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Trading-education subscription · Binary MLM with a resold crypto node-license investment product

iX Global, LLC

A real trading-education subscription, resold alongside crypto node licenses priced up to $16,249 and marketed at up to $72,000 a year - the company and its CEO were named as defendants in a federal securities complaint, and the company itself announced it was shutting down in June 2024.

Reviewed August 1, 2026 Founded Domain ixglobal.us registered January 2020; the company announced it was ceasing primary operations on 24 June 2024, roughly three and a half years later Confidence: Medium-High
FGRADE
1.1/10
Weighted composite

NAMED IN A FEDERAL COMPLAINT, THEN SHUT DOWN

The company and its CEO were named as defendants in a federal securities complaint alleging a fabricated $49 million node-license scheme; the case was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures - neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it - and the company itself announced it was shutting down in June 2024. This is not a live opportunity today; this report grades the historical offer.

The question you came with

Can you actually make money with iX Global?

NO No - not on the numbers this company publishes

No, and start with the plainest reason of all: there is nothing to join. The founder announced on 24 June 2024 that iX Global was shutting down, with a thirty-day window through 24 July for affiliates to withdraw remaining backoffice balances and no independent receiver or audit confirming that every balance was honored. What this report grades is the historical offer, as it stood. Every scenario on this page is worth zero today.

What was sold was a $124.99-a-month membership, $174.99 for the tier that unlocked full binary and VIP-bonus eligibility, and beside it node and CloudX positions running from $250 to $16,249 that were marketed at up to $72,000 a year. No independent operating business was ever shown anywhere to produce that return. On the compensation side, a participant relying on fast-start bonuses alone needed roughly 116 Pro-tier sales a year, about 9.7 a month, simply to cover their own membership.

The legal position has to be stated exactly, because it is easy to get wrong in either direction. The company and its chief executive were named as defendants in a federal securities complaint filed in Utah on 26 July 2023, alleging at least $49 million raised through fabricated mining claims and fictitious business partnerships. That case was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator's own procedural failures, for which the court sanctioned the regulator. A dismissal on those grounds is not a finding against the company. It is also not a vindication of it. The allegations were never tested, and no court has found anyone liable.

Two things belong on the credit side. A genuine education subscription existed and was delivered to paying subscribers - trading courses, alerts access and coaching content - which is more than several files graded here can say. And new node-license sales were voluntarily suspended after the 2023 action rather than pushed through the investigation, the company's own August 2023 statement said in writing that it offered no guarantees of return, and no admission of wrongdoing exists anywhere in the record reviewed.

What it costs to be in
$124.99/month

Basic Membership; full binary and VIP-bonus eligibility requires the $174.99/month Premium tier, and separately, the capital-intensive node/CloudX product line ran from $250 to $16,249 per position

What would have to change
  • The company would have to exist. Primary operations ceased on 24 June 2024, and the successor platform's first iteration had already collapsed that March, so there is no live offer for anything below to attach itself to.
  • An income disclosure statement. None was ever located, despite targeted searches of the marketing pages, third-party archives and document-sharing sites, so nobody could say what typical participants earned while it was running.
  • A retail-customer rule inside the compensation plan. Rank was expressed entirely through personally-recruited-affiliate counts and Group Volume, and neither of those requires a sale to somebody outside the structure.
  • A verifiable business behind the node returns. Positions priced from $250 to $16,249 were marketed at up to $72,000 a year with no independent operating business shown anywhere in the record capable of generating it.

That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.

$49M+
Alleged raised through the node-license scheme
per the SEC complaint’s own tally - an allegation, never proven or disproven
$72,000/yr
Marketed return on a $15,000–$16,249 node license
no operating business was shown anywhere to generate it
Jun 24, 2024
Date the founder announced iX Global was shutting down
with a 30-day window to withdraw backoffice balances
$0
What every scenario in this report is worth today
the company is no longer operating - this grades the historical offer

Legal status

CONTESTED, NEVER ADJUDICATED - iX Global, LLC and its CEO, Joseph A. Martinez, were named as defendants in SEC v. Digital Licensing Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah, filed 26 July 2023), alleging at least $49 million raised through a fabricated crypto “mining” node-license scheme. In 2024 the court found the SEC had misrepresented facts to obtain emergency relief and sanctioned the SEC directly (reported at roughly $1.8 million by one source and $2.1 million by another, unreconciled). On 28 May 2024 the court granted the SEC’s own request to dismiss the case without prejudice, explicitly declining the defendants’ request to dismiss with prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it - the underlying allegations were never tested on the merits, and that is true in both directions. There is no conviction, no indictment, no arrest of the company or its CEO, no consent judgment, and no admission of wrongdoing anywhere in the US record. Separately, in India, an affiliated entity and forex brand tied to the same founder network have drawn asset-freeze action from the Enforcement Directorate and investigations from the Reserve Bank of India, SEBI, and two state police forces - these are pre-trial investigative and asset-freeze measures against individuals and an Indian corporate vehicle, not against iX Global LLC as the US entity, and not adjudications; the persons and entities involved are presumed innocent, and the amounts reported are unreconciled across sources.

Confidence: Medium-High

Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.

What this actually is

Follow the money

A Utah trading- and financial-education subscription business, launched in 2020, selling monthly membership tiers - Basic at $124.99, Pro at $145, Premium at $174.99 - through independent affiliates on a binary compensation plan, alongside a separately sold, capital-in investment product in crypto “node licences.”

The subscription side is a real product and it should be said first. Courses, an “AI trading bot” alerts service, and coaching and community access were delivered to paying subscribers, and the company’s own August 2023 public statement disclaimed guaranteed returns and described its role in the disputed node product candidly as a reseller rather than the manufacturer - a documented, if partial, mitigating fact worth crediting rather than dismissing.

