Polar Tensor™
A weekly "profit distribution" on pooled crypto, sold at a 100 USDT minimum by a company that told the SEC it runs a $100 million pooled hedge fund and tells its own customers it offers no collective investment schemes - with a compensation plan that commits 104-106% of its only principal-facing fee back out to recruiters.
Deposit 1,000 USDT and withdraw the same week and you receive 810 - a contractual 19% round-trip loss - into a program whose 22.04%-a-month claim compounds to +991% a year and whose founder’s public face is an AI-filtered avatar with a footprint that begins the month the domain was bought.
Can you actually make money with Polar Tensor?
No. There is nothing here to sell. Rank is qualified purely by how much money the people beneath you have deposited, from 100 USDT at Iron to 8,000,000 at Diamond, and deeper commission levels are gated on recruit counts, with level fifteen requiring fourteen personally recruited paying investors. Every commission is paid out of the 10% license fee charged on a deposit, or out of a downline's reported trading profit. No product is sold and no customer exists who is not also a depositor.
The fee arithmetic is published and worth reading slowly. Ten percent is taken on the way in and 10% on the way out during the first twelve months, so a 1,000 USDT deposit withdrawn the same week returns 810, a 19% round-trip loss before any market movement at all. The compensation plan then commits 104% to 106% of that same license fee back out to affiliates on the company's own published figures, before any rank bonus. A plan whose published maximum exceeds the pool funding it resolves one of two ways: the published numbers overstate what participants can be paid, or the shortfall comes out of other participants' principal.
The documents also disagree with each other. A Form D filed 9 September 2025 declares a $100,000,000 pooled investment fund, described as a hedge fund, under a Rule 506(b) exemption that prohibits general solicitation, while the program is marketed publicly in ten-plus languages at a 100 USDT minimum and the Regulatory Status Disclosure tells consumers it offers no collective investment schemes. Three securities regulators posted caution listings in twenty-two days: Alberta on 14 May, British Columbia on 27 May and the AMF on 5 June 2026, all on non-registration. Across eight entities and fifteen legal documents, no officer, director or beneficial owner is named anywhere.
The one thing this file scores above zero on is the exit paperwork, and it is worth stating without irony. Membership is genuinely free, with no kit, no autoship and no subscription. The fee schedule is disclosed up front rather than sprung at withdrawal. The exit fee really does taper to nothing at twenty-four months, part-withdrawals are permitted, and there is no lock-up or forced-reinvestment clause. Governing law is Wyoming, with no visible arbitration clause, no class-action waiver, no non-compete and no downline forfeiture. A fair contract with a counterparty nobody can name is a document rather than a protection.
promoter membership is genuinely free with no kit and no autoship, but 100 USDT must be deposited before any commission or rank counts, and 10% of it is taken as a license fee before anything is "traded"
- A named human being. Eight entities, seven jurisdictions, fifteen legal documents and one corporate page name no officer, director or beneficial owner at all, so there is nobody a participant could hold to anything.
- Verifiable trading. No audited statement has been filed with any regulator in any of the eight claimed jurisdictions, and there is no proof of reserves, no published wallet, no read-only exchange key and no third-party trade verification.
- Something to sell that is not participation itself. Rank is qualified purely by downline deposit volume and deeper commission levels are gated on recruit counts, so no customer exists anywhere who is not also a depositor.
- A payout plan that fits inside the fee funding it. Unilevel 70%, License Infinity 20-22% and seven leadership pools at 2% each total 104-106% of the 10% license fee on the company's own numbers, before rank bonuses.
That call is computed, not chosen - the rule reads three of the nine published dimension scores and is printed on the methodology page. It describes this company's plan and the figures it publishes about the people already in it. It is not a prediction about you, and nothing on this site is advice.
