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Life insurance field marketing organization · Recruiting-gated contract-level hierarchy

PHP Agency, Inc.

A genuine, portable state insurance license and a genuinely demanded product - sold through an eleven-rung contract ladder on which every single promotion requires recruits, so a producer who sells well and recruits nobody stays at 30% of target premium permanently while the open market pays 55% to 100% for nothing.

Reviewed July 31, 2026 Founded Founded 2009 in California by Patrick Bet-David · headquarters relocated to Texas in 2016 · acquired by Integrity Marketing Group on 20 July 2022 Confidence: Medium-High
D+GRADE
5.3/10
Weighted composite

REAL LICENSE, RECRUIT-GATED PAY

The company publishes its own income disclosure - rare in this channel and a real credit - and that disclosure shows 44.10% of paid agents earning under $1,000 for the year, averaging $388.59, against a realistic Texas first-year cost of $1,543 to $5,033.

The question you came with

Can you actually make money with PHP Agency?

GO, WITH CONDITIONS Only under conditions, and they are specific

Yes, with conditions, and the strongest thing here is something you keep. A resident life producer license is issued by a state insurance department to you personally. It survives termination, it survives the company, and it cannot be clawed back. Pay the $199, get licensed, sell nothing, quit after six months, and you still walk out holding a credential an independent brokerage will contract that same afternoon at 55% to 100% of target premium. That is the single strongest fact in the file and it belongs first.

Nothing here is paid for recruiting itself. No headhunting fee, no pack bonus, no commission on enrollment, and the company's own disclosure states that you cannot earn income from sponsoring new agents. Every dollar starts life as first-year or renewal commission on a real policy underwritten by a real carrier. What the plan does instead is withhold your contract level: all eleven promotions require recruits, from three direct business partners at the bottom to six hundred licensed agents at the top, and no rung is reachable on personal sales alone.

So a producer who sells well and sponsors nobody sits at 30% permanently while the ladder runs to 82%, and that decides what leads can do for you. Twenty exclusive final-expense web leads a month at $35 is $700 of spend, and on a lead vendor's own optimistic funnel that yields about 1.8 issued policies paying roughly $231 each at a 30% contract. The arithmetic runs at minus $403 a month at 30%, minus $291 at 40% and minus $179 at 50%. It turns positive at the 75% rung, which needs fifteen licensed agents and fifty base recruits.

The company publishes an income disclosure when most of this channel publishes none, and the contents are hard. In the 2022 edition, 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents earned under $1,000 for the year, averaging $388.59, and 74.92% earned under $5,000, while the top 2.02% took 49.4% of all agent income. It states no denominator, it is gross of every cost, and it excludes everybody who paid the $199 and never got licensed - against a realistic Texas first year of $1,543 on the frugal path and $5,033 on the normal one.

What it costs to be in
$199

one-time New Associate Fee with a three-business-day refund window, then $99–$180 a year in platform fees and a reported $15 a month for the app - all before a dollar of state licensing cost

What has to be true for this to work for you
  • You are there for the license, and you know what it is worth elsewhere. Independent brokerages contract never-licensed agents at 55% to 100% and many pay for the pre-licensing course, so that comparison is available to you before you sign anything.
  • You can sell out of a warm market rather than out of a lead budget. Bought leads run negative at every contract level below Marketing Director on published vendor prices and published vendor conversion rates, and that is before fuel and phone.
  • You are willing to recruit, or content to stay at the entry contract. No promotion on this ladder is reachable through personal production alone, so it is not a decision you can defer until you have seen how the selling goes.
  • You ask for the restrictive covenants in writing before paying anything. The two-year non-solicit, the confidentiality provision and the Dallas forum clause are documented in a federal court's recitation of the contract, not in the agreement published on the website.

That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.

44.10%
Paid agents who earned under $1,000
averaging $388.59 for the year - the company’s own published disclosure
74.92%
Paid agents who earned under $5,000
three-quarters of the field, gross of every cost of doing the job
49.4%
Share of all agent income taken by the top 2.02%
the mean of $11,155 is 7.4 times the median of roughly $1,500
$199 → $1,543
Advertised entry against realistic Texas first year
$1,543 on the most frugal path, $5,033 on the normal one

Legal status

LEGAL - no court and no regulator has found PHP Agency to be a pyramid scheme, and no state insurance department order, consent order, cease-and-desist, assurance of voluntary compliance, FINRA matter or SEC proceeding naming the company or any named executive was located in the searches run for this report. What the file does contain is one self-regulatory matter - DSSRC Case #209-2025, closed 14 April 2025 by administrative closure after the company removed fourteen challenged income and lifestyle claims rather than attempt to substantiate them. The DSSRC is the direct-selling industry’s own self-regulatory council, operated by BBB National Programs: its closure is a private body’s determination, not a government sanction, not a fine and not a finding of liability. The file also contains four civil actions, in two of which PHP is the plaintiff suing its own former agents; a filed complaint is an allegation and none of the four produced a merits judgment this report could retrieve. The 154 BBB complaints closed over three years are consumer allegations recorded by a private ratings body, not findings.

Confidence: Medium-High

Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.

What this actually is

Follow the money

A Texas life-insurance field marketing organization - it describes itself as a "tech-enabled FMO" - that holds top-of-house distribution contracts with carriers and contracts individual producers underneath them at a "contract level," meaning the percentage of a policy’s target premium the writing agent personally keeps. Everything between the writing agent’s level and the level held by each person above them is override. The company has been a subsidiary of Integrity Marketing Group since 20 July 2022.

Four things about it are genuinely good and belong first. The product is real and independently demanded: term, whole life, indexed universal life, simplified-issue, final expense and fixed indexed annuities, underwritten by ordinary well-capitalized carriers and backed by state guaranty associations. The license the recruit earns is a state credential issued to them personally - it is portable, it survives termination, it survives the company, and it is the single most valuable thing anyone acquires here. There is no inventory, no autoship and no mandatory product purchase. And the company publishes an income disclosure, which almost nobody in this channel does; that act of publishing is a transparency credit and this report awards it even though the numbers inside are grim.

Now the ladder, which is what the grade turns on. Eleven ranks run from Trainee at 30% of target premium to Chairman’s Council at 82%, and every single promotion requires recruiting as well as production: three direct business partners for Associate, one direct Associate plus fifteen base recruits for Field Associate, thirty base recruits for Director, fifteen licensed agents and fifty base recruits for Marketing Director, and six hundred licensed agents at the top. There is no rung a producer can reach on personal sales alone. On a single sale with $1,200 of target premium, a Trainee is paid $360 and the hierarchy above splits as much as $624 - the person who sat in the kitchen and filled out the application is paid less than the people who did not. That is how every FMO works and it is not concealment; the criticism is that 30% is an unusually punitive entry rung when independent brokerages routinely start never-licensed agents at 55% to 100%.

The prospecting method and the ladder interlock, and this is the analytical core of the file. The taught method is warm-market - write a list of 100 friends, family and former colleagues, and work it with an upline riding along. Its genuine advantage is that lead cost is zero, so the break-even bar is set by fixed fees alone rather than by lead spend, which matters a great deal for a cash-poor recruit. Its defect is that a list of 100 warm names is a finite, non-renewable asset that produces sales for perhaps 60 to 120 days and is then gone. At that point the agent can buy leads, which the arithmetic shows loses money at every contract level below Marketing Director; cold-prospect, which almost no first-year agent sustains; or recruit - because a recruit arrives with a fresh list of 100 names and the upline earns override on those sales. The recruiting requirement in the ladder is not incidental to the lead model. It is the lead model.

And the exit terms are the worst part. From the federal court’s recitation of the contract: a two-year post-termination bar on recruiting the company’s associates to a competitor, a confidentiality provision, and a Dallas County forum clause - enforced in an action against ten former agents at once pleading nine causes of action. The Terms of Service adds AAA arbitration in Dallas with a class waiver. The refund window on the entry fee is three business days. None of those covenants appears in the agreement published on the company’s own website, which is the finding: the published agreement is not the whole agreement, and a prospect cannot read the binding parts before paying.

Where each first-year commission dollar goes on an entry-level sale

A MODEL, not a company disclosure. One indexed universal life sale with $1,200 of target premium; the carrier releases 110% of target premium - $1,320 - into the distribution channel; the writing agent is a Trainee at 30% and the hierarchy above runs to 82%. Built from the published ladder and industry-standard carrier allocations.