Then the harder fact. iX Global, LLC - the company itself, not an affiliate or a loosely connected partner - was named as an entity defendant, and CEO Joseph A. Martinez individually, in SEC v. Digital Licensing Inc., filed 26 July 2023 in the District of Utah, alleging at least $49 million raised through node-license tokens marketed as “mined” crypto assets backed by real-world business partnerships the complaint alleges were fabricated or grossly overstated. That case was dismissed without prejudice on 28 May 2024, at the SEC’s own request, after the court found the SEC had misrepresented facts to obtain emergency relief and sanctioned the regulator directly (reported at roughly $1.8 million by one source and $2.1 million by another, unreconciled). Worth repeating in plain words: a dismissal on those grounds is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it - the underlying allegations were never tested on the merits, and there is no conviction, no admission, and no civil finding of liability anywhere.

Separately from the subscription, node licenses priced from $250 to $16,249 were marketed at up to $72,000 a year in return, with no operating business shown anywhere in the record to generate that figure - that is the fact this report’s securities-exposure score rests on, independent of the SEC case’s outcome. And on 24 June 2024, the founder announced on a company-wide call that the company was ceasing primary operations, giving affiliates a thirty-day window to withdraw backoffice balances, roughly three and a half years after the business began.

This is not a live opportunity today. The founder has stated related products continue under separate entities he still controls, and the operator’s own current website could not be reached by this research - a retrieval failure, not confirmation either way - but the historical offer graded here, at the point it was being actively sold, is what follows.

Where a modeled dollar of Pro-tier membership revenue was estimated to go

No official payout disclosure exists - this is a reasoned estimate built from the documented commission mechanics (fast-start rate, binary caps, VIP bonus tiers) and standard subscription-MLM cost structures, applied to a representative $145/month Pro-tier dollar. It is explicitly not a company-published figure.

10% 20% 8% 7% 10% 10% 25%
Direct / fast-start bonus to enroller (10%)Binary / team residual commission pool (20%)VIP / rank bonus pool (8%)Payment processing / platform fees (5%)Content production, hosting, coaching delivery (7%)Customer support & back-office operations (10%)Marketing & leaderboard incentive spend (10%)Legal & regulatory defense costs (5%)Corporate margin, residual (25%)
ProductPricePays
Basic Membership
Entry-level subscription: trading and investing courses and community access, no binary or VIP-bonus eligibility.
$124.99/month
monthly
fast-start rate undocumented at this tier
Pro Membership
Adds the documented “AI trading bot” alerts access; the tier used as the reference point for the fast-start rate in every source reviewed.
$145/month
monthly
$15 fast-start bonus (~10.3%) + binary volume credit
Premium (Affiliate) Membership
The tier a would-be earner is steered toward; full commission eligibility was not available at the Basic tier.
$174.99/month
monthly
fast-start bonus + full binary and VIP-bonus eligibility
Hosted Account add-on
No separate bonus documented; adds to Group Volume only.
$19.99/month
monthly
binary volume credit only
Alerts Pro add-on
Marketed alongside claims of 5% to 30% monthly trading returns that no audited performance record was found to support.
$19.99–$39.99/month
monthly
binary volume credit only
CloudX Node - international, small
More than a sixty-times price spread against the US node price for a reportedly similar position, per third-party reporting.
from $250
one-time
not publicly documented
CloudX Node - US, leased
Marketed at up to $72,000 a year in return, framed as “$2 a day per 1% of claimed usage” - no independent revenue-generating business was shown behind it.
$16,249
one-time
not publicly documented
Node-license tokens (discontinued 2023)
Eleven tokens resold to affiliates as reseller of the product’s originator; the SEC’s complaint alleges these were instantly created tokens marketed as “mined.”
varied by token
one-time, historical
not documented
Background check

Who runs it, and what they ran before

JA
Joseph A. Martinez
Founder and Chief Executive Officer

Named individually as one of thirteen defendants in the SEC’s civil complaint - a filed claim, never adjudicated. No court has found against him or against the company, and there is no conviction, no indictment, no arrest, and no admission anywhere in the US record. A prior venture he was involved with, a crypto/forex program already graded elsewhere on this site’s own ranking and not named here to avoid collision, reportedly collapsed in early 2020 amid its own unregistered-securities allegations. Announced the company’s June 2024 shutdown personally, on a company-wide call, rather than the operation disappearing without notice.

HB
Helen Boyle
Co-founder and Chief Compliance Officer

Per third-party reporting, previously an affiliate of the same prior venture described above, later positioned as a company co-founder in testimonials. No regulatory or criminal action against her individually could be located in any source reviewed.

AD
Anita Davis
Co-founder and Chief Operating Officer

Ran a prior venture, “IGOnline” (approximately December 2017 to December 2019), a forex-automation scheme that folded before this company launched; that branding reportedly transitioned into this company’s UK-facing marketing around March 2020. No regulatory or criminal action against her individually could be located.

Gn
Governance note
A senior India-based promoter in the affiliated network

Viraj Patil, later reported to hold a stake in the operation and to own or operate the affiliated TP Global FX forex brand, was arrested in India in December 2023; released on interim humanitarian bail in September 2024 to visit a critically ill parent; then re-arrested immediately when the bail bond was not furnished. This is a criminal proceeding against a promoter and affiliate, not against iX Global LLC as a corporate entity, and no conviction has been reported.

Registered address

Bountiful, Utah, USA
Placed in Bountiful, Utah by a corporate-directory listing (Dun & Bradstreet); no audited public accounts exist and no independent confirmation of the registered-agent filing was obtained, so this is reported as a directory listing rather than a primary state filing record. No company-wide revenue or profit figure was located anywhere in the record, including the litigation documents, which disclose only specific transfer amounts tied to individual relief defendants rather than a company-wide figure.

Compensation plan

What has to be true for you to get paid

To coverYou need
Hold the Basic tier for a year with no recruiting $1,499.88/year
Sunk cost; no independent revenue mechanism for the content itself was documented, so profit depends entirely on trading gains the product did not guarantee.
Break even on fast-start bonuses alone (Pro tier) ~116 Pro-tier sales/year
$1,740/yr membership ÷ $15 fast-start bonus per sale ≈ 9.7 sales a month - a pace far beyond ordinary friends-and-family recruiting.
Break even via a small binary team ~$2,000/month in weaker-leg Group Volume
10% capped at $300/cycle → $200/cycle × 13 cycles = $2,600/yr against $1,740/yr membership = +$860/yr, contingent on sustained downline growth.
Recover a $16,249 leased CloudX node undefined / unverifiable
Marketed break-even of ~11.7 weeks assumes the $72,000/yr claim was real; no independent business was ever shown to generate it, so a realistic break-even cannot be modeled.