Legal status
UNREGISTERED - and the distinction between "unregistered" and "proven fraud" is the most important line in this report. What is established: three Canadian securities regulators formally cautioned the public within a 22-day window, each on the single basis that the entity is not registered - the Alberta Securities Commission added Polar Tensor to its Investment Caution List on 14 May 2026 ("not registered to trade in or advise on securities or derivatives in Alberta," citing polar-tensor.com and polar-money.com, and warning that it "may be actively advertising to victims of BG Wealth Sharing and DSJ Exchange"); the British Columbia Securities Commission published its Investment Caution List entry on 27 May 2026 ("This company is not registered with the BC Securities Commission"); and Québec’s Autorité des marchés financiers issued an investor warning on 5 June 2026 ("not registered with the AMF and is not authorized to solicit investors in Québec"). Between them the warnings name five business names - Polar-Tenzor, Polar-Tensor, Polar Tensor Global, Polar Tensor US LLC, Polar Tensor Europe SP ZOO - and seven domains. The Canadian Securities Administrators published a consolidated national alert in June 2026. Separately, Polar Tensor Corp. filed a Form D with the US SEC on 9 September 2025 (CIK 0002085242, File No. 021-557106) self-declaring a "Pooled Investment Fund — Hedge Fund" with a $100,000,000 offering under Rule 506(b). The primary .com domain was placed in registry clientHold on 3 June 2026 and web hosting was lost around 15 May 2026. What is NOT established, and must not be reported as though it were: no regulator anywhere has alleged fraud against Polar Tensor; no cease-and-desist order has been issued against it in any jurisdiction (the Texas emergency order ENF-26-CDO-1897 of June 2026 names BG Wealth Sharing and DSJ Exchange, not Polar Tensor); no asset freeze exists; no person connected to it has been charged, indicted or convicted in relation to it; no court has made any finding of any kind; and it has not been established that withdrawals have stopped. An unregistered-entity caution listing is an administrative warning published under an early-intervention program. It is not a judicial finding of fraud, and this report does not treat it as one. BehindMLM, an industry publication and not a court, has characterised the program as a Ponzi scheme; that is an informed observer’s structural assessment, not a legal determination.
Confidence: Medium-High
Primary sources fetched directly where possible. Everything we could not verify is listed at the bottom of this page by name.
Follow the money
A program that takes customer money in USDT, USDC, BTC, ETH, SOL or by credit card from a 100 USDT minimum, deducts a one-time 10% "licence fee," pools the remainder, states that a proprietary AI called "Polar One" trades it on Binance, and pays a "profit distribution" every Friday at 23:00 UTC. Attached to that is a fifteen-level unilevel compensation plan paying commissions on the license fees of everyone recruited beneath you, a ten-level match on downline "trading profits," a differentially coded Infinity bonus, seven monthly leadership pools and ten ranks qualified by downline deposit volume from 100 USDT at Iron to 8,000,000 USDT at Diamond.
What is genuinely better than baseline should be said first and plainly, because it is real. Joining costs nothing - no kit, no autoship, no monthly fee, no minimum purchase. The fee schedule is disclosed up front rather than sprung at withdrawal. The exit fee tapers from 10% to 5% at twelve months and to 0% at twenty-four, part-withdrawals are permitted, and there is no hard lock-up or forced-reinvestment clause. Governing law is Wyoming rather than an offshore arbitration forum; there is no visible class-action waiver, no non-compete, no downline forfeiture and no claim over an affiliate’s contacts. The Risk Disclosure says "You may lose part or all of your invested capital," the Independent Marketers Disclosure expressly forbids affiliates from making performance guarantees, and the Regulatory Status Disclosure states that no regulator, supervisory authority or governmental body has endorsed, approved or guaranteed the services. A participant who read only that last sentence would have been told the truth.
Then the substance. On 9 September 2025 Polar Tensor Corp. filed a Form D with the US SEC (CIK 0002085242) declaring itself a "Pooled Investment Fund — Hedge Fund" raising $100,000,000 under the Rule 506(b) private-placement exemption. Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation; the program runs public YouTube campaigns in ten-plus languages, open affiliate websites soliciting deposits from 100 USDT, Zoom calls with 725 attendees and a Las Vegas leadership event. The same legal entity’s consumer-facing Regulatory Status Disclosure states it offers "no collective investment schemes" and "does not offer securities." A due-diligence reader should treat that conflict - a federal filing against a consumer disclosure, by one entity, in the same year - as dispositive.
