost nothing else in this sector can be checked at all, and this can. It is also worth saying plainly what the filings are not: a net loss of $8,908,479 for FY2025, a share price around $0.026, an accumulated deficit of $96,789,073 and cash falling from $22.5m to $4.5m in fifteen months are facts about capacity and direction, not findings of wrongdoing, and this report does not treat them as any such thing. The parent’s other segments - bitcoin mining under SAFETek, contract manufacturing and skincare under Renu Labs and myLife Wellness, and a pre-commercialisation self-directed brokerage - are corporate divisions, not separate opportunities. Only the Conectiv membership is sold through the distributor network.
The veteran's checklist
Eight questions that decide whether this is a business or a transfer mechanism. Same eight, every review.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who legally owns it? |
OK
Investview, Inc., a Nevada corporation quoted on OTCQB as INVU and reporting to the SEC under CIK 0000862651, headquartered in Haverford, Pennsylvania. The opportunity itself is sold by its wholly-owned subsidiary Conectiv, LLC, formerly iGenius, LLC, before that Kuvera, LLC and Wealth Generators, LLC. Accounts are audited and filed.
|
| What does it really cost? |
CONCERN
On the last fully documented schedule, $199 upfront and $99 a month at the entry tier up to $1,499 upfront and $179 a month at the top - a year-one cash cost of $1,387 to $3,647, plus an annual distributor renewal fee whose amount is not published. Current pricing after the June 2026 two-tier simplification could not be retrieved.
|
| Published income disclosure? |
RED
None. Not on the corporate site, not on the brand site, not in the distributor policy directory that publishes everything else, not in general search. What exists instead is the audited segment schedule: $29,224,823 in from members, $15,992,550 back to the network in FY2025.
|
| Does the plan pay for recruiting or for selling? |
RED
For recruiting, on the company’s own account. Every rank above entry is gated on personally enrolling affiliates; there is no retail-customer rule anywhere; and the 10-K says bonuses are earned "on sales of new memberships and on upgrades sold to their personally enrolled members."
|
| Has a regulator found this to be a pyramid scheme? |
CONCERN
One has, at first instance and subject to appeal. Poland’s UOKiK decided on 29 December 2025 that aspects of the model as conducted in Poland breach laws prohibiting pyramid-style promotional schemes, fining PLN 14,668,589 with a cease-and-desist. Appealed in February 2026; not final; denied by the company. No U.S. authority has made any such finding.
|
| Did the SEC find fraud? |
WATCH
No. Securities Act Release 33-11355, 17 January 2025, charged Sections 5(a) and 5(c) - registration provisions only - over an unregistered offering that raised about $21m from 500+ investors in 2019–2020. $375,000, settled without admitting or denying the findings, no fraud charge and no restitution ordered.
|
| Am I investing money, or buying a subscription? |
OK
Buying a subscription. The optional automated-trading connector is non-custodial: your crypto stays in your own exchange account, you set the allocation, and the vendor’s own FAQ says "there are no guarantees." Three historical products did take capital against promised returns; none of them is the live offering.
|
| Can you get your money back, and what do you lose on exit? |
RED
Ten days on the initial purchase, and renewals must be canceled at least three days before the date against an auto-renew default; complaints to the private ratings body about inability to cancel are the dominant theme in that file. On exit you forfeit your entire sales organization permanently, with a six-month non-solicit and Utah arbitration behind it.