Read this twice

All four scenarios model the historical offer while it was being actively sold; the company announced it was ceasing operations on 24 June 2024, so the present-day figure at every level in this table is zero - there is no current subscription to recoup, no current binary team to build, and no current node position to redeem beyond whatever could be withdrawn in the thirty-day window that closed on 24 July 2024. The arithmetic above is retained because it explains what a participant was actually being asked to believe while the offer was live, and because no company-published income disclosure was ever located to check it against.

Run your own numbers

Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.

-
Cumulative net, after costs
Retained retained Pro-tier subscribers -
Commission that month -
Total commissions earned -
Total you paid in -
Net -

Read this calculator as history. The founder announced on 24 June 2024 that the company was ceasing operations, with a thirty-day window to withdraw remaining balances, so the present-day figure at every position on every slider is zero. What is modeled here is the offer as it stood: $15 is the reported flat direct and fast-start commission on a Pro-tier subscription, about 10.3% of the $145 monthly price, paid on a four-week cycle on a new sale or a renewal. The cost line is that same $145 subscription, which an affiliate had to hold to stay commissionable. The binary is excluded because it paid 10% to 20% on the weaker leg only, so roughly half of anything an affiliate built paid nothing at all, and because qualification required two personally enrolled affiliates placed one per side before it paid anything. The node licenses are excluded for a different and more important reason: at $250 to $16,249 they were capital handed over against a marketed return of up to $72,000 a year, not a product sold to a customer, and putting them on a commission slider would model an investment scheme rather than a business. The company described itself publicly as a reseller of those products and said it made no guarantees of return. No income disclosure was published at any point in the company’s life, so nothing here can be checked against a company figure. Your own subscription cost of $145/mo is included.

Your money

What it costs to replace this yourself

A rational buyer wanting market education and tools, without any income opportunity attached, could assemble the following at documented 2026 prices. No competitor named here is a company this site has already graded.

What they sell youWhat you'd use insteadYour cost
Pro-tier membership - $145/month ($1,740/yr)A professional charting subscription, comparable tier~$407/yr
A forex/technical-analysis course bundled into the subscriptionA comparable one-time forex/technical-analysis course on the open market~$20 one-time
Ongoing “market education” contentA MOOC-style subscription including university-taught finance coursework~$399/yr
“AI trading bot” alerts with no audited track recordA self-paced, professionally produced markets certificate~$249/yr
No independent credential documented anywhere in the offeringA one-time, portable, third-party-verified professional credential (one exam level)~$1,140–$1,490 one-time
CloudX node license, US leased - $16,249, marketed at up to $72,000/yrNo open-market equivalent exists for a fixed-return capital placement with no shown business behind itnot applicable
Total as sold
~$1,740/yr for the membership alone, excluding any node capital
Total, built yourself
~$1,075 for the first year of the core recurring stack; ~$2,215 including the one-time credential

Price-to-value

Roughly 38% cheaper for a comparable recurring stack, while adding a recognized professional credential and university-taught content this offering never documented having. The node licenses sit outside this comparison entirely, because there is no open-market product that takes a fixed sum against a fixed marketed return with no shown business behind it - that is not a pricing gap, it is the entire reason this report exists.

Odds of profit

Three operators, five horizons

Probability of cumulative net profit

Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%3 mo6 mo1 yr3 yr (pre-shutdown)Today (2026) 0% 0% 0%
Pure Learner - Basic tier, no recruiting, courses onlyPart-Time Promoter - Premium tier, light recruiting, small binary teamCloudX Node Investor - $16,249 leased US node, marketed at up to $72,000/yr

Pure Learner

Basic tier, no recruiting, courses only

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 0% −$375
6 mo 0% −$750
1 yr 0% −$1,500
3 yr (pre-shutdown) 0% −$4,500
Today (2026) 0% $0 - company inoperative

Part-Time Promoter

Premium tier, light recruiting, small binary team

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 12% −$400
6 mo 16% −$300
1 yr 20% +$60
3 yr (pre-shutdown) 14% +$180
Today (2026) 0% $0 - company inoperative

CloudX Node Investor

$16,249 leased US node, marketed at up to $72,000/yr

HorizonP(profit)Median
3 mo 0% −$16,249
6 mo 0% −$16,249
1 yr 0% −$16,249
3 yr (pre-shutdown) 0% −$16,249, unresolved
Today (2026) 0% $0 - company inoperative; recovery undocumented

Methodology note. ANCHORED to the brief’s documented pricing and commission mechanics: the $124.99 / $145 / $174.99 monthly tiers, the $15 (~10.3%) Pro-tier fast-start bonus, the 10%–20% binary rate structure capped from $300 to $1,000,000 per four-week cycle, and the $250–$16,249 CloudX node pricing marketed at up to $72,000 a year. MODELED by us, because no official income disclosure was ever located for this company: the cohort definitions, the share of each cohort in cumulative profit, and the dollar path between the documented endpoints in the brief’s own break-even scenarios. These are modeled outcome ranges, not claims of what any specific person earned. The single fact that overrides every other number in this table: the founder announced on 24 June 2024 that the company was ceasing primary operations, giving affiliates a thirty-day window to withdraw backoffice balances with no independent audit or receiver confirming full payout. Whatever a cohort’s trajectory looked like while the company operated, the present-day figure at every level, in every profile, is zero - there is no current subscription, no current binary team, and no current node position, because the company is no longer operating. These profiles model the historical offer, not a live opportunity.

Go-to-market

Where you are actually allowed to promote this

Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.