27% 47% 25%
The agent who made the sale - 30% of target premium ($360)The upline hierarchy, all levels from 31% to 82% ($624)Retained at house level - home office, technology, contracting, compliance, events ($336)
ProductPricePays
New Associate Fee (entry)
Covers administrative processing, educational materials, licensing resources and twelve months of platform access. Refundable only within three business days of enrollment, by email. No evidence was found that any part of it is paid up the hierarchy, and the income disclosure states that no income can be earned from sponsoring - so it is modeled as retained by the company, which is materially better than a product MLM entry pack.
$199
one-time
no commission paid on it
Annual platform fee
From year two onward, per the company’s own income disclosure document. At the claimed field size this is a revenue line of real scale in its own right, before a single policy is sold.
$99/yr Associate · $180/yr Marketing Director
annual
Mobile app subscription
Reported by agents on a public employer-review site rather than published by the company. $180 a year.
$15/month
recurring
Term life (10–35 year)
The right product for most of the stated mission demographic - cheap, simple, high face amount per dollar. 70–110% of premium is released into the channel; a Trainee at 30% receives $90 to $396 of it, where an independent at 100% would receive $300 to $1,320.
$300–$1,200 annual premium
per policy
30% at Trainee
Indexed universal life
Permanent cover with cash value credited to an equity index subject to a cap and a floor. Commission is paid on target premium - a carrier-defined base usually well below what the client actually pays - so a client paying $6,000 a year against a $2,400 target earns a Trainee $720, not $1,800. Excess premium above target typically pays 2–4%. Any recruiter quoting "30% of the premium" is describing something that does not exist.
$1,200–$6,000 annual premium (middle market)
per policy
30% of target premium at Trainee
Whole life and simplified-issue / no-exam
55–110% released into the channel depending on product and carrier. Simplified-issue costs the client more per unit of cover in exchange for skipping the medical exam.
$600–$3,000 annual premium
per policy
30% at Trainee
Final expense / burial (ages 50–80)
Small whole-life policies of $5,000 to $25,000 face value, and the product most commonly sold on purchased leads. 100–120% released into the channel; $180 to $648 to a Trainee. First-year lapse rates in this segment commonly run 20% to 35%, which is where chargeback risk concentrates.
$600–$1,800 annual premium
per policy
30% at Trainee
Fixed indexed annuity
Commission is a percentage of the deposit rather than of an annualised premium, and how the contract-level ladder maps onto annuity compensation could not be determined - so no entry-level annuity figure is published here. Most states apply the NAIC best-interest standard and a four-hour suitability training requirement before an agent may sell these.
$50,000–$500,000+ deposit
per contract
4–8% of deposit into the channel
Background check

Who runs it, and what they ran before

PB
Patrick Bet-David
Founder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Born in Tehran in 1978, came to the United States as a refugee via a camp in Germany, served in the 101st Airborne Division, and was hired as a financial advisor at a major brokerage in Glendale, California in September 2001. He then spent roughly eight years to 2009 selling under the umbrella of the carrier Transamerica - a carrier, and unproblematic to name - through what the documentary record and the near-identical model he subsequently built strongly suggest was the largest multi-level life-insurance distribution hierarchy in the United States, an organization this site has already graded separately and which is therefore not named here. That identification is a strong inference, not a first-party confirmation. He founded this business in 2009, became a Managing Partner at the acquiring platform in July 2022, and runs a very large media operation alongside both roles. No regulatory bar, criminal matter, fraud judgment or state insurance-department disciplinary order naming him could be located in any source reviewed - a genuine positive and worth stating plainly.

MK
Maral Keshishian
President, appointed 2023

Appointed one year after the acquisition. Her appointment, together with the founder’s two other concurrent senior roles, means the person whose face and audience sell this opportunity is not the person running day-to-day operations. That is normal at scale and is recorded as a governance fact, not a criticism. No regulatory or disciplinary matter naming her was located.

MJ
Mark Johnson
General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer

A named, single-point compliance function listed with the BBB as a principal of the business. In a channel where the compliance role is frequently unnamed or absent, having a named General Counsel who is also Chief Compliance Officer is a real structural credit, and the Terms of Service prohibitions on autodialers, spam, unscreened contact and lead reselling read as the product of a functioning legal department. No regulatory or disciplinary matter naming him was located.

Gn
Governance note
Institutional ownership since 20 July 2022

An earlier $10 million expansion round in August 2017 was led by Ambina Partners and Atalaya Capital Management, with participation from Brener International Group and Oscar De La Hoya. The material event is the 2022 acquisition. Two things follow that a recruit should hold in mind together. First, the recruiting page advertises "the opportunity to earn equity," and the acquisition release says employees gained access to the parent’s Employee Ownership Plan - but whether 1099 field agents are eligible, what the units are worth, how they are valued, what the vesting schedule is and whether any liquidity mechanism exists short of a sale of the parent are all unpublished. Treat it as an undocumented promise: not a benefit, and not a fraud. Second, no retrievable public financial statement, leverage metric or credit rating for the parent exists, so this report makes no claim about the parent’s financial condition in either direction. Neither a change of control nor an executive departure is a finding of wrongdoing.

Registered address

Addison, Texas, USA
The operating entity appears under two suffixes in current documents - "PHP Agency, Inc." on the BBB file, the 2021 New Associate Agreement and the federal court caption; "PHP Agency, LLC" on the 2022 income disclosure, the Terms of Service and the 2025 self-regulatory caption - which is consistent with a conversion at or around the 2022 acquisition, though the Texas Secretary of State filing itself could not be retrieved for this report and the conversion is therefore an inference rather than a verified fact. The single largest thing a recruit is unlikely to know is the ownership: since 20 July 2022 this has not been an independent company but a subsidiary of Integrity Marketing Group, a Dallas insurance distribution platform in which Silver Lake led a $1.2 billion strategic investment in December 2021 alongside HGGC and Harvest Partners. Financial terms of the PHP acquisition were not disclosed; Houlihan Lokey acted as sell-side adviser. A change of control is not a finding of wrongdoing, and institutional ownership brings real governance infrastructure that a founder-run agency lacks. It also means contract levels, override spreads and platform fees are now levers inside a platform with institutional return expectations. The company publishes its own agent-count history - 5,000 in 2017, 11,000 in 2019, 21,000 in 2021, 27,000 in 2022, 45,000 in 2024, and 50,000-plus claimed today across 49 states and Puerto Rico - alongside a stated goal of 500,000 licensed agents by 2029, which is roughly a tenfold increase in five years. It also publishes a self-reported field demographic: 43% Hispanic or Latino, 34% Black or African American, 53% women, average age 35, and 92% with no prior industry experience. That last figure is presented as accessibility, and in one sense it is; it also means more than nine in ten agents are learning a regulated financial product for the first time from an upline paid on the spread between their contract level and the recruit’s.

Compensation plan

What has to be true for you to get paid

To coverYou need
Recover the frugal Texas first-year cost, warm market only 5 issued policies (6 with clawback)
$1,543 of first-year cost ÷ $360 per sale at a 30% contract on $1,200 of target premium
Recover the normal-path first-year cost 14 issued policies
$5,033 ÷ $360, once a national convention, a mid office plug-in and an own policy are included
Break even buying 20 exclusive leads a month at a 30% contract a 62% issued-policy rate per lead
against a 9% industry benchmark - roughly seven times it. Structurally impossible at the entry contract
Reach the rung where personal production alone pays 15 licensed agents and 50 base recruits
Marketing Director at 75%, the first level at which the lead model nets positive on personal sales

Read this twice

Two arithmetics run in parallel here and they reach opposite conclusions, which is why the entry-level economics of this organization are so widely misdescribed in both directions. On the taught warm-market method, break-even is genuinely reachable and quickly: lead cost is zero, so the only bar is the fixed cost, and five or six issued policies clears it. A recruit who works a hundred-name list hard for five months and writes ten policies grosses $3,600 at a 30% contract, loses roughly $675 to lapses at a 25% first-year lapse rate with a blended clawback, pays $1,543 of first-year cost and ends the year about $1,382 ahead. That is a real, positive number and this report will not pretend otherwise. It is also roughly 400 hours of evenings and weekends, which works out near $3.45 an hour, and it is materially consistent with the company’s own published median of about $1,500 - the model and the disclosure corroborate each other, which is the strongest validation available for either. Then month seven arrives and the list is empty. The second arithmetic covers what happens next. Buying leads at market prices - 20 exclusive final-expense web leads a month at $35, a 9% issued-policy rate taken straight from a lead vendor’s own optimistic funnel, a $700 average annual premium and 110% of premium released into the channel - produces $416 of gross commission a month against $700 of lead spend, about $40 of platform and app fees, and roughly 19% of the commission clawed back. That is minus $403 a month at a 30% contract, minus $291 at 40%, minus $179 at 50%, and only plus $102 at the 75% Marketing Director level. An identically productive agent at an independent brokerage on a 100% contract nets plus $408 a month from day one on the same leads, the same close rate and the same premium. Every purchased-lead route is loss-making at the entry contract: exclusive web leads cost $389 per issued policy against $231 of commission, direct mail $444, live transfers $400, and even aged leads at $8 apiece cost $267 against $231. So the only route to positive cash flow inside the model, once the warm market is exhausted, is override income; and the only route to override income is recruiting. That is what "the plan pays for recruitment rather than sales" means in concrete dollars. Note two honest caveats. The company does not require anyone to buy leads, and the zero-lead-cost method is a genuine advantage over lead-buying organizations for a cash-poor recruit. And the advance and chargeback terms modeled here are industry norms drawn from published carrier schedules - the company publishes neither its own advance percentage nor its own chargeback schedule, which is itself a finding.