|
What has to be true for you to get paid
| To cover | You need |
|---|---|
| Make a Basic membership free | 4 personally enrolled members who all keep paying $99/mo ÷ $25 Rapid Fire per personal = 3.96, so four - which is $100 a month against a $99 subscription, a $1 margin, and costs those four people $5,548 of year-one outlay between them |
| Recover a Pro year-one outlay from sales commissions | ~19 top-tier enrollments, or ~39 mixed $3,647 ÷ $200 at the top of the documented commission band; on a 20/40/40 tier mix blending to about $94 a sale it is roughly 39 enrollments, more than three new paying people every month for twelve months |
| Cover a $179 subscription from binary residuals instead of recruiting | ~18 active members on the weaker leg, so ~36 in total at 10% of weaker-leg volume and 100 GV per active member - but Executive rank itself requires two personally enrolled plus 1,000 GV a month, so there is no route there without recruiting first |
| Can the participant body as a whole break even? | No - not arithmetically members paid $29,224,823 in and the network received $15,992,550 back in FY2025, so the body lost 45.3 cents of every dollar; the company’s own 65% cap rule guarantees a floor loss of 35 cents regardless of how the plan performs |
Read this twice
This arithmetic is unusual on this site because most of it comes from an audited filing rather than from a model. The commission total, the segment revenue, the segment margin and the direction of travel are all in the FY2025 Form 10-K. What is derived rather than disclosed is the member headcount - the company publishes no member count, no distributor count and no country count anywhere in the filing, so roughly 17,700 average paying members is an estimate built from segment revenue divided by a blended subscription price, and it is labeled as such every time it appears. At an all-entry-tier mix the figure would be about 24,300 and at an all-upper-tier mix about 13,900, so the per-member loss figure moves with it; the aggregate transfer of $13.2m does not move at all, because both of its inputs are audited. Three fairness points belong here. First, the closed-system statement is about the participant body as a whole and not about any individual: a top-rank position can and does earn well, and the plan is not a fraud for paying it. Second, the Rapid Fire residual at $25 a month per personally enrolled member is a real, documented, repeating payment and the four-recruit break-even is genuinely reachable - the criticism is not that it is impossible but that reaching it produces a free subscription rather than an income, and that losing one of the four puts the position straight back underwater at $75 against $99. Third, the plan is funded from a real 22.55% segment margin, so this is not a scheme paying old members from new deposits. The structural problem is narrower and it is disclosed: the commission ratio has risen to 61.03% against the company’s own 65% ceiling while membership revenue fell 68.8% year on year, which means the plan is being squeezed toward a limit its own rulebook sets. Something eventually gives - the guarantees, the cap or the price.
Run your own numbers
Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.
Ten dollars a month is a residual on a retained member’s subscription at the entry rank, and it is deliberately conservative: the engine is a two-leg binary paying 10% to 20% of the weaker leg’s volume, so roughly half of everything an affiliate builds pays nothing at all, and the rate at the bottom of the rank ladder is the 10%. Fast Start bonuses are excluded on purpose. They are the largest number a new affiliate will be shown, and the company’s own Form 10-K says bonuses are earned “on sales of new memberships and on upgrades” - money paid for an enrollment rather than for anything sold, which would turn this into a recruiting calculator. Binary qualification itself requires personally enrolling affiliates placed one per side, two at the lower ranks and four higher up, so the slider understates how much recruiting the plan actually demands. The cost line is the entry Choice tier at $99.99 a month with its $99.99 enrollment fee spread across a first year; the top tier costs $1,499.99 to enter and runs to roughly $3,600 in year one. Churn is set at 25% because membership revenue fell 68.8% year on year. Unusually for this site, the outcome can be checked against audited figures: the FY2025 segment schedule shows $29,224,823 taken in from members and $15,992,550 returned in commissions, which is about minus $747 per member per year across the whole field. Your own subscription cost of $108/mo is included.