Channel
Status
Notes
Zoom / webinar-based recruitment meetings
REPORTED TO HAVE USED FABRICATED PROOF
Indian consumer-complaint sourcing describes recruitment meetings using high-pressure tactics and fabricated demo-account or trading-screenshot “proof” of earnings - public consumer allegation, not an adjudicated advertising-conduct finding, and weighted accordingly.
Quantified return claims in marketing
REPORTED, UNSUBSTANTIATED
“5% to 30% monthly” trading returns and “$72,000 annually” node returns were reportedly used at the affiliate level; no audited or independently verified performance record was found behind either figure.
Social media under official branding
PRESENT, POLICY UNDOCUMENTED
Multiple official-looking accounts existed across Instagram, X, YouTube and Facebook; no dedicated social-media or influencer-marketing compliance policy, and no income-claim disclaimer standard for affiliate content, could be located.
Written policies and procedures / income-claims manual
NOT LOCATED
No standalone, company-published compliance manual or advertising guide for affiliates was found in this research - a gap this report flags rather than fills with assumption.
The company’s own public statement on the SEC matter
ISSUED, CANDID
Published in August 2023, it explicitly disclaimed guaranteed returns and described the company’s role in the disputed node product as a reseller rather than the manufacturer - a real, if partial, mitigating fact on the record.
Node / CloudX marketing materials
MADE SPECIFIC DOLLAR CLAIMS
CloudX was marketed at up to $72,000 a year on a $15,000 node, framed as “$2 a day per 1% of claimed usage” - a specific, quantified return claim with no shown business behind it.
Shutdown communication
MADE DIRECTLY, ON A COMPANY-WIDE CALL
The founder personally announced the June 2024 cessation and a thirty-day withdrawal window, rather than the operation disappearing without notice - a modest but real distinguishing fact.
The operator’s current website
COULD NOT BE REACHED
One domain returned a blocked outbound proxy tunnel and the other a DNS resolution failure to this research; current marketing, pricing and terms could not be checked at all - a retrieval failure, not evidence of anything either way.
The evidence

Red flags and green flags

Red flags

15
1The company is a named entity defendant in an active federal securities complaint, alongside its CEO individually
SEC v. Digital Licensing Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah, filed 26 July 2023), alleging at least $49 million raised through fabricated “mining” claims and fictitious business partnerships. A filed claim, never adjudicated.
2Node licenses priced $250–$16,249 were marketed at up to $72,000 a year
With no independent, verifiable operating business shown anywhere in the record to generate that return - the exact structure this report’s securities-exposure score is built to catch.
3The company ceased primary operations on 24 June 2024
Roughly three and a half years after its 2020 origin, with only a thirty-day window for affiliates to withdraw backoffice balances and no independent receiver or audit confirming full payout.
4No retail-customer requirement was found in the documented compensation plan
Rank advancement is expressed entirely through personally-recruited-affiliate counts and Group Volume, neither of which requires a genuine, non-participant customer.
5No official income disclosure statement could be located
Despite targeted searches of marketing pages, third-party archives, and document-sharing sites - leaving prospective participants with no company-published data on typical earnings.
6The binary plan’s caps scale to $1,000,000 per four-week cycle
With no disclosed, audited revenue figure anywhere in the record sufficient to plausibly fund that ceiling on margin alone.
7Marketing reportedly promoted “5% to 30% monthly” trading returns and “$72,000/yr” node returns
Neither figure was substantiated by any audited or independently verified performance record found in this research.
8No refund on membership once a payment processed, per third-party sourcing
A real gap next to the 30-day money-back windows common among mainstream course marketplaces; no verbatim company-sourced clause could be checked because the operator’s site was unreachable.
9The founder’s prior venture reportedly collapsed in 2020 amid unregistered-securities allegations
Already graded elsewhere on this site’s own ranking and not named here to avoid collision - a repeat pattern in the same risk category rather than a single isolated company history.
10A co-founder’s prior venture, a forex-automation scheme, also folded before this company launched
Reported to have run from approximately December 2017 to December 2019, immediately preceding this company’s 2020 launch.
11A senior India-based promoter was arrested twice
Detained in December 2023, released on interim humanitarian bail in September 2024, then re-arrested immediately when the bail bond was not furnished - an unresolved criminal proceeding against an individual, not a conviction.
12India’s central bank, securities regulator, Enforcement Directorate, and two state police forces have all taken action against the affiliated brand
Against an Indian corporate vehicle and forex brand tied to the same founder network, not against the US LLC itself - investigatory and asset-freeze measures, not adjudications.
13Multiple confusingly similar entity names exist across three countries
A Utah LLC, a renamed Indian entity, an unconnected UK company sharing the name, and a successor brand together create real risk that consumers and researchers conflate distinct legal entities and track records.
14The successor “iN8” platform’s first iteration itself collapsed after roughly two months, in March 2024
Before the original company’s own June 2024 shutdown - the same founder network producing a second, faster failure in a related product.
15Node pricing showed more than a sixty-times spread between international and US positions
International node positions were reported as low as $250 while a functionally similar US position ran $15,000–$16,249, raising real questions about what was actually being purchased at either price.

Green flags

7
1A genuine education subscription existed and was delivered to paying subscribers
Trading and investing courses, alerts access, and coaching/community content - not itself a claim on pooled investor capital, a meaningfully different and less severe risk category than the node product layered alongside it.
2A documented, candid disclaimer exists
The company’s own August 2023 public statement said, in writing, that it does “not offer any guarantees of ROI” and described its role in the disputed product as a reseller rather than the manufacturer - a real, if partial, mitigating fact on the record.
3New node-license sales were voluntarily suspended following the SEC’s 2023 action
Rather than continuing to sell the disputed product outright through the investigation - a more responsible response than the alternative.
4The SEC’s case was dismissed, and no court has found the company liable
Albeit without prejudice, and on procedural grounds attributable to the SEC’s own errors, for which the SEC itself was sanctioned by the court - the underlying allegations were never proven, and the company is entitled to that presumption pending any refiling.
5No admission of wrongdoing exists anywhere in the record reviewed
Neither the company nor any individual defendant has admitted to the SEC’s allegations.
6A structured, if short, wind-down window was given at shutdown
A thirty-day formal withdrawal period, announced on a company-wide call by the founder himself, is a materially more orderly exit than an instant, unannounced disappearance.
7This file is unusually well-documented for its category
A filed federal complaint, a public court sanctions order, a documented company statement, and detailed multi-agency India law-enforcement reporting together mean the conclusions here rest on a stronger evidentiary base than is typical for a thinly sourced watchlist entry.
What would move this grade

We would like to be wrong about this

Upward

  • Independent, audited confirmation that any current successor product has fully discontinued every capital-in, fixed-return node structure and operates solely as a flat-fee content subscription with a genuine retail-customer requirement.
  • A published, third-party-audited income disclosure statement - something that has never existed for this company at any point in its documented history.
  • Confirmation, backed by an independent audit or receiver rather than the company’s own account, that every affiliate and node-license holder from the June 2024 shutdown recovered their funds in full.