Run your own numbers

Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.

-
Cumulative net, after costs
Total issued policies -
Commission that month -
Total commissions earned -
Total you paid in -
Net -

Set the ad-spend slider to your monthly lead budget, because that is the real cost of this business and the reason the presets matter. Exclusive final-expense web leads run about $35 each and a published industry-vendor conversion chain issues roughly nine policies per hundred leads - an optimistic figure produced by a lead seller, and the brief notes a realistic first-year rate is nearer four to seven. A $700 monthly budget therefore buys about twenty leads and produces about 1.8 issued policies. The $231 per policy is a 30% entry contract on the $770 of first-year commission a roughly $700 annual premium releases into the channel; the ladder runs to 82%, and an independent brokerage on a 100% contract would pay $770 on the identical sale. Cost is the $15 monthly platform plus the $199 entry and $99 fee spread across a first year. Commissions are paid almost entirely in year one, so nothing compounds and the churn slider is disabled - but lapses still bite: first-year lapse on this book commonly runs 20–35%, and with a blended clawback the expected drag is around 19% of first-year commission, which this slider does not deduct. Read every figure as gross of that. Your own subscription cost of $40/mo is included.

Your money

What it costs to replace this yourself

Every row is a real, currently available route to the same job, at open-market prices. The comparison that matters is not the $199 - it is the contract level, because that is what is actually being paid for, on every policy, for as long as the agent stays.

What they sell youWhat you'd use insteadYour cost
Entry fee, licensing support and "educational materials" - $199Buy the pre-licensing course and sit the state exam yourself: exam prep, exam fee, fingerprinting, department filing$150–$290 in Texas · $478–$629 in California
30% of target premium as a new agentIndependent life brokerage or IMO with no downline requirement$0 - 55–100% from day one; many pay your course and reimburse the exam
30% and a two-year non-solicitDirect carrier appointment, applied for yourself$0–$100 in appointment fees - carrier street level, typically 70–90%
Commission-only from day one with no floorCaptive career agency - the traditional route, with training and supervision$0, plus a validated training allowance commonly $2,000–$4,500/mo, benefits and a 401(k)
Self-employed with no wage floor and full self-employment taxW-2 producer or account manager at an established independent agency$0 - $40,000–$65,000 base plus commission, unemployment insurance and workers’ comp
Pay to learn the industryService role at a carrier or agency, licensing paid by the employer, then transfer into sales$0 - $38,000–$55,000 while you learn
Buy your own final-expense leads on a 30% contractFinal-expense telesales desk that supplies the leads$0 up front - 80–110% contract with lead cost charged back against commission
Life only, highly lapse-sensitiveProperty and casualty license first, add life later~$140 in Texas - P&C renews at 10–15% and a P&C book is genuinely saleable
Contract-level ladder gated on recruitsMedicare and senior-market FMO$0 plus ~$175/yr certification - CMS-capped flat commissions, so no contract-level games
The $199 entry and the first-year cost that follows itKeep the day job and simply buy term cover for your own family$20–$60/month - the outcome most recruits would have been better off with
Total as sold
$1,543–$5,033 in year one, then a 25-to-70-point commission haircut for as long as you stay
Total, built yourself
$0–$290 to hold the identical state license, unattached

Price-to-value

Row two is the direct comparison and it is devastating on the arithmetic: the same job, the same carriers, the same leads and the same clients, at 55% to 100% of target premium from day one instead of 30%, with no recruiting requirement and no two-year non-solicit. On the median-production model that difference is roughly $811 a month, or about $9,700 a year, on identical work. The honest counter-argument is that rows two and four assume a self-starter who can prospect without structure, and this organization supplies structure - a peer group, a weekly office meeting, a scripted warm-market method, a mentor with a financial stake in the first sale, and a room that reflects a demographic the captive career agencies have historically under-recruited. That is a real service and it is why the field force is as large as it is. The question is whether it is worth 25 to 70 points of commission plus a two-year restraint, and on the numbers it is not.

Odds of profit

Three operators, five horizons

Probability of cumulative net profit

Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%3 mo6 mo1 yr3 yr5 yr 17% 11% 31%
Warm-market part-timer - evenings and weekends, works a hundred-name list, no lead spend, no recruitingFull-time producer who will not recruit - 40+ hrs/wk, genuinely good at selling, buys leads once the warm market dies, stays at 30–40%Builder who recruits - climbs the ladder, runs the Tuesday meeting, income becomes a function of downline headcount

Warm-market part-timer

evenings and weekends, works a hundred-name list, no lead spend, no recruiting

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 34% −$460
6 mo 41% +$180
1 yr 38% −$120
3 yr 21% −$1,900
5 yr 17% −$3,400

Full-time producer who will not recruit

40+ hrs/wk, genuinely good at selling, buys leads once the warm market dies, stays at 30–40%

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 22% −$1,400
6 mo 19% −$2,700
1 yr 16% −$5,100
3 yr 12% −$14,000
5 yr 11% −$22,000

Builder who recruits

climbs the ladder, runs the Tuesday meeting, income becomes a function of downline headcount

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 9% −$2,100
6 mo 13% −$3,200
1 yr 18% −$4,400
3 yr 27% −$3,000
5 yr 31% +$4,500

Methodology note. These are MODELED outcome ranges, not claims, not promises and not company figures - no cohort data of this kind is published by anyone in this channel. ANCHORED to the company’s own 2022 income disclosure: 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents under $1,000 averaging $388.59, 74.92% under $5,000, the top 2.02% taking 49.4% of all agent income, a derived mean of about $11,155 and an interpolated median of about $1,500. Anchored also to the published cost side - the $199 entry, the $99–$180 annual platform fee, the reported $15 monthly app, and the Texas first-year totals of $1,543 frugal and $5,033 normal - and to the published ladder, with its 30% entry contract and its 75% Marketing Director rung requiring 15 licensed agents and 50 base recruits. MODELED by us: the cohort definitions, which the company does not segment; the share of each cohort in cumulative profit; the warm-market decay curve; lead prices, contact and close rates taken from published vendor benchmarks; and the chargeback drag, taken from published carrier schedules because the company publishes neither its advance percentage nor its own chargeback terms. Three calibration notes, two of which cut in the company’s favor. The warm-market cohort is genuinely positive in its first six months, because zero lead cost sets a low bar - that is real and it is why the first row looks unlike the equivalent row on a product-MLM page. The builder cohort turns positive only at three to five years, which is honest: this plan is not abusive at the top, where a Marketing Director keeps 68 cents of the commission dollar on their own sales. And every negative figure here excludes the value of the license itself, which the agent keeps in all cases and can carry to an open-market contract paying 55% to 100% the following Monday.

Go-to-market

Where you are actually allowed to promote this

Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.

Channel
Status
Notes
Income and earnings claims
RESTRICTED - AND POLICED SINCE APRIL 2025
The published agreement prohibits false, misleading or deceptive representations about income, profits or earnings, to clients and to recruits alike. That is correctly drafted. Following the 2025 self-regulatory case the company also introduced a mandatory social-media compliance certification for the whole field force and updated its agreements to require posting guidelines. The practical constraint is arithmetic: with a median of roughly $1,500, any claim above about $5,000 a year describes the top quartile and any six-figure claim describes the top 2%.
Autodialers, spam and unscreened calling
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED
The Terms of Service bars agents from using autodialers, sending spam, contacting leads without proper consent or do-not-call screening, and violating telemarketing law. These are genuine, industry-appropriate compliance controls and they should be credited - no TCPA docket naming the company was located, which is unusual in a channel where such actions are close to universal.
Selling or reselling leads
PROHIBITED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION
Agents may not sell leads on without authorization. A sensible control, and one that limits a common secondary abuse in recruiting-heavy organizations.
Speaking critically about the company
PROHIBITED BY CONTRACT
The published New Associate Agreement bars agents from disparaging, demeaning or making negative remarks about the company. It is one reason the public record of complaint in this sector is dominated by anonymous review-site postings rather than named accounts, and it is a control on the speech of exactly the people best placed to warn a prospect.
Recruiting from the organization after you leave
BARRED FOR TWO YEARS - AND LITIGATED
From the federal court’s recitation of the contract: a departing Associate may not recruit the company’s Associates to a competitor for two years after termination. The company sued ten former agents at once to enforce it, pleading nine causes of action including federal and Texas trade-secret misappropriation and defamation. Note precisely what this is not - it is a non-solicit of associates, not a general non-compete, and nothing located bars a departing agent from selling life insurance elsewhere.
Where a dispute gets heard
DALLAS - ARBITRATION WITH A CLASS WAIVER
The Terms of Service requires binding arbitration administered by the AAA in Dallas under the Commercial Arbitration Rules, with an express waiver of jury trial and of participation in any class or representative proceeding. The contract recited in court also carries a Dallas County forum-selection clause. The asymmetry is the point: the agent arbitrates individually in Dallas, while the company has litigated against its former agents in federal district court.
The back-office database and customer data
TREATED AS THE COMPANY’S PROPERTY
The published Terms of Service is silent on ownership of customer data. The litigation record answers it in practice: the company characterised its agent-facing database as confidential proprietary information and sued over its use under federal and state trade-secret statutes. The operative assumption a recruit should make is that what is in the back office is the company’s, not theirs.
Medicare marketing
ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS APPLY
The Terms of Service applies Medicare-specific restrictions on top of the general rules. Appropriate, because Medicare marketing is separately regulated at federal level with its own recording and disclosure requirements.
Trademark and brand use
RESTRICTED
Misuse of company trademarks is prohibited. No detailed public policy on agent-owned websites, paid search or brand-keyword bidding could be located, so an agent planning to build any marketing asset should get the permission in writing before spending money on it.
The evidence