What it costs to replace this yourself
Every capability a Conectiv membership provides, priced against named open-market vendors at real 2026 list prices. Two comparison points are given because both are honest: what a serious retail trader would actually pay, and what the same capability costs at zero. The counterweight is stated afterwards rather than buried - the membership bundles live human sessions and a community, and the free stack does not.
| What they sell you | What you'd use instead | Your cost |
|---|---|---|
| Charting, indicators, screeners, alerts | TradingView Premium, annual billing | $719.40/yr |
| Same capability, mid tier | TradingView Plus, annual billing | $359.40/yr |
| Same capability, adequate for most | TradingView Free - no time limit | $0 |
| Automated crypto trading, DCA and grid bots, backtesting | 3Commas Pro, annual billing | $480/yr |
| Same, entry tier | 3Commas Starter, annual billing | $180/yr |
| Structured forex education, beginner to advanced | Babypips School of Pipsology - complete free curriculum | $0 |
| General markets and investing reference | Investopedia | $0 |
| Personal-finance and budgeting fundamentals | Khan Academy Personal Finance | $0 |
| University-quality finance courses with certificates | Coursera Plus | ~$399/yr |
| Budgeting software | YNAB, or Monarch Money for net-worth tracking | $109/yr or $99.99/yr |
| Market research, screeners and education | Any major zero-commission US broker, with a funded account | $0 |
| Live market commentary and daily sessions | Free broker webinars, exchange education portals, public video channels | $0 |
| Total as sold $1,387–$3,647 in year one |
Total, built yourself $0 free · ~$1,047 serious · ~$1,807 maximal |
Price-to-value
The maximal open-market stack - professional-tier charting, a paid trading-bot service, two budgeting applications and an unlimited university-course subscription - costs about $1,807 a year against the top membership tier at $3,647. Roughly half, for the paid version of everything. And the free stack, at $0, delivers charting with no time limit, a complete structured forex curriculum, portfolio tracking, broker research and unlimited market commentary. The bundled live sessions and community are the one thing money cannot replicate for nothing, and they have real value - but the company’s own audited accounts price that component at $701,381 across the entire member base, which against an estimated 17,700 members is roughly $40 per member per year. The member pays between $1,387 and $3,647 a year; about $40 of it buys the experts.
Three operators, five horizons
Probability of cumulative net profit
Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.
The member who never recruits
buys the subscription for the education, enrols nobody, earns nothing from the plan
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 0% | −$836 |
| 6 mo | 0% | −$1,373 |
| 1 yr | 0% | −$2,447 |
| 3 yr | 0% | −$6,743 |
| 5 yr | 0% | −$11,039 |
The qualified distributor at the four-recruit floor
holds a mid tier, enrols and retains four personals, reaches Executive rank
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 6% | −$620 |
| 6 mo | 9% | −$700 |
| 1 yr | 12% | −$350 |
| 3 yr | 14% | −$700 |
| 5 yr | 15% | −$1,000 |
The full-time builder chasing rank
top tier, 30+ hrs/wk, recruiting both binary legs toward Ambassador and above
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 2% | −$1,900 |
| 6 mo | 4% | −$2,400 |
| 1 yr | 7% | −$2,900 |
| 3 yr | 9% | −$1,500 |
| 5 yr | 9% | −$2,000 |
Methodology note. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims and not disclosures. They have to be modeled because no income disclosure statement exists - none on the corporate site, none on the brand site, none in the distributor-facing policy directory, and none located in general search - which is a genuine absence and is the reason the numbers here are ours rather than the company’s. ANCHORED to figures that are documented: the February-to-July 2026 tier schedule of $199+$99, $299+$179, $599+$179 and $1,499+$179; the $25-a-month Rapid Fire residual per personally enrolled active member; the documented $35–$200 band for subscription-sale commissions; the Top-Up guarantee of $175 a month at four active personals and $500 at twelve; the binary rate of 10% at Executive with a $75 weekly cap, rising to 20% with a $250,000 weekly cap at the top rank; and the rank table in which every rank above entry requires personally enrolled affiliates. Anchored also to the audited aggregate - $29,224,823 in from members, $15,992,550 back to the network in FY2025 - which is why no cohort here shows a majority in cumulative profit at any horizon and why the medians stay negative where a rank table alone would look positive. MODELED by us: the share of each cohort in cumulative profit, the cohort definitions, attrition, and the distribution of commissions across ranks, because the company publishes no rank distribution. One calibration note in the company’s favor: the four-recruit break-even is genuinely reachable and the Rapid Fire residual is a real repeating payment, so the median in the second cohort sits close to zero rather than deeply negative - that is the plan working exactly as designed, and the point is that the design produces a free subscription rather than an income. One against: the pool the top cohort is claiming against fell 38.3% in a single year, from $25,913,260 to $15,992,550, so the upside figures are a claim on a rapidly contracting base.