Downward

  • A refiled and successful SEC judgment against the company or its principals, or a US state or foreign securities regulator order specifically naming the company.
  • Confirmed evidence that CloudX or a similarly structured passive-return product is still being actively sold in 2026 under any of this founder network’s brand names.
  • Confirmed evidence, via a primary law-enforcement document, that the CEO is a fugitive with an active international arrest warrant, or that shutdown-era withdrawal requests were not honored.
The better trade

Grade is F. A real education product and a candid public disclaimer, attached to a resold crypto node product marketed at up to $72,000 a year, a federal complaint naming the company and its CEO, and a June 2024 shutdown.

Two things here are genuinely better than the file’s reputation suggests, and they deserve to be said first. The subscription content - trading courses, alerts access, coaching - was a real product delivered to paying subscribers, not itself a claim on pooled capital. And the company’s own August 2023 public statement is unusually candid for this category: it says, in writing, that it offers “no guarantees of ROI,” and it describes its role in the disputed node product as a reseller rather than the manufacturer. That is a documented, if self-serving, attempt at a disclaimer, and it is worth crediting rather than waving away.

Then the harder record. The company itself, not an affiliate or a loosely connected partner, was named as an entity defendant, and its CEO individually, in a federal complaint alleging at least $49 million raised through a node-license scheme marketed as “mined” crypto assets backed by real-world business partnerships the complaint alleges were fabricated. That case was dismissed without prejudice in May 2024, at the SEC’s own request, after the court found the SEC had misrepresented facts to the court and sanctioned the regulator directly. It has to be said plainly, more than once: a dismissal without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it. The underlying allegations - fabricated business partnerships, unregistered securities, tokens marketed as mined that were not - were never tested on the merits, in either direction. There is no conviction, no consent judgment, and no admission anywhere in the US record.

Separately from the litigation, the structural fact that drives this report’s low `sec` score stands on its own: node licenses priced from $250 to $16,249 were marketed at up to $72,000 a year, with no operating business ever shown to generate that figure. And the company itself confirms the outcome that matters most to anyone weighing this today - its own founder announced on a company-wide call, on 24 June 2024, that primary operations were ceasing, with a thirty-day window for affiliates to withdraw backoffice balances and no independent audit confirming that every balance was honored. In India, an affiliated entity and forex brand tied to the same founder network have drawn asset-freeze action and investigations from the central bank, the securities regulator, the Enforcement Directorate, and two state police forces, and a senior promoter has been arrested twice - all of it pre-trial, none of it adjudicated, and none of it a finding against the US company by name. Put together, this is a file where the historical facts are unusually well-documented, and where none of them, taken individually, proves the fraud the complaint alleged - but where the company no longer exists to test that question either.

1

Do not evaluate this as a live opportunity

The founder announced a shutdown in June 2024 and the operator’s current site could not be reached by this research. Whatever is on a pitch today describes a defunct or unconfirmed operation, not a functioning business - verify independently before sending money anywhere near this name.

2

Separate the course from the node before judging either

A trading-education subscription and a fixed-return capital placement are different risk categories entirely. If a recruiter blends the two in one pitch, ask which one is actually being sold - a $145 course and a $16,249 node license do not belong in the same sentence.

3

Read the dismissal correctly, in both directions

The SEC’s case against this company was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures. That is not a finding of fraud, and it is also not an exoneration - the underlying allegations were never tested on the merits. Anyone citing this case as proof of either innocence or guilt is overstating the record.

4

Get trading education from a credentialed, portable source instead

A charting subscription, a university-taught MOOC, a Bloomberg-branded certificate, and a CFA Level I registration together cost less than this company’s own Pro-tier membership and carry independent, third-party-recognized credentials this offering never documented having.

The company’s own CEO said, in writing, “We Do Not offer any guarantees of ROI” - about a product marketed at up to $72,000 a year.
Scorecard