Red flags and green flags

Red flags

15
1Every promotion in the eleven-level ladder requires recruiting
Three direct business partners for Associate, fifteen base recruits for Field Associate, thirty for Director, fifty base recruits and fifteen licensed agents for Marketing Director, six hundred licensed agents at the top. There is no rung reachable on personal sales alone, so a producer who will not recruit is held at a 30% contract permanently while the ladder runs to 82%.
2A 30% entry contract where the open market starts new agents at 55% to 100%
Independent brokerages and direct carrier appointments contract never-licensed agents at 55% to 100% of target premium for $0, and many pay for the pre-licensing course. On identical production the gap is roughly $811 a month, about $9,700 a year.
3Buying leads is loss-making at every contract level below Marketing Director
On published vendor prices and published vendor conversion rates: minus $403 a month at 30%, minus $291 at 40%, minus $179 at 50%, and only plus $102 at the 75% rung that requires 15 licensed agents and 50 base recruits. Exclusive web leads cost $389 per issued policy against $231 of commission at the entry contract.
444.10% of paid agents earned under $1,000, averaging $388.59
The company’s own 2022 disclosure, gross of every cost - against a realistic Texas first-year cost of $1,543 on the frugal path. 74.92% earned under $5,000, and the top 2.02% took 49.4% of all agent income.
5The published agreement is not the whole agreement
The two-year non-solicit, the confidentiality provision and the Dallas forum clause are documented only in the federal court’s recitation of the contract. None of them appears in the New Associate Agreement the company publishes on its own website, so a prospect cannot read the binding restraints before paying.
6The company sues its former agents
Ten at once in PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez, N.D. Tex. 3:21-cv-00418, on nine causes of action including federal and Texas trade-secret misappropriation and defamation. The competing organization the defendants allegedly moved to is a life-insurance recruiter this site has separately graded and is not named here. Interlocutory rulings only; the final disposition could not be retrieved and nothing was found against anyone.
7A three-business-day refund window on the entry fee
By email to the upline director and the company administrator, and nothing after. Set that against a BBB complaint file dominated by people who sought refunds of the $199 once they understood the structure - which is generally after three business days.
8DSSRC Case #209-2025: fourteen claims removed rather than substantiated
Closed 14 April 2025. The claims communicated atypical income expectations - "financial freedom," "unlimited income," "six figures in less than a year," and "$104,000" a month - and some appeared on the corporate website rather than on agents’ feeds. $104,000 a month is $1.248 million a year, above the average of the top 0.17% bracket in the company’s own table. This is a self-regulatory closure, not a government action or a finding of liability.
9154 BBB complaints closed in three years
22 in the last twelve months, dominated by refund requests over the $199 after the multi-level structure became apparent. These are consumer allegations recorded by a private ratings body, not findings - and the A+ rating alongside them measures responsiveness to complaints, not the quality of the opportunity.
10Advance and chargeback terms are disclosed nowhere
The New Associate Agreement and the Terms of Service are both silent on advances, chargebacks, debit balances and what happens to a negative balance on termination. The mechanism by which a new agent ends up owing money - commission advanced, policy lapses, advance clawed back - is in no document a prospect can read before paying.
11"Points," "base recruits" and "super base recruits" are undefined publicly
Promotion thresholds are denominated partly in points, from 3,000 at Associate to 1,200,000 at the top rung, and no public definition of the points-to-premium conversion could be found. A prospect cannot compute a single promotion threshold from any public document.
12No carrier list is published
The homepage, the About page, the recruiting page and the consumer product site name no underwriting carrier. A recruit cannot determine, before paying, whose products they will be authorized to sell. The most consistently reported set in independent reviews is Allianz, Corebridge, Nationwide, National Life Group, Foresters, National Western and American National - secondary-sourced and possibly stale.
13Office "plug-in" fees charged by the local hierarchy
Reported by agents at "from $30 a month and I have seen as high as $1,000 a month," charged by the local office rather than centrally, and disclosed nowhere in company documents. They are a material part of the real first-year cost and they vary by whoever recruited you.
14"The opportunity to earn equity" with no accessible plan document
Advertised on the recruiting page; the acquisition release refers to the parent’s Employee Ownership Plan. Whether 1099 field agents are eligible, what the units are worth, how they are valued, the vesting schedule and any liquidity mechanism are all unpublished. An undocumented promise - not a benefit, and not a fraud.
15A structural incentive toward indexed universal life over term
On published commission ranges a $1,200-target indexed policy pays a Trainee about $360 where a $400 term policy pays $120, so roughly five term sales equal one indexed sale. The stated mission demographic mostly needs term, and 92% of the sales force has no prior industry experience. No allegation of instruction to mis-sell is made and none was found; the incentive is verifiable from the commission table.

Green flags

10
1The license belongs to the agent, permanently and portably
A resident life producer license is issued by a state insurance department to a natural person. It survives termination, it survives the company, and it cannot be clawed back. A recruit who pays $199, gets licensed, sells nothing and quits after six months still walks away holding a credential an independent brokerage will contract the same afternoon at 55% to 100%. This is the single strongest fact in the file.
2No inventory, no autoship and no mandatory product purchase
Searched for specifically and not found as a contract term. The agreement imposes a one-time $199 fee and no purchase obligation. There is a reported soft expectation that agents own a policy themselves, which is a real pressure and a norm shared with essentially every career agency - but it is a norm, not a term.
3Nothing is paid for recruiting itself
No headhunting fee, no pack bonus, no commission on enrollment. The income disclosure states plainly that no income can be earned from sponsoring new agents, no evidence was found that any part of the $199 flows up the hierarchy, and every dollar in the plan originates as commission on a real policy sold to a real third party. That is a genuine structural distinction from a product MLM and it is why this is not a pyramid.
4It publishes an income disclosure when most of this channel publishes none
At a stable public URL, linked from the homepage and the recruiting page, with bracket averages and cumulative shares. The document is flawed - no denominator, no expense data, and the most recent public edition covers 2022 - and the numbers inside are grim. Publishing it anyway is a real transparency credit.
5Real products from real, well-capitalized carriers
Term, whole life, indexed universal life, simplified-issue, final expense and fixed indexed annuities, underwritten by ordinary insurers and backed by state guaranty associations, sold to households that would want the cover regardless. Nothing in this file raises a concern about carrier quality.
6No securities exposure and no securities-licensing mismatch
The product line is insurance, so a life-only producer license suffices and no Series 6, 63 or 7 gap arises; no variable universal life and no variable annuities are offered. Commission advancing is a loan to the agent rather than an investment by the agent. Howey fails at common enterprise and at efforts-of-others.
7No government regulatory action located anywhere
No state insurance department order, fine, consent order, cease-and-desist or assurance of voluntary compliance, and no FINRA or SEC matter, naming the company or any named executive, in searches covering four state department records plus federal sources. State enforcement databases are fragmented across fifty jurisdictions, so a null is weaker evidence here than it would be federally - reported as none located, which is not the same as none exists.
8No TCPA, wage-and-hour or discrimination docket located
Genuinely unexpected for the TCPA, since recruiting-heavy insurance organizations that run lead-calling operations are among the most frequently sued classes of defendant. Two explanations fit and this report cannot distinguish them: the warm-market method may genuinely generate less cold-call volume, or suits may be filed against individual agents under names that do not surface. The Terms of Service prohibitions on autodialers and unscreened contact are a real control either way.
9The self-regulatory matter was remediated cooperatively
All fourteen challenged claims were removed rather than defended, the website was changed, agreements were updated to require posting guidelines, and a mandatory social-media compliance certification was created for the whole field force. The council recorded the response as necessary, appropriate and made in good faith. That is what remediation is supposed to look like.
10Institutional ownership and a named compliance function
A subsidiary of a large established insurance distributor since 20 July 2022, with a named General Counsel who is also Chief Compliance Officer listed as a principal. Sixteen years of continuous operation and no regulatory bar, criminal matter or disciplinary order located against any principal. That combination is materially better than the modal founder profile in this category.
What would move this grade

We would like to be wrong about this

Upward

  • Decoupling contract level from recruiting - letting a producer climb the ladder on personal production alone, or simply raising the entry rung from 30% toward the 55%-plus the open market pays. This is the single change that would most move the grade, and it would move compensation and price-to-value together.
  • Publishing the full compensation plan in machine-readable form with the points conversion and the definitions of "base recruit" and "super base recruit," plus the vesting schedule, the advance percentage and the chargeback schedule, at a public URL a prospect can read before paying $199.
  • A current income disclosure with a stated denominator and a definition of "paid agent," including everyone who paid the entry fee in the period; a carrier list on the public site; a refund window extended from three business days to thirty days; and either shortening the two-year non-solicit or vesting renewals immediately on issue.