Where you are actually allowed to promote this
Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.
Red flags and green flags
Red flags
15154.7 cents of every membership dollar goes to the network; 2.4 cents goes to the education
2The company’s own SEC filing frames the compensable event as a membership sale
3Every rank above entry is gated on personally enrolling affiliates
4The four-recruit guarantee is tuned to cancel your own subscription, not to pay you
5A national competition regulator has found the model to be a prohibited pyramid-style scheme
6No income disclosure statement exists in the public domain
7Membership revenue fell 68.8% year on year in a single quarter
8The commission ratio is rising toward the company’s own 65% cap as revenue falls
9Three historical products took participant capital against promised returns
10Prices are published nowhere the company controls
11A ten-day refund window against an upfront charge of up to $1,499
12Total forfeiture of your sales organization on exit
13A former chief executive is serving ten years, and holds a claim on 11% of the company
14Five consumer-facing brand names in nine years
15The plan’s top weekly cap would absorb four-fifths of everything it paid last year
Green flags
81The payout ratio is audited, filed and public - almost uniquely in this category
2No class action, no U.S. state regulator order, no FTC action, no criminal charge against the company
3The SEC matter was registration provisions only - not fraud
4No going-concern qualification, no bankruptcy, no Form 15, no delisting
5A credentialled current chief executive with no enforcement history
6One of the strictest written income-claims rules in the graded set
7A+ and accredited with the private ratings body, with 17 complaints in three years
8No inventory loading, no forced autoship, no garage qualifying - and the live trading tool is non-custodial
We would like to be wrong about this
Upward
- Publishing a genuine income disclosure statement - rank distribution, medians, percentiles and the share earning nothing. The company already files audited commission totals quarterly and runs a fourteen-rank plan, so it holds every input; this is the cheapest and highest-impact change available anywhere in the file.
- Introducing and enforcing a real retail-customer qualification - a minimum number of non-participant customers before binary commissions unlock - and disclosing the retail-versus-participant revenue split. That is the single largest lever on the lowest score on the card, and it would materially strengthen the Polish appeal at the same time.
- Winning or substantially narrowing the UOKiK appeal; publishing prices on a public, non-gated page; extending the refund window to thirty days with a one-click cancellation control on the member site; and moving the market-experts line from 2.4% of revenue toward 8–10%.
Downward
- Any new product that takes participant capital against a stated return - a pooled fund, a staking product, a revenue share, a yield-bearing token or a managed account holding member funds. Given three prior instances in six years this is the specific thing to watch, and it would cut the securities score from 8 to low single digits immediately.
- Losing the UOKiK appeal with the cease-and-desist becoming final and enforceable, or a first U.S. state securities or consumer-protection order, or an FTC action - none of which exists today.
- Commissions breaching the company’s own 65% cap, the cap being raised, or the Top-Up guarantees being cut; a going-concern qualification, which would be an auditor’s judgment about liquidity and not a finding of wrongdoing; or cash falling below the level needed to fund a quarter’s commissions, which were $1,673,975 in Q1 2026 against $4.5m of cash.
Grade is D-. The only company on this site whose accounts are audited and filed under oath - and the filings are what produce the grade.