Nine dimensions, weighted

Comp structure & KoscotDoes the plan pay for recruitment or for sales to real customers?
20%
1.5
The documented plan is a binary structure across eleven ranks, Active through Elite Influencer, with advancement keyed to maintaining two personally recruited affiliates plus a monthly Group Volume requirement escalating from roughly 1,000 to 1,000,000 GV. A flat fast-start bonus - reported at $15 on the $145 Pro tier, roughly 10.3% - is paid on every new sale or renewal, and the residual binary rate itself rises with rank, from 10% to 20%, against caps running as high as $1,000,000 per four-week cycle. No documentation of any rule requiring sales to a genuine, non-participant retail customer was found anywhere in the compensation-plan sources reviewed; rank is expressed purely in personally-recruited-affiliate counts and Group Volume. The credit due is real and worth stating plainly: an actual education product existed and was delivered to paying subscribers, which is more than every plan graded on this site can say.
Securities exposureAny passive return on capital? Howey, staking, tokens, withdrawal friction.
15%
1.0
This dimension measures capital taken from a participant against a marketed return, and here it rests on one fact alone: alongside its education subscription, the company sold node licenses - priced from $250 to $16,249 - marketed at up to $72,000 a year in return, with no operating business shown anywhere in the record to generate that figure. That is precisely the structure this metric exists to catch, independent of everything else in this file, and it does not rest on the SEC’s case, which produced no finding either way. That complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures, and a dismissal on those grounds is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it. Two things are due to the company and are said here plainly: it publicly described itself in August 2023 as “a reseller of D.E.B.T. mining software and or hardware” rather than the product’s originator, and in the same statement it said it does “not offer any guarantees of ROI.” Neither changes the exposure a $250–$16,249 participant actually carried. It is also worth stating what would not have moved this score: the education subscription on its own, absent the node product, would not have been securities exposure at all - a $145-a-month course is not a security. A $16,249 position marketed at a fixed $72,000 annual return with no shown business behind it is.
Ownership & track recordWho runs it, what did they run before, and what happened to it.
15%
1.0
This dimension asks who runs the company, what they ran before, and what happened to it, and each answer here is severe - though it must be stated fairly. CEO Joseph A. Martinez was named individually, not merely the company, as a defendant in a federal civil complaint alleging at least $49 million raised; that is a filed claim, never adjudicated, and no court has found against him or against the company - there is no conviction, no indictment, no arrest, and no admission anywhere in the US record. Co-founder Anita Davis ran a prior forex-automation venture that folded before this company launched, and Martinez’s own prior venture - already graded elsewhere on this site’s ranking and not named here - reportedly collapsed in early 2020 amid its own unregistered-securities allegations. A senior India-based promoter in the affiliated network was arrested in December 2023 and re-arrested in September 2024; that is a criminal proceeding against a promoter, not against iX Global LLC as a corporate entity, and no conviction has been reported anywhere. The company itself announced it was ceasing operations on 24 June 2024, roughly three and a half years after its 2020 origin - a severe outcome that, on its own, says nothing about wrongdoing, but is exactly the kind of pattern this dimension is built to weigh.
Product reality & demandWould a rational buyer purchase this if no income offer existed?
12%
1.5
The core recurring product is a real one: trading and investing courses, an “AI trading bot” alerts service, and coaching and community access, delivered to paying subscribers at $124.99–$174.99 a month. It is not itself a claim on pooled capital, and that distinction is worth keeping in view. But it is a commodity, readily assembled cheaper and with more verifiable credentialing on the open market - a professional charting subscription, a Bloomberg-branded certificate, university-taught coursework and a portable CFA credential all price out below the equivalent membership here. No independent, audited track record of the trading bot’s actual performance was located anywhere in the sources reviewed, against marketing claims of 5% to 30% monthly returns. The product is no longer purchasable at all following the June 2024 shutdown - but this dimension asks about demand and substitutability, not present availability, and on both counts a rational buyer with no interest in the income opportunity would very likely have chosen the open-market alternative even while the product was live.
Participant economicsReal cost in, realistic money out, and whether they publish the numbers.
10%
1.0
No official income disclosure statement was ever located for this company, despite targeted searches of its marketing pages, third-party archives, and document-sharing sites; one document purporting to be an income projection could not be rendered by any research tool used, and its absence is reported as “not found,” not as evidence that no such document exists in a backoffice. Absent that disclosure, the realistic arithmetic has to be built from the documented commission mechanics themselves. A pure subscriber with no recruiting has no route to profit at all - the entire $1,499.88–$2,099.88 annual membership is sunk cost unless the buyer separately develops trading profit the product does not guarantee. A participant relying only on fast-start bonuses would need roughly 116 Pro-tier sales a year, about 9.7 a month, just to break even - a pace far beyond ordinary friends-and-family recruiting. A small binary team generating a modest $2,000 a month in weaker-leg volume can turn a few hundred dollars a year of net income, but only by sustaining continuous downline growth. And a node-license buyer at $16,249 carried outright, undisclosed principal risk against a marketed return with no shown business behind it. None of this is offset anywhere by a company-published median.
Price-to-valueWhat the same capability costs on the open market.
8%
1.5
The Pro-tier membership at $145 a month, $1,740 a year, ran roughly 38% above a comparable open-market stack assembled at real 2026 prices: a professional charting subscription, a one-time technical-analysis course, an annual MOOC subscription, and a Bloomberg-branded self-paced certificate together total about $1,075 for the first year, and that stack adds a recognized professional credential and university-taught content this offering does not document having. The node licenses are a different problem entirely: priced up to $16,249, they have no open-market equivalent at all - there is no comparable consumer product to price against, because a fixed capital placement marketed at a fixed dollar return is not a consumer good in the first place.
Payout sustainabilityCan the company fund the plan out of margin, or only out of inflow?
8%
0.5
The strongest available evidence on this dimension is simply what happened. A compensation plan whose binary caps scale to $1,000,000 per four-week cycle, layered on top of a node product with no shown underlying business, needs to be funded from somewhere, and with no audited revenue figure ever published, continuous new-participant inflow is the only plausible source visible in the record. The company stopped operating: its own founder announced on a company-wide call on 24 June 2024 that primary operations were ceasing, with only a thirty-day window for affiliates to withdraw backoffice wallet balances and no independent receiver or audit confirming that every participant was made whole. A structure funded by inflow, that runs roughly three and a half years and then stops, is close to the clearest possible demonstration of what this dimension measures.
Marketing conductIncome claims, regulator run-ins, hype, deadline stacking.
7%
0.5
Marketing reportedly promoted trading returns of 5% to 30% a month through an “AI trading bot,” and separately promoted the node/CloudX product at up to $72,000 a year on a $15,000–$16,249 placement, framed as “$2 a day per 1% of claimed usage.” Neither figure was substantiated by any audited or independently verified performance record found anywhere in this research. The federal complaint against the wider corporate family alleges the business partnerships used to justify similar returns elsewhere in the same product family were fabricated or grossly overstated - those are allegations, not proven findings, but they describe the same product line resold to this company’s own affiliate base. A marketed annual-return figure attached to a product with no shown underlying business is exactly what this dimension penalises.
Operator terms & exitWho owns the customer, what you forfeit, how hard it is to leave.
5%
0.5
Per third-party review, cancellation was possible at any time but no refund was offered once a payment had processed, on any tier - a real gap next to the 30-day money-back windows common among mainstream course marketplaces. At shutdown, the company gave affiliates a unilateral thirty-day window, through 24 July 2024, to withdraw remaining backoffice balances, with no independent escrow or receiver confirming that every balance was actually honored. One limit needs to be stated rather than papered over: the operator’s current site was unreachable to this research - a DNS failure on one domain and a blocked proxy tunnel on the other - so the live terms of service and any verbatim refund clause could not be checked. That is a retrieval failure, not evidence that no better terms exist today.
Weighted composite
1.10
F

Dimension profile

Further from center is better. Hover any point.