Downward

  • Any state insurance department order, consent order, fine or cease-and-desist naming the company or an executive; an FTC action on income-claim or business-opportunity grounds; or a second self-regulatory case, particularly a referral to the FTC rather than a cooperative closure.
  • Evidence that any portion of the entry fee or the annual platform fee flows up the hierarchy as recruitment compensation, or that a personal policy purchase is a contract term rather than a cultural norm. Either would convert the service fee into recruitment pay and would fire a hard cap immediately.
  • A regulatory finding of unsuitable indexed universal life or annuity sales by the field force, a TCPA class action or an FLSA collective with an adverse first-instance decision, or withdrawal of the income disclosure from the public site.
The better trade

Grade is D+. A real, portable state license and a genuinely demanded product, attached to a contract ladder where the commission rate itself is bought with recruits rather than sales.

Four things here are better than this organization’s reputation and they belong first. The product is real: regulated life cover from ordinary well-capitalized carriers, priced by actuaries, backed by state guaranty associations, bought by people who would want it whether or not anybody was recruiting agents. The license is the agent’s own - a state credential in their name that survives termination and the company alike, and that an independent brokerage will contract on the same afternoon. There is no inventory, no autoship and no mandatory product purchase, and nothing whatsoever is paid for the act of recruiting: every dollar in the plan starts life as commission on a policy somebody actually bought. And the company publishes an income disclosure, which almost nobody in this channel does. Those are not small credits. They are the reason the securities, product and payout-sustainability scores on this page are high, and the reason no regulator has ever alleged a pyramid.

The grade is set by the ladder. Eleven ranks run from 30% of target premium to 82%, and every promotion requires recruits as well as production - three, then fifteen, then thirty, then fifty, then six hundred licensed agents at the top. There is no rung a producer can reach on personal sales alone, so someone who sells superbly and recruits nobody stays at 30% permanently. That is not a recruitment bonus; it is worse, because a withheld contract level compounds across every policy the agent will ever write. The open market prices the same capability at 55% to 100% from day one, for $0, and the state pre-licensing route costs $150 to $290 at retail in Texas. The company’s own disclosure shows what the difference produces: 44.10% of paid agents under $1,000 averaging $388.59, 74.92% under $5,000, and the top 2.02% taking 49.4% of all agent income - against a realistic first-year cost of $1,543 to $5,033 on an advertised $199.

The third element is the exit, and it is documented rather than inferred. The federal court in the Martinez action recited the contract: a two-year bar on recruiting the company’s associates to a competitor, a confidentiality provision and a Dallas County forum clause, enforced against ten former agents at once on nine causes of action. The Terms of Service adds AAA arbitration in Dallas with a class waiver. The refund window on the entry fee is three business days. And none of those covenants appears in the agreement the company publishes for prospects - the published agreement is not the whole agreement. Whether renewals vest, what happens to a downline on termination, and whether a book of business can ever be sold could not be established from any public document. Stage-label all of it correctly: nothing here is a regulatory finding, the self-regulatory case was closed after cooperative remediation rather than adjudication, and no court has found against this company on anything. The criticism is the structure, not a verdict.

1

Buy the license at retail first, then decide who to contract with

Exam prep, the exam fee, fingerprinting and the department filing come to $150 to $290 all-in in Texas and $478 to $629 in California. That produces the identical credential, in your own name, with no affiliation, no non-solicit, no downline obligation and no three-day refund window. Every agency worth joining will contract you the same week - and you will be negotiating from a position where the license is already yours rather than something you are being helped to obtain.

2

Negotiate the contract level, the vesting term and the release policy in writing before you sign anything

These three clauses decide whether an insurance career is a business or a job you cannot take with you. Ask any prospective organization, in writing: what percentage of target premium do I start at, when do renewals vest, will you release me to another carrier appointment on request, and what happens to my book if I leave. Independent brokerages answer those questions in an email. If an answer is vague or the document is not shown to you, that is the answer.

3

Run the lead arithmetic before you run the emotion

Twenty exclusive final-expense leads at $35 is $700 a month. A 9% issued-policy rate - a lead vendor’s own optimistic number - is 1.8 policies. At a $700 average premium with 110% released into the channel, a 30% contract pays $231 a policy. That is $416 against $700. Do that sum on whatever contract level you are actually offered, at whatever lead price you are actually quoted, and see which side of zero you land on before you spend a dollar.

4

If you want the room, get the room without the haircut

The genuine service on offer here is structure - a peer group, a weekly meeting, a scripted method, a mentor with a stake in your first sale. That is worth having and it is why the field force is large. But it is available elsewhere at a fraction of the economic price: a captive career agency pays a validated training allowance and benefits while you learn, a W-2 producer role at an independent agency pays $40,000 to $65,000 plus commission, and a service role at a carrier will pay for your licensing outright. None of them charges you 25 to 70 points of your own commission for the privilege.

Nothing here is paid for recruiting - and every one of the eleven promotions requires recruits, so the plan pays for recruitment by withholding contract level from those who do not.
Scorecard