Take the credit seriously first, because it is the whole reason this report can be written the way it is. Investview, Inc. is a current SEC reporter. It filed its FY2025 Form 10-K on 31 March 2026 and its Q1 2026 Form 10-Q on 15 May 2026, and inside those documents the direct-selling unit is broken out as its own segment with its own commission line. In this category that is almost unheard of. Everywhere else, payout ratios are reverse-engineered, revenue is whatever the company says it is, and participant economics are guesswork. Here a prospective member can download the filing, for free, before joining, and read exactly how much of their money the plan pays out. Add to that a credentialled chief executive with no enforcement history of any kind, no class action, no U.S. state order, no FTC action, no criminal charge against the company or any current officer, no going-concern qualification, no inventory to load, and one of the strictest written income-claims rules in the graded set - warning, then a $500 fine, then termination, with an outright ban on distributors selling sales aids to each other.
Then read the filing. The direct-to-consumer segment took in $29,224,823 in FY2025 and paid $15,992,550 of it to the distributor network - 54.72 cents in the dollar - while the "market experts" line, the third-party professionals who actually produce the trade alerts and live sessions, came to $701,381, or 2.40%. Twenty-three times more for recruiting than for the education. The closed-system arithmetic follows without a single unverified input: members put in $29.2m, the network got $16.0m back, and the difference is $13.2m transferred out of the participant body - roughly −$747 per member for the year against an estimated base of about 17,700, a headcount the company does not publish. There is no income disclosure statement anywhere, which for a company that files audited commission totals every quarter is a choice rather than a limitation. And the plan itself: fourteen ranks, every one above entry gated on personally enrolling affiliates placed by binary side, no retail-customer rule anywhere, the issuer’s own 10-K saying bonuses are earned "on sales of new memberships and on upgrades," and a Top-Up guarantee of $175 a month at four active personals - to the cent, the monthly subscription price. Four recruits make your membership free. That is the plan’s first objective, and it is not a customer objective.
The third element has to be stated with care, because the file invites over-reading and most of what is in it is not what people assume. The SEC did not find fraud: Securities Act Release 33-11355 of 17 January 2025 charged registration provisions only, $375,000, settled without admission. Poland’s decision is a first-instance administrative finding under appeal since February 2026 - not final, and denied by the company. The European matters are public warnings, which are advisories and not adjudications. The ten-year sentence belongs to a former chief executive, terminated for cause in December 2021, for fraud committed through an unaffiliated entity, and the current chief executive has no enforcement history at all. And the $8.9m net loss, the cash fall from $22.5m to $4.5m and the sub-penny share price are not findings of wrongdoing - they are facts about capacity. What they bear on is whether the plan can keep being paid, and the answer the filings give is uncomfortable: the commission ratio has risen to 61.03% against the company’s own 65% cap while membership revenue fell 68.8% year on year. The plan is being squeezed toward a ceiling its own rulebook sets, and the money to close the gap has to come from somewhere.
Read the 10-K before you read the presentation
It is free, it is public, and it takes twenty minutes. Search it for the word "commissions" and for the segment schedule. You will find the payout ratio, the market-experts line, the revenue trend, the litigation reserve and the cash balance, all signed. Then ask the person recruiting you to explain the gap between 54.72% and 2.40%. Whatever answer you get, you will have asked a question that almost nobody in this industry can be asked at all, because almost nobody else files.
Price the free stack before you price the membership
Free-tier charting with no time limit, a complete structured forex curriculum from a well-known free school, a free general-investing reference library, free personal-finance courses, portfolio tracking, and broker research and screeners with a funded account: $0. The paid maximal version - professional charting, a paid bot service, two budgeting apps and an unlimited university-course subscription - is about $1,807 a year against $3,647 for the top tier. If the answer is that you are paying for the live sessions and the community, note that the audited accounts price that component at roughly $40 per member per year.
Ask for the four numbers the company does not publish
The annual distributor renewal fee. The current two-tier price after the June 2026 simplification. The number of members who are not distributors. And the rank distribution of commissions - the company has all of it, because it runs a fourteen-rank plan and files the commission total quarterly. If your sponsor cannot produce any of the four in writing, you are being asked to underwrite a business on figures the counterparty holds and will not show.