Comp structure& Koscot 1.5 Securitiesexposure 1.0 Ownership &track record 1.0 Product reality& demand 1.5 Participanteconomics 1.0 Price-to-value 1.5 Payoutsustainability 0.5 Marketingconduct 0.5 Operator terms& exit 0.5

Hard caps that bind here

Cap at F (non-binding) The weighted arithmetic across the nine scores above already lands at 1.10, deep inside the F band on its own, so a ceiling here binds nothing and changes nothing - it is stated only for completeness, so a reader does not have to hunt for an implicit one. What matters more is what this ceiling does NOT rest on. It does not rest on a conviction, an indictment, an arrest of any company officer, a consent judgment, or an admission of wrongdoing - none exists anywhere in the record reviewed. It does not rest on an adjudicated finding of fraud or of an illegal pyramid scheme - no court has made either finding, for or against. It does not rest on any state or foreign securities regulator order naming the company - a targeted search across thirteen US states and multiple foreign regulators found no such order, an absence of a search hit rather than a confirmed clean record. And it does not rest on the outcome of the SEC’s own case, which was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures, with the regulator itself sanctioned by the court - a dismissal on those grounds is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it. Without stating all of that, a reader would infer a charge this report never makes.

The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.

Sources consulted

What we read

Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.

  1. SEC v. Digital Licensing Inc. dba DEBT Box, et al. - Complaint, Case No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah), filed 26 July 2023 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · 2023-07-26archived copy

    SEC v. Digital Licensing Inc., et al., Complaint, Case No. 2:23-cv-00482 (D. Utah, filed 26 July 2023) - entity and individual defendants, alleged $49M+ raised, node-license token allegations

  2. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Digital Licensing, No. 2:23-cv-00482 - full docket
    Court recordTier 1CourtListener (Free Law Project)archived copy
  3. Memorandum Decision and Order imposing sanctions on the SEC and denying its motion to dismiss without prejudice - Doc. 275, filed 18 March 2024 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Utah (Chief Judge Robert J. Shelby), via GovInfo · 2024-03-18archived copy

    Order Imposing Sanctions on the SEC and Denying the SEC’s Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice, D. Utah, 2024 - court findings on the SEC’s conduct in seeking emergency relief

  4. iX Global Response On SEC Allegations In The USA - company statement, August 2023
    ReportingTier 3BusinessForHome.org · 2023-08archived copy

    Company public statement on the SEC allegations, August 2023 - “a reseller of D.E.B.T. mining software and or hardware,” “We Do Not offer any guarantees of ROI”

  5. Memorandum Decision and Order awarding fees against the SEC - Doc. 312, filed 28 May 2024, total award $1,821,823.11 (PDF)
    Court recordTier 1U.S. District Court for the District of Utah (copy posted by CCH Securities Regulation Daily) · 2024-05-28archived copy

    Coverage of the May 2024 dismissal and the SEC fee sanction (reported at approximately $1.8 million by one outlet and $2.1 million by another, unreconciled)

    Not established by this document: The order itself fixes the award at $1,821,823.11; no primary document supporting the '$2.1 million' figure reported by a second outlet was located, and that figure should be treated as unsourced.

  6. Judge Dismisses SEC Case Against iX Global, Orders $1.8 Million Fee Payment
    ReportingTier 3BusinessForHome.org · 2024-05archived copy
  7. As requested by SEC, iX Global fraud case dismissed
    ReportingTier 3BehindMLM · 2024-05archived copy
  8. US judge orders SEC to pay $1.8 million in legal fees in DEBT Box case
    ReportingTier 3The Block · 2024-05archived copy
  9. iX Global Review: Securities fraud hidden behind edu platform - membership tiers $124.99/$145/$174.99 a month, binary structure, VIP bonus tiers
    ReportingTier 3BehindMLM · 2021-02-15archived copy

    Third-party MLM-industry product and compensation-plan review - membership tiers, binary structure, fast-start and VIP-bonus mechanics, CloudX node pricing, shutdown timeline

  10. iX Global securities fraud continues with CloudX - CloudX node pricing
    ReportingTier 3BehindMLMarchived copy
  11. iX Global collapses amid ongoing SEC investigation - shutdown timeline
    ReportingTier 3BehindMLMarchived copy
  12. iX Global Refund Policy (company page)
    Policies & proceduresTier 1iX Global, LLCarchived copy

    Third-party review of the cancellation and refund policy - cancel-anytime, no-refund characterization

    Not established by this document: ixglobal.us appeared in search results with matching page titles but could not be fetched from this environment (DNS failure), so the refund text was not read directly; the third-party review is the only confirmed description.

  13. iX Global Terms & Conditions (company page)
    Policies & proceduresTier 1iX Global, LLCarchived copy
  14. iX Global Review - third-party review describing cancel-anytime, no-refund terms
    ReportingTier 3Even Insightarchived copy
  15. ED press release, TP Global FX / IX Global forex case, 12 January 2024 - Rs 121.16 crore frozen, Rs 121.23 crore of property attached, iX Global named alongside promoters Viraj Suhas Patil and Joseph Martinez (PDF)
    RegulatorTier 1Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India · 2024-01-12archived copy

    India enforcement reporting on the affiliated forex brand and Indian corporate vehicle - Enforcement Directorate asset-freeze figures, Mumbai and West Bengal police actions, RBI and SEBI action

  16. ED press release, provisional attachment order in the TP Global FX case, 28 August 2025 (PDF)
    RegulatorTier 1Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India · 2025-08-28archived copy
  17. ED press release, searches in the TP Global FX case, 20 May 2025 (PDF)
    RegulatorTier 1Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India · 2025-05-20archived copy
  18. iX Global, TP Global FX Scam: After Nagpur Police, Mumbai Police Register FIR against 25 in Rs 35.21 Crore Investment Fraud
    ReportingTier 3Moneylife (India)archived copy
  19. ED Attaches Rs 18.78 Crore in TP Global FX and IX Global Forex Scam; Total Seizures Near Rs 291 Crore
    ReportingTier 3Moneylife (India)archived copy
  20. iX Global arrest warrants issued by Indian authorities
    ReportingTier 3BehindMLMarchived copy
  21. IX GLOBAL LIMITED, company no. 09988022 - Companies House overview
    Corporate registryTier 1Companies House (United Kingdom)archived copy

    UK Companies House record for a same-named UK company - relationship to the Utah entity not confirmed in any source reviewed

    Not established by this document: No document connects IX GLOBAL LIMITED (UK) to iX Global, LLC of Utah; the registry record is cited only to show the namesake exists.