Nine dimensions, weighted

Comp structure & KoscotDoes the plan pay for recruitment or for sales to real customers?
20%
3.5
Say the good part first and without hedging: nothing here is paid for recruiting itself. Every dollar in this plan originates as first-year or renewal commission on a real insurance policy sold to a real third party and underwritten by a real carrier. There is no headhunting fee, no pack bonus, and the company’s own income disclosure states in terms that "You cannot earn income from sponsoring new agents." On the evidence available that sentence is accurate, and it is a genuine structural distinction from a product MLM. But all eleven promotions on the contract ladder require recruits - three direct business partners for Associate, fifteen base recruits for Field Associate, thirty for Director, fifty for Marketing Director, six hundred licensed agents for the top rung - and there is no rung reachable on personal sales alone. A producer who sells superbly and recruits nobody is capped at a 30% contract level permanently, while the ladder runs to 82%. In economic substance the plan pays for recruitment by withholding contract level from those who do not recruit. That is a different mechanism from a recruitment bonus, and it is a harsher one: a bonus is a one-off payment, whereas a withheld contract level compounds across every policy the agent will ever write. This is the lowest compensation score of any insurance recruiter on this site, and the reason is that specific fact rather than any general objection to overrides.
Securities exposureAny passive return on capital? Howey, staking, tokens, withdrawal friction.
15%
9.5
There is no securities exposure to the participant here and the report will not manufacture one. Roughly $199 buys enumerated services - administrative processing, educational materials, licensing support, carrier contracting and back-office access. There is no product purchase, no inventory, no autoship, no minimum order and no capital contributed to a pooled enterprise. The licensing costs that follow are paid to the state, not to the company. Under Howey the analysis fails at two prongs, not one: there is no common enterprise, because each agent’s income derives from their own policies and their own hierarchy with no pot and no pro-rata allocation; and the return is emphatically not derived from the efforts of others, because the participant must personally obtain a state license, prospect, present, close and submit. The entire criticism elsewhere in this report is that the model demands too much effort from the participant for too little return, which is the opposite of passivity. Two facts that look like securities exposure and are not. The carriers behind the products are large listed insurers and the parent is private-equity owned - both are irrelevant to this dimension, because a listed counterparty is not a security and an owner’s capital structure is not the participant’s investment. And two mechanisms were checked specifically: commission advancing is a loan to the agent, with capital flowing toward the participant, so it is a debt exposure scored under participant economics and terms; and indexed universal life and fixed indexed annuities are insurance products regulated by state insurance departments, so a life-only producer license suffices, no Series 6 or 63 gap arises, and no variable products are sold. The half-point comes off only for the undocumented equity offer and for the investment-adjacent language in which indexed universal life is customarily marketed.
Ownership & track recordWho runs it, what did they run before, and what happened to it.
15%
6.0
The credit comes first because it is real. Sixteen years of continuous operation. A named, publicly identifiable founder who has not hidden behind a shell. No regulatory bar, criminal proceeding, fraud judgment or state insurance-department disciplinary order located against the entity or against any named principal, in searches that covered Texas, California, Louisiana and New Jersey department records, FINRA and SEC sources and general legal news. And institutional ownership since 20 July 2022, when the company became a subsidiary of Integrity Marketing Group, itself backed by Silver Lake, HGGC and Harvest Partners, with a named General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer sitting inside the structure. That is governance, and it belongs before the criticism. The deductions are three. The founder learned this model inside the multi-level insurance channel and reproduced it, including the restraints - the two-year non-solicit that governs departing agents here is the same species of clause that governed the hierarchy he left. A very large personal media business runs alongside, and functions in practice as the recruiting funnel, so the same principal profits from the audience’s attention and from converting that audience into 1099 agents who start at 30%. And he holds three senior roles concurrently - founder-CEO here, managing partner at the parent, and principal of the media operation. None of that is misconduct. A change of control is not a finding of wrongdoing, and neither is an executive departure or appointment.
Product reality & demandWould a rational buyer purchase this if no income offer existed?
12%
7.5
Lead with what this actually is: a genuinely demanded, state-regulated financial product. Term life, indexed universal life, whole life, simplified-issue, final expense and fixed indexed annuities, underwritten by ordinary well-capitalized carriers and backed by state guaranty associations, sold to households that would want a death benefit whether or not anyone was recruiting agents. Nobody needs an income opportunity to want to protect their children. There is no inventory, no autoship and no mandatory product purchase anywhere in this model - that was looked for specifically and not found as a contract term. And the license the agent earns is portable and belongs to the agent, not to the company: it is issued by a state insurance department to a natural person, it survives termination, it survives the company, and an independent brokerage will contract on it the same afternoon. That single fact is the strongest thing in this file. The score sits below its peers for one reason: the structural incentive to place indexed universal life over term. On the published commission ranges, a $1,200-target-premium indexed policy pays a trainee roughly three times what a term policy pays, while the stated mission demographic mostly needs cheap high-face term - and the sales force is, by the company’s own published figure, 92% inexperienced. Index caps, participation rates, cost-of-insurance charges that escalate with age and surrender schedules are being explained to first-time buyers by people in their first year of financial services. No regulatory action alleging unsuitable sales was located and none is alleged here. This is a suitability problem, not a product problem, and it is graded as one.
Participant economicsReal cost in, realistic money out, and whether they publish the numbers.
10%
3.0
Credit the rarity first, because it is rare: the company publishes an income disclosure at a stable public URL linked from its own homepage, and the overwhelming majority of organizations in this channel publish nothing at all. Now its numbers, unsoftened. In the 2022 disclosure - the most recent public edition as of this review - 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents earned under $1,000 for the year, averaging $388.59. 74.92% earned under $5,000. The top 2.02% took 49.4% of all agent income, and the top 0.17% alone, about one agent in 588, took 15.1% of it. Working the bracket averages against their shares gives a mean of roughly $11,155 and a median of roughly $1,500 - the mean is 7.4 times the median. Set that against the real cost: $1,543 in Texas on the most frugal path and $5,033 on the normal one, against an advertised $199. The lead arithmetic makes the mechanism concrete. Twenty exclusive final-expense web leads a month at $35 is $700 of spend; at a 55% contact rate, a 45% presentation rate, a 40% close and a 90% placement rate - a lead vendor’s own optimistic funnel - that is 1.8 issued policies a month. At a $700 average annual premium and 110% of premium released into the channel, a 30% contract pays $231 a policy, so $416 of gross a month against $700 of leads and about $40 of platform and app fees, then roughly 19% of it clawed back as a chargeback drag at a 25% first-year lapse rate. That is minus $403 a month. The same agent at 50% is still negative; profitability on personal production arrives only at the 75% Marketing Director contract, which requires 15 licensed agents and 50 base recruits. Three further facts the disclosure omits: it states no denominator, it is gross of every cost, and it excludes everyone who paid $199 and never got licensed - so the true share who paid money and earned nothing is necessarily higher than 44.10% and nobody can say by how much.
Price-to-valueWhat the same capability costs on the open market.
8%
2.5
The starkest number on the page. The capability being sold here is a license, carrier appointments and training. On the open market a brand-new, never-licensed agent is routinely contracted by an independent brokerage or a direct carrier appointment at 55% to 100% of target premium, from day one, for $0 - many such shops pay for the pre-licensing course and reimburse the exam fee. Here the same capability comes with a 30% starting contract. The state pre-licensing route is buyable at retail for $150 to $290 all-in in Texas - exam prep, the exam fee, fingerprinting and the department filing - against a $199 entry fee that buys none of those things, plus $99 to $180 a year and a reported $15 a month thereafter. So the price of admission is not really the fee at all. The fee is trivial; the price is a 25 to 70 point commission haircut on every policy the agent writes, worth roughly $811 a month, or about $9,700 a year, on the median-production model. There is a real service on the other side of that trade - a peer group, a weekly meeting, a scripted warm-market method, a mentor with a financial stake in the first sale, and for a demographic the captive career agencies have historically under-recruited, a room full of people who look like them. That is worth something. It is not worth 25 to 70 points of commission plus a two-year non-solicit, and the difference is the override the ladder above the agent collects.
Payout sustainabilityCan the company fund the plan out of margin, or only out of inflow?
8%
8.0
This is a genuine structural strength and it is shared with the rest of this channel rather than unique to this company, which is exactly why it should be stated plainly. The money that funds this plan is carrier commission on real premium paid by real policyholders. It is not recruit inflow. There is no product margin to strain, no pool that depends on new joiners, no inventory to load and no mechanism by which the plan collapses when recruitment slows - commissions on existing policies keep arriving whether or not anybody new signs a New Associate Agreement. Modeling the entry fee as retained by the company, as the evidence supports, roughly 27 cents of each first-year commission dollar on an entry-level sale reaches the agent who made it, about 47 cents goes up the hierarchy and about 25 cents is retained at house level. That distribution is harsh on the writing agent but it is not unstable. The qualification is lapse sensitivity. The channel advances commission and claws it back when policies lapse - carrier schedules commonly recapture 100% in months one to six and 50% in months seven to twelve, and first-year lapse rates in the middle market run 20% to 35%. So the funding is real, but the agent’s share of it is contingent on persistency they do not control, and the company does not publish its own advance percentage or chargeback schedule.
Marketing conductIncome claims, regulator run-ins, hype, deadline stacking.
7%
3.0
DSSRC Case #209-2025, closed 14 April 2025. The Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council identified fourteen claims across social media and the company’s own website communicating that a typical member of the sales force could achieve "financial freedom," "unlimited income" and "full-time income" - including "six figures in less than a year" and monthly earnings of "$104,000." Stage-label that precisely: the DSSRC is a self-regulatory body operated by BBB National Programs, not a government regulator. The closure is an administrative closure, not a fine, not a consent order and not a finding of liability, and it followed remediation rather than adjudication. The remediation deserves honest credit: the company did not stonewall. It removed all fourteen claims rather than attempt to substantiate them, modified its website, updated its agreements to require posting guidelines and created a mandatory social-media compliance certification for the whole field force, and the council recorded its actions as necessary, appropriate and made in good faith. Against that: fourteen simultaneous claims, some on the corporate website rather than on agents’ feeds, sixteen years into the company’s life. And the $104,000 a month figure is $1.248 million a year - above the average of the top 0.17% bracket in the company’s own published table. Add 154 BBB complaints closed over three years, 22 in the last twelve months, dominated by people seeking refunds of the $199 after realizing what they had joined; those are consumer allegations recorded by a private ratings body, not findings, and the A+ rating alongside them measures responsiveness rather than conduct. The genuine nulls belong here too: no state insurance department action, no FINRA or SEC matter, no TCPA docket, no FLSA suit and no discrimination suit naming the company was located.
Operator terms & exitWho owns the customer, what you forfeit, how hard it is to leave.
5%
1.5
The lowest number on the page after compensation, and it is documented rather than inferred. From the court’s own recitation of the contract in PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez, N.D. Tex. 3:21-cv-00418: a clause barring a departing Associate from recruiting the company’s Associates to a competitor for two years after termination, a confidentiality provision, an ethics clause, and a forum-selection clause fixing venue in Dallas County, Texas. The company enforces it - that action was brought against ten former agents at once, pleading nine causes of action including federal and state trade-secret misappropriation and defamation. Separately the Terms of Service requires binding AAA arbitration in Dallas under the Commercial Arbitration Rules with an express jury-trial and class-action waiver. The refund window on the entry fee is three business days, by email, and nothing after. And here is the part a prospect cannot check before signing: those restrictive covenants do not appear in the New Associate Agreement the company publishes on its own website, which covers the $199, the three-day refund, independent-contractor status and prohibitions on false income representations and disparagement - and nothing else. The published agreement is not the whole agreement. Beyond that, the terms that decide whether any of this is a business at all could not be established from any public document: whether renewals vest and after how long, what happens to a downline on termination, and whether a book of business can ever be sold. One industry source reports one year to full vesting; no company document confirms it. It is worth being precise about what is not here - this is a non-solicit of associates, not a general non-compete, and nothing found bars a departing agent from selling life insurance elsewhere.
Weighted composite
5.35
D+

Dimension profile

Further from center is better. Hover any point.