Sell financial education without the plan
The category is real and the demand is real - people genuinely pay for trading and personal-finance instruction. What they will not pay for, at $1,387 to $3,647 a year, is instruction they cannot price before enrolling. Publishing your prices, publishing your track record, and selling to customers who are not required to recruit anyone is a merchant business with no rank table, no binary legs, no renewal fee, no ten-day refund window and no clause that forfeits everything you built on the day you leave.
Nine dimensions, weighted
Dimension profile
Further from center is better. Hover any point.
Hard caps that bind here
The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.
What we read
Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.
- Investview, Inc. Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 31 December 2025, filed 31 March 2026 (accession 0001493152-26-014042) - Item 1 Business and consolidated financial statements
Investview, Inc. Form 10-K for FY2025, filed 31 March 2026 (CIK 0000862651) - Item 1 Business, including "Conectiv members are eligible to earn bonuses on sales of new memberships and on upgrades sold to their personally enrolled members"; consolidated statement of operations showing revenue of $36,255,669 against $52,381,971 and a net loss of $8,908,479; balance sheet showing cash of $9,992,443 against $22,467,710, deferred revenue of $952,977 against $3,029,145, long-term accrued liabilities of $4,135,276 and accumulated deficit of $96,789,073 - FY2025 Form 10-K segment schedule, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing Platform - segment revenue $29,224,823, commissions $15,992,550 (54.72%), market experts $701,381 (2.40%), credit-card processing $1,244,360, segment salaries $1,634,078, segment G&A $2,504,463, segment net income $6,589,889 (22.55%); prior-year comparatives at $47,061,290 and 55.06%. This single schedule is the most valuable document in the file and it exists because the company files - FY2025 Form 10-K contingencies note and risk factors - the UOKiK decision text, the $4,080,000 loss contingency, the Canadian securities risk-factor heading, and the disputed $1,550,000 Cammarata Note with its "up to approximately 203 million shares" conversion claim; Form 10-Q for Q1 2026, filed 15 May 2026 - membership revenue $2,743,019 against $8,791,443, commissions $1,673,975 (61.03%), cash $4.5m, working capital $1,631,521, operating cash flow −$2.8m
- EDGAR annual-report filing index for Investview, Inc. (CIK 0000862651) - all Forms 10-K
- EDGAR filing index for Investview FY2025 Form 10-K, accession 0001493152-26-014042 (document list and XBRL financial reports)
- Investview, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 March 2026, filed 15 May 2026 (accession 0001493152-26-023510)
- SEC Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 33-11355, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-22423, In the Matter of Investview, Inc. (17 January 2025) (PDF)
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-11355, 17 January 2025 - settled administrative cease-and-desist proceeding against Investview, Inc.; Apex raised approximately $21 million from more than 500 investors between July 2019 and June 2020; violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, registration provisions only; civil money penalty $375,000; consented to without admitting or denying the findings except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction
- SEC administrative proceeding page - "SEC Charges Investview, Inc. for the Unregistered Offer and Sale of Securities" (33-11355-s)
- Investview Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1 press release, "Investview, Inc. Announces Settlement of Outstanding SEC Inquiry," 17 January 2025
- CFTC Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and (d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, In re Wealth Generators LLC, 14 September 2018 (PDF)
CFTC settled consent order, 14 September 2018, In re Wealth Generators, LLC - acting as an unregistered commodity trading advisor between January 2016 and March 2018, violating CEA Sections 2(c)(2)(C)(iii)(I)(bb) and 4m(1) and Regulation 5.3(a)(3); civil monetary penalty $150,000; "without admitting or denying any of the findings or conclusions herein"
- CFTC press release 7785-18, "CFTC Charges Multiple Forex and Binary Options Dealers with Registration Violations" (naming Wealth Generators, LLC)
- UOKiK Decision No. RGD-6/2025 against iGenius LLC (Kaysville, USA) - PLN 14,668,589 fine and cease-and-desist for operating a pyramid-type promotional scheme, 29 December 2025 (PDF, Polish)