  22. IX GLOBAL LIMITED - officers and persons with significant control
    Corporate registryTier 1Companies House (United Kingdom)archived copy
  23. TradingView Pricing - Essential $12.95, Plus $29.95, Premium $59.95, Ultimate $199.95 a month billed annually
    Open-market comparisonTier 4TradingView, Inc. · 2026archived copy

    Open-market 2026 pricing sources used in the replacement stack - a professional charting-platform pricing guide, a MOOC-subscription pricing page, a Bloomberg-branded certificate review, and a CFA Program exam-cost guide

  24. Coursera Plus subscription pricing - $59 a month or $399 a year
    Open-market comparisonTier 4Coursera, Inc. · 2026archived copy
  25. Bloomberg Market Concepts certificate - course and certificate listing
    Open-market comparisonTier 4Bloomberg for Education (Bloomberg L.P.)archived copy
  26. CFA Program exam dates and fees
    Open-market comparisonTier 4CFA Institute · 2026archived copy
  27. Texas State Securities Board - enforcement orders and actions index (searched; no order naming iX Global)
    RegulatorTier 1Texas State Securities Boardarchived copy

    State-by-state and foreign securities-regulator search log across thirteen US states and multiple foreign regulators - no order naming the company was located in any

    Not established by this document: This entry records a negative search result, so there is no document to link. The two regulator enforcement indexes actually consulted are given; the remaining eleven state and the foreign regulator searches produced no responsive order and therefore no citable URL.

  28. Arizona Corporation Commission, Securities Division (searched; no order naming iX Global)
    RegulatorTier 1Arizona Corporation Commissionarchived copy
Unable to verify

What we could not get

  • Whether any current product under this founder network is being actively sold in 2026 - the operator’s website could not be reached by this research
  • The exact court-sanction fee amount against the SEC - reported at roughly $1.8 million by one source and $2.1 million by another, not reconciled against a primary court filing
  • The India Enforcement Directorate’s total asset-freeze figure - reported as roughly ₹75 crore in one summary and ₹263 crore in another, alongside a separate ₹55.44 crore, 392-investor figure specific to Mumbai cases; none of these figures has been reconciled
  • Whether the CEO is a “fugitive” wanted by Indian authorities - this rests on a single MLM-watchdog source and was not corroborated against a primary law-enforcement document
  • Whether an official income disclosure statement exists at all - none was located publicly, but a backoffice-only version cannot be ruled out
  • The exact current refund and cancellation terms - the operator’s site could not be reached, so no verbatim policy language could be checked against the third-party review this report relies on
  • Whether the UK-registered company sharing this name has any connection to the Utah entity - no evidentiary link was found in either direction
  • The aggregate customer-review rating for the operator’s primary domain - the review page returned an access error and could not be retrieved

Not advice

This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.

Who writes this

Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.

Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.

  • Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
  • The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
  • Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
  • No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Common questions

iX Global - frequently asked

QIs iX Global a pyramid scheme?
No court has made that finding, in either direction. The documented compensation plan is a binary structure in which rank advancement runs on personally-recruited-affiliate counts and Group Volume, and no rule requiring sales to a genuine retail customer was found in any source reviewed - the structural feature this site’s comp score is built to catch. Separately, the company was named as an entity defendant in a federal securities complaint over a different product, a resold crypto node license, not over the compensation plan itself; that case was dismissed without prejudice on the regulator’s own procedural failures and never reached a decision on the merits.
QIs iX Global still operating in 2026?
This could not be confirmed either way. The company’s own founder announced on a company-wide call on 24 June 2024 that primary operations were ceasing, with a thirty-day window for affiliates to withdraw backoffice balances. The founder separately stated that related products would continue under other entities he controlled. The operator’s own website returned a blocked connection and a DNS failure to this research, so current status is unconfirmed rather than confirmed-defunct or confirmed-active - this report grades the historical offer and states plainly that it is not a live opportunity today.
QWhat happened with the SEC lawsuit against iX Global?
The SEC filed a civil complaint on 26 July 2023 naming iX Global, LLC and its CEO individually, among five entity defendants and thirteen individuals, alleging at least $49 million raised through a crypto node-license scheme marketed as “mined” assets backed by business partnerships the complaint alleges were fabricated. In 2024 the court found the SEC had misrepresented facts to obtain emergency relief and sanctioned the SEC itself. The case was then dismissed without prejudice on 28 May 2024, at the SEC’s own request, with the court explicitly declining to dismiss with prejudice. A dismissal on those grounds is neither a finding against the company nor a vindication of it - the underlying allegations were never tested on the merits, and there is no conviction, no admission, and no civil finding of liability anywhere in the record.
QWhat were the CloudX and node-license products?
Separately from its trading-education subscription, the company sold, and by its own description resold, packaged crypto “node licence” products: eleven tokens from 2021 to 2023, and a rebranded “CloudX” node product into 2024. Pricing ran from $250 for smaller international positions to $15,000–$16,249 for a US position, marketed at up to $72,000 a year in return. No independent, verifiable operating business was shown anywhere in the record to generate that marketed return, and new node-license sales were voluntarily suspended following the 2023 SEC action.
QCan members get a refund?
Per third-party review, cancellation was possible at any time but no refund was offered on any tier once a payment had processed; no verbatim company-sourced refund clause could be checked because the operator’s site was unreachable to this research. At the June 2024 shutdown, the company gave affiliates a unilateral thirty-day window to withdraw remaining backoffice balances, with no independent audit or receiver confirming that every balance was actually honored.
Who wrote this report

Author, editor and publisher

C
Written by Claude AI
Reviewed by Rob Fore · Published by Listech Inc · August 1, 2026

This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - iX Global’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.

Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.

The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.

Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.

About the author and our conflicts  ·  Contact the editor  ·  Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com

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Every factual claim on this page is sourced, and the ones we could not stand up are named in the unable to verify list above. If something here is wrong, we want to know, and we would rather hear it from iX Global than from a reader.

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