Comp structure& Koscot 3.5 Securitiesexposure 9.5 Ownership &track record 6.0 Product reality& demand 7.5 Participanteconomics 3.0 Price-to-value 2.5 Payoutsustainability 8.0 Marketingconduct 3.0 Operator terms& exit 1.5

Hard caps that bind here

Non-binding ceiling at D+ the recruiting-gated contract ladder. All eleven promotions require recruits - 3, then 15, then 30, then 50, then 600 licensed agents - so the commission rate itself, not merely a bonus, is contingent on recruitment at every rung, and a producer who will not recruit is held at 30% permanently. The 20% weight on compensation still under-represents that, because the same factor compounds into price-to-value, where it is the whole of the 25-to-70-point gap against open-market contracts, and into terms, where the two-year non-solicit protects the hierarchy the ladder builds. This ceiling is recorded so the channel is graded consistently, and it does not bite: the weighted arithmetic already lands at 5.35, at or below the band the ceiling describes. Say plainly what it does not rest on. There is no securities exposure - no investment contract, no promised return on capital, no securities-licensing mismatch. No state insurance department action, consent order, fine or cease-and-desist was located. No FINRA or SEC matter was located. No TCPA docket and no wage-and-hour or misclassification action was located. No regulator has alleged a pyramid, and no court has found one. And the company publishes an income disclosure when most of its peers publish none. A ceiling would only convert into a hard cap on new evidence: proof that any part of the entry or platform fee flows up the hierarchy as recruitment compensation, a mandatory product purchase written into the contract, or a government enforcement action.

The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.

Sources consulted

What we read

Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.

  1. PHP Agency, LLC Income Disclosure 2022 (PDF, published December 2023) - 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents under $1,000 averaging $388.59; top 0.17% averaging $990,875.25; $199 New Associate fee; $99 / $180 annual platform fees; "You cannot earn income from sponsoring new agents"
    Income disclosureTier 1PHP Agency, LLC · 2023-12archived copy

    PHP Agency income disclosure for calendar year 2022, published December 2023 at the company’s own public URL - 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents under $1,000 averaging $388.59; 74.92% under $5,000; top 2.02% at 49.4% of all agent income; top 0.17% averaging $990,875; annual platform fees of $99 and $180; and the statement "You cannot earn income from sponsoring new agents"

  2. PHP Agency, Inc. New Associate Agreement & Refund Policy (2021.10 revision, PDF) - the $199 one-time New Associate Fee, the three-business-day refund window by email, independent-contractor designation and the prohibition on false or misleading income representations
    Policies & proceduresTier 1PHP Agency, Inc. · 2021-10archived copy

    PHP Agency New Associate Agreement & Refund Policy (2021 revision, published on the company site) - the $199 one-time fee, the three-business-day refund window by email, independent-contractor designation, prohibition on false or misleading income representations, and the non-disparagement clause

  3. PHP Agency, LLC Terms of Service, version 2023.10 (PDF) - independent-contractor status, conditions on use of the Company's Resources, and the liability limitation
    Policies & proceduresTier 1PHP Agency, LLC · 2023-10archived copy

    PHP Agency Terms of Service dated 12 November 2023 - binding AAA arbitration in Dallas under the Commercial Arbitration Rules with an express jury-trial and class-action waiver; prohibitions on autodialers, spam, unscreened contact, do-not-call violations, unauthorised lead reselling and trademark misuse; Medicare-specific restrictions

  4. PHP Agency, Inc. v. Jose Martinez et al., Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-00418-X (N.D. Tex.) - Memorandum Opinion and Order of 10 January 2022 granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions to dismiss (Claims Six, Seven and Eight dismissed with leave to amend; breach-of-contract, Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act and Defend Trade Secrets Act claims permitted to proceed)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (via GovInfo) · 2022-01-10archived copy

    PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez et al., N.D. Tex. Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00418-X - the court’s recitation of the two-year associate non-solicit, the confidentiality provision, the ethics clause and the Dallas County forum-selection clause; nine causes of action against ten former agents; the 27 September 2022 ruling dismissing three claims with leave to amend and permitting the rest to proceed; the 28 February 2023 denial of default judgment without prejudice. Interlocutory rulings only, no merits judgment retrieved, and the competing organization named in the opinion is graded separately on this site and is therefore not named here

  5. PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez - Memorandum Opinion and Order of 27 September 2022 on the counter-defendants' motions to dismiss the former Associates' counterclaims, reciting the New Associate Agreement dispute and the misclassification, withheld-override and false-income-promise allegations
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (via GovInfo) · 2022-09-27archived copy
  6. PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez - Memorandum Opinion and Order of 14 September 2022 denying the motion to vacate the clerk's entry of default
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (via GovInfo) · 2022-09-14archived copy
  7. DSSRC Case #209-2025: Administrative Closure - PHP Agency, LLC, closed 14 April 2025 (fourteen income and lifestyle claims identified, including "six figures in less than a year" and "$104,000" a month; all removed rather than substantiated; mandatory Social Media Compliance Certification created)
    Self-regulatoryTier 2Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council, BBB National Programs · 2025-04-14archived copy

    BBB National Programs, Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council Case #209-2025, closed 14 April 2025 - fourteen income and lifestyle claims identified as communicating atypical earnings expectations, including "six figures in less than a year" and "$104,000" a month; all fourteen removed rather than substantiated; website modified; agreements updated; mandatory social-media compliance certification created; actions recorded as necessary, appropriate and made in good faith

  8. PHP Agency, Inc. - BBB Business Profile, Addison, Texas (file opened 22 December 2016; BBB Accredited since 28 September 2020; A+ rating)
    Self-regulatoryTier 2Better Business Bureau serving North Central Texasarchived copy

    Better Business Bureau business profile and complaint file, Addison, Texas - file opened 22 December 2016, accredited since 28 September 2020, A+ rating, 154 complaints closed in three years and 22 in the last twelve months, categorised across product, service, order, customer-service, advertising, billing and delivery issues, with refunds of the $199 the dominant theme

  9. PHP Agency, Inc. - BBB complaint file (complaints closed in the last three years and the last twelve months)
    Self-regulatoryTier 2Better Business Bureau serving North Central Texasarchived copy
  10. "Become An Insurance Agent" - PHP Agency corporate recruiting page, including the compensation program, monthly bonuses and "the opportunity to earn equity"
    Company documentTier 1PHP Agency, LLC · 2022-06-10archived copy

    PHP Agency corporate site - the "tech-enabled FMO" self-description, the agent-count series from 5,000 in 2017 to 45,000 in 2024 with a stated 2029 goal of 500,000, the 49-state and Puerto Rico footprint, the self-reported field demographics including 92% with no prior industry experience, the leadership page, and the "opportunity to earn equity" on the recruiting page

  11. Integrity Marketing Group PHP Agency press kit (PDF) - "PHP Agency has grown from 66 agents in one office to over 27,000 agents located in 49 states across the U.S. and Puerto Rico"
    Company documentTier 1Integrity Marketing Group, LLC · 2022-07-20archived copy
  12. "Patrick Bet-David and PHP Agency Join Integrity to Accelerate Growth and Serve More People", 20 July 2022 - acquisition announcement, terms not disclosed, founder appointed a Managing Partner, PHP employees to take part in Integrity's Employee Ownership Plan
    Company documentTier 1Integrity Marketing Group, LLC · 2022-07-20archived copy

    Integrity Marketing Group acquisition announcement of 20 July 2022 and the sell-side adviser’s transaction record - the acquisition of PHP Agency, terms not disclosed, the founder’s appointment as a Managing Partner, the 27,000 agent figure for 2022, and employee access to the parent’s Employee Ownership Plan; plus the December 2021 announcement of a $1.2 billion strategic investment led by Silver Lake alongside HGGC and Harvest Partners