UOKiK (Poland) administrative decision, 29 December 2025 - PLN 14,668,589 fine plus cease-and-desist on a finding of practices breaching laws prohibiting pyramid-style promotional schemes; appeal filed February 2026 with the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection; regulator’s stated test that "in legal MLM, profits come primarily from product sales, whereas in a pyramid-style project, the ability to receive material benefits depends primarily on introducing new people to the system"
- UOKiK press release (English), "When profit depends on recruitment – new pyramid-type incentive schemes exposed and penalised by UOKiK," 29 December 2025
- Investview, Inc. Form 8-K of 5 January 2026 disclosing the UOKiK decision, the PLN 14,668,589 fine and the intended appeal
- FSMA public warning against Kuvera Global LLC, 9 October 2019 - "the system proposed by Kuvera exhibits features characteristic of a pyramid scheme"
FSMA (Belgium) public warning, 9 October 2019 - "The FSMA strongly advises against responding to any offers made by Kuvera," "The system proposed by Kuvera exhibits features characteristic of a pyramid scheme," and the firm "mainly targets young people"; AMF (France) public warning against the Kuvera entities, citing no French authorization, promotion of "trading on highly speculative products," the targeting of young people, and compensation that "automatically increases with the number of subscribers recruited"
- AMF public warning, "The Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) warns the public against the company KUVERA LLC/KUVERA France"
- iGenius Purchase Terms (refund and subscription-cancellation terms)
iGenius Purchase Terms, Distributor Agreement and Policies and Procedures - "NO REFUNDS of initial purchases will be made, except when requested within ten (10) days of the initial purchase date"; "NO REFUNDS for subscription renewals that have not been canceled at least three (3) days prior to the renewal date"; the income-claims prohibition with warning, $500 fine and termination; the ban on selling sales aids between distributors; the closed-forum broadcast rule; the 65% Cap Rule; the downline-forfeiture waiver; the six-month non-solicit; the Montana carve-out; Utah governing law and arbitration
- iGenius Distributor Agreement - terms and conditions, one-year term, renewal and downline-forfeiture waiver
- iGenius Policies and Procedures (PDF, archived copy of the company-served file at igeniusglobal.io)
- "Cforce FAQ" - Coinrule Help Center article for the iGenius-exclusive Cforce strategy (archived copy; the live article has since been removed)
Coinrule help-center FAQ for the Cforce strategy - "When you connect the Cforce strategy and software to your exchange account, you choose how much of your USDC/USDT you want to be allocated," "You retain ownership and control of your exchange account," and "there are no guarantees," with past performance disclaimed; GlobeNewswire release of 24 June 2026 announcing ConeqtX and the restructuring of membership "from multiple tiers to two simplified options," which does not state what those options cost
- GlobeNewswire release, "ConectivGlobal Unveils Expanded Platform with Launch of ConeqtX and MyLife Wellness," 24 June 2026
- BehindMLM, "Conectiv Review: Investview reboots fraud for 3rd time" - compensation-plan and cost breakdown, 9 February 2026
Independent secondary pricing and plan documentation - an MLM-watchdog compensation-plan review and a February 2026 review updated 12 July 2026, an independent English-language review site, and a German consumer-law review that states the provider publishes no prices and that "Es gibt kein Income Disclosure Statement"; open-market replacement pricing from TradingView, 3Commas, YNAB, Monarch Money and Coursera published rates, 2026; private ratings body profile showing A+ accreditation, 17 complaints in three years and a dominant cancellation-and-refund complaint theme
- jessesingh.org, "Conectiv Review: Investview's Third Costume Change (Same Show, New Logo)," February 2026
- Kagels Trading (German), "iGenius Erfahrungen | Kosten | Seriosität | Warnung (2026)" - package prices and monthly fees
- Kanzlei Herfurtner (German consumer-law firm), "iGenius seriös? Kann ich mein Abo kündigen?" - subscription-cancellation complaints
- Better Business Bureau business profile - Conectiv (formerly iGenius), Kaysville, Utah: A+ rating, accredited since 6 January 2015, complaints and refund policy
- TradingView subscription pricing page (open-market charting/analysis comparison), 2026
- 3Commas crypto trading-bot pricing plans (open-market automated-trading comparison), 2026
What we could not get