  13. "Houlihan Lokey Advises PHP Agency" - sell-side adviser's transaction record for the acquisition of PHP Agency, Inc. by Integrity Marketing Group, LLC (more than 27,000 agents)
    Company documentTier 1Houlihan Lokey, Inc. · 2022archived copy
  14. "Ambina Partners Announces Sale of PHP Agency", 27 July 2022 - prior institutional investor's account of the 2017 investment and the sale to Integrity
    Company documentTier 1Ambina Partners LLC · 2022-07-27archived copy
  15. "Integrity Announces Strategic Investment from Silver Lake to Accelerate Growth as Omnichannel Insurtech Leader", 9 December 2021 - $1.2 billion investment led by Silver Lake, with Harvest Partners the largest institutional investor and HGGC a significant investor
    ReportingTier 1Silver Lake · 2021-12-09archived copy
  16. Integrity Marketing Group press kit for the Silver Lake investment (PDF), 9 December 2021
    Company documentTier 1Integrity Marketing Group, LLC · 2021-12-09archived copy
Unable to verify

What we could not get

  • The Texas Secretary of State filing number, formation date and entity-conversion record. The state system is behind a paid login and third-party mirrors returned blocks, so this is a retrieval failure rather than evidence of absence - the filings certainly exist. Whether "PHP Agency, Inc." formally converted to "PHP Agency, LLC," and when, is therefore a strong inference from document dates and not a verified fact.
  • The primary compensation-plan document. A PDF titled as the company’s compensation plan is publicly hosted, but it is an image-only scan from which no text could be extracted, so the eleven-rung ladder on this page is reconstructed from three secondary sources that agree with one another on every rank name, percentage and threshold. Treat the percentages as reliable-by-corroboration rather than primary-sourced.
  • The definitions of "points," "base recruit" and "super base recruit." Promotion thresholds run from 3,000 points at Associate to 1,200,000 at the top rung, and no public definition of the points-to-premium conversion could be found anywhere. A prospect cannot compute a single promotion threshold from any public document. No conversion rate is guessed at here.
  • The advance percentage and the chargeback schedule. The company discloses neither, in any document a prospect can read. The industry norm is an advance of about 75% of first-year commission over a nine-month earn-out, and published carrier schedules commonly recapture 100% in months one to six and 50% in months seven to twelve - those norms are what this page models, and no company-specific figure is published because none could be found.
  • Vesting of renewals, what happens to a downline on termination, and whether a book of business can be sold. One industry source reports one year of service to full vesting; no company document confirms it and the company publishes nothing on any of the three. Vesting is the single most valuable term in an insurance agent’s contract, and this one is invisible before signing.
  • The current carrier appointment list. No carrier is named on the homepage, the About page, the recruiting page or the consumer product site. The set most consistently reported in independent reviews is Allianz, Corebridge, Nationwide, National Life Group, Foresters, National Western and American National - secondary-sourced, possibly stale, and not confirmed as the current appointment list.
  • Any income disclosure more recent than 2022. Site-restricted searches, the upload directories and the recruiting page’s own document links were all checked and all still point at the 2022 edition as of this review date - a four-year lag. A newer edition behind an agent login cannot be ruled out. Also unverified: the denominator behind the percentages, which the document never states, and whether 1099 field agents are eligible for the parent’s equity plan at all.
  • The final disposition of all four located civil actions - the federal action against ten former agents, a Harris County action naming the company and two individuals as defendants, a Texas state petition against a former agent, and a California state-court action in which the company is a defendant and the plaintiff is a rival recruiting organization graded separately on this site. Only captions and interlocutory rulings could be retrieved; none has produced a merits judgment this report could read, and no finding exists against anyone. Distinguish these carefully from the genuine nulls, which are different and are worth publishing as such: no state insurance department action, no FINRA or SEC matter, no TCPA docket, no FLSA or misclassification suit and no discrimination suit naming the company or any named executive was located, in searches whose limits are described on this page.

Not advice

This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.

Who writes this

Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.

Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.

  • Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
  • The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
  • Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
  • No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Common questions

PHP Agency - frequently asked

QIs PHP Agency a pyramid scheme?
No court and no regulator has found it to be one, and the structural reasons are worth stating precisely. A pyramid scheme pays for recruitment out of recruitment money. Every dollar in this plan originates as first-year or renewal commission on a real insurance policy sold to a real third party and underwritten by a real carrier; there is no headhunting fee, no product purchase requirement, no inventory and no autoship, and the company’s own income disclosure states that no income can be earned from sponsoring new agents. On the evidence available that is accurate. But every promotion in the eleven-level ladder requires recruiting - three recruits for the first rung, fifteen for the second, fifty base recruits for Marketing Director, six hundred licensed agents at the top - and at the 30% entry contract, personal production on purchased leads loses money at market prices. So: not a pyramid scheme, but a compensation plan in which recruiting is the only viable route to profitability once a warm market is exhausted. Those are different things, and the difference matters a great deal legally and rather less to a recruit’s bank balance.
QHow much do PHP Agency agents actually earn?
The company publishes this itself, which is rare in this channel and a genuine credit. Its 2022 income disclosure - the most recent public edition as of this review - shows 44.10% of paid life-licensed agents earning under $1,000 for the year, averaging $388.59. 74.92% earned under $5,000. Working the bracket averages against their shares gives a mean of roughly $11,155 against an interpolated median of roughly $1,500, so the mean is about 7.4 times the median; the top 2.02% took 49.4% of all agent income and the top 0.17%, about one agent in 588, took 15.1% of it. Three caveats make the real picture worse rather than better. The figures are gross, before the entry fee, platform fees, licensing, errors-and-omissions cover, office fees, events, leads, mileage and self-employment tax. The document states no denominator, so the percentages cannot be converted into people. And it covers only agents who were paid - everyone who paid $199 and never got licensed is invisible, so the true share who paid money and earned nothing is necessarily higher than 44.10%.
QHow much does it really cost to join PHP Agency?
The advertised figure is $199, a one-time New Associate Fee refundable only within three business days of enrollment. That is not the real number. Add the annual platform fee of $99 for an Associate or $180 for a Marketing Director, and a reported $15 a month for the mobile app. Then the costs the company does not charge but the recruit must pay: state licensing at $150 to $290 all-in in Texas or $478 to $629 in California, errors-and-omissions cover at $300 to $1,000 with about $500 typical, continuing education, and office "plug-in" fees charged by the local hierarchy that agents report at anywhere from $30 to $1,000 a month. Event tickets run $150 for a regional and $200 to $1,000 or more for a national with travel. A realistic Texas first year comes to $1,543 on the most frugal path and $5,033 on the normal one - seven to twenty-five times the headline, and the same order of magnitude as the median agent’s entire gross income for the year.
QWhat are PHP Agency contract levels, and why does 30% matter?
A contract level is the percentage of a policy’s target premium the writing agent personally keeps; everything between that level and the level of each person above them in the hierarchy is override. The ladder here has eleven rungs running from Trainee at 30% to Chairman’s Council at 82%, and every promotion requires recruits as well as production - three direct business partners, then fifteen base recruits, then thirty, then fifteen licensed agents and fifty base recruits for Marketing Director, then six hundred licensed agents at the top. There is no rung reachable on personal sales alone, so an excellent salesperson who refuses to recruit is held at 30% permanently. The comparison that matters is the open market: independent brokerages and direct carrier appointments routinely contract brand-new, never-licensed agents at 55% to 100% of target premium from day one, for $0, often paying for the pre-licensing course. On identical production that gap is roughly $811 a month, about $9,700 a year. On a single sale with $1,200 of target premium, a Trainee receives $360 while the hierarchy above splits as much as $624.
QWhat happens if you leave PHP Agency?
Your license is yours and always was - it is a state credential issued to you personally, it survives termination and the company alike, and an independent brokerage will contract you on it the same week. That is the best thing about this opportunity and it should not be underrated. Your downline is not yours: the contract recited by the federal court in PHP Agency, Inc. v. Martinez, N.D. Tex. 3:21-cv-00418, bars a departing Associate from recruiting the company’s associates to a competitor for two years, alongside a confidentiality provision and a Dallas County forum clause, and the company sued ten former agents at once to enforce it on nine causes of action. The Terms of Service separately requires AAA arbitration in Dallas with a class-action waiver. Note precisely what this is not: it is a non-solicit of associates, not a general non-compete, and nothing located bars a departing agent from selling life insurance elsewhere. Whether your renewals vest, and after how long, could not be established - one industry source says one year of service, no company document confirms it, and nothing about vesting is published anywhere a prospect can read before signing.
Who wrote this report

Author, editor and publisher

C
Written by Claude AI
Reviewed by Rob Fore · Published by Listech Inc · July 31, 2026

This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - PHP Agency’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.

Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.

The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.

Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.

About the author and our conflicts  ·  Contact the editor  ·  Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com

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Every factual claim on this page is sourced, and the ones we could not stand up are named in the unable to verify list above. If something here is wrong, we want to know, and we would rather hear it from PHP Agency than from a reader.

Write to corrections@opportunitygrade.com. Point at the specific sentence and send the document that contradicts it - a plan document, a filing, an income disclosure, a policy page. We will check it against the primary source, correct the page if it is wrong, and say in the report that it was corrected and when. A grade moves if the evidence moves it.

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