- Current pricing. COULD NOT RETRIEVE - this is explicitly different from "does not exist." The company announced on 24 June 2026 that membership had been restructured "from multiple tiers to two simplified options" and did not publish what they cost. The brand site is a JavaScript application that returned only metadata, the product page returned "You need to enable JavaScript to run this app," and the enrollment funnel returned HTTP 403. Every price in this report is therefore the February-to-July 2026 schedule as documented by independent reviewers, and no post-June-2026 price is asserted here at all
- The annual distributor renewal fee. The distributor agreement and Policies require payment by the anniversary date and provide that non-payment within 30 days causes automatic cancellation - but the dollar amount appears in no retrievable company document, so every year-one cost figure in this report is understated by an unknown amount
- Member and distributor headcounts. Not disclosed anywhere in the FY2025 10-K, which reports segments by product type without a member count, a distributor count or a country count. The roughly 17,700 average paying members used here is derived from segment revenue and a blended subscription price and is labeled as derived every time it appears; at an all-entry-tier mix it would be about 24,300 and at an all-upper-tier mix about 13,900
- Whether the Founder Revenue Agreement still runs. The agreement is a filed SEC exhibit granting each of four founders 0.75% of top-line revenue, permanent and irrevocable. A 2023 Stock Purchase and Release Agreement bought out two of them, but no document terminating the revenue rights could be located, so this is presented as documented history with the uncertainty attached rather than as a live 3% skim
- Whether the Top-Up guarantees of $175 and $500 a month survived the 2026 reprice. If the $175 floor held while the monthly moved to $179, the four-recruit guarantee no longer quite covers the subscription - a $4-a-month gap. Small, and unconfirmed, but it would be a precise illustration of the plan being tuned against the participant
- The current status of the ndau token packages. They appear in no 2026 product listing, in no part of the FY2025 10-K and in no part of the Q1 2026 10-Q - but no announcement discontinuing them could be located either. The honest position is "not evidenced as current," which is weaker than "confirmed withdrawn"
- Whether an income disclosure exists behind the distributor login. Untestable - the enrollment domain returned HTTP 403. A disclosure a prospect can only see after joining would not be a disclosure in any useful sense, but this report cannot rule out that some document exists there
- Executive compensation figures, the exact date of the French warning, the Spanish regulator warning referenced by Belgium’s FSMA, the per-generation matching-bonus percentages, the bonus-pool naming, whether any enforcement followed the December 2025 promoter income claims, and the review-platform score and distribution - all either single-sourced, aggregator-sourced or blocked by HTTP 403, and none of them load-bearing for the grade
Not advice
This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.
Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.
Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.
- Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
- The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
- Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
- No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Investview - frequently asked
QIs Investview or iGenius a pyramid scheme?
QHow much of an iGenius or Conectiv subscription actually pays for the education?
QWhat does it cost to join, and how many people do you need to recruit to break even?
QIs a Conectiv membership an investment, and did the SEC find fraud?
QThe company is publicly traded and files with the SEC. Does that make it safer?
Author, editor and publisher
This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - Investview’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.
Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.
The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.
Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.
About the author and our conflicts · Contact the editor · Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com
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Corrections
Every factual claim on this page is sourced, and the ones we could not stand up are named in the unable to verify list above. If something here is wrong, we want to know, and we would rather hear it from Investview than from a reader.
Write to corrections@opportunitygrade.com. Point at the specific sentence and send the document that contradicts it - a plan document, a filing, an income disclosure, a policy page. We will check it against the primary source, correct the page if it is wrong, and say in the report that it was corrected and when. A grade moves if the evidence moves it.
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