The arithmetic is the second half. The 10% license fee is the only charge on principal, and therefore the only pool from which recruitment commissions can be paid without touching deposits. Against it the published plan commits 70% across fifteen unilevel levels, 20-22% in License Infinity and 14% across seven leadership pools: 104-106% of the fee, before rank bonuses reaching 500,000 USDT at Diamond, before infrastructure, before staff, before the claimed institutional AI, and before any capital is deployed. Meanwhile the headline return of 22.04% a month compounds to roughly +991% a year, and the company publishes nineteen consecutive months without a single losing month through periods that included major crypto drawdowns.
And nobody is home. Eight entities across seven jurisdictions, each assigned a role that individually avoids requiring a securities license - Panama is "technology," Wyoming is "custody," Montana is "payments," Hong Kong is "research," Poland is "onboarding" - so that no single company is nominally responsible for pooling retail money and paying a return. Across all of them, plus fifteen legal documents and the corporate page, not one officer, director or beneficial owner is named. The two names that appear in the federal filing are a director sharing the Panama service address and a signature belonging to a public face assessed as an AI filter over an actor, with an online footprint that begins the month the domain was bought.
What the plan commits against the only fee charged on principal
The 10% license fee deducted from every deposit is the sole principal-facing charge. These are the company’s own published commission percentages of that fee. They total 104% on BehindMLM’s conservative Infinity figure and 106% using the company’s own Diamond figure of 22% - before any rank bonus, before infrastructure, staff or legal costs, and before a single dollar of trading capital is deployed.
| Product | Price | Pays |
|---|---|---|
| Promoter membership Genuinely free. No starter kit, no autoship, no monthly subscription, no minimum purchase. This is a real credit and it is why the entry cost line reads $0. It is also why the only way to earn anything is to deposit. |
Free one-time |
— |
| Starter tier The smallest depositor - the one least able to absorb a loss - pays the highest rate on any reported profit. 10 USDT of a 100 USDT deposit is taken as the license fee before anything is "traded." |
100 USDT minimum deposit |
50% performance fee |
| Basic tier Promoters teach recruits to deposit 550 if they want 500 to reach the trading balance. 450 USDT actually works after the license fee. |
500 USDT minimum deposit |
40% performance fee |
| Advanced and Professional tiers The two authoritative sources disagree on the upper-tier percentages, and the company’s own affiliate site publishes only the minimum deposit without a fee column, describing the charge generically as "a performance fee on generated profits." |
2,000 / 8,000 USDT deposit |
35-30% / 30-20% |
| Elite and Enterprise tiers The ladder from Starter to Enterprise is a 1,000× increase in capital at risk, sold as a way to save on fees. That is continuous upward pressure to deposit more, dressed as a discount. |
25,000 / 100,000 USDT deposit |
25-15% / 20-10% |
| License fee on every deposit The only charge on principal, non-refundable, deducted before a single dollar is traded - and simultaneously the only pool from which the entire recruitment plan is funded. |
10% of principal one-time, per deposit |
104-106% committed to affiliates |
| Withdrawal fee 10% within the first twelve months, 5% between twelve and twenty-four, 0% thereafter. Combined with the entry fee this is a guaranteed 19% round-trip loss in year one - and a two-year soft lock-up presented as a fee schedule. That it genuinely reaches zero is a real point in its favor. |
10% / 5% / 0% on exit |
— |
| Rank bonuses, Iron to Diamond Qualified entirely by downline deposit volume: 100 USDT at Iron, 8,000,000 USDT at Diamond, with maximum-leg rules of 20-50% to force wide building. No product sold, no customer served, nothing bought by anyone outside the scheme. |
20 to 500,000 USDT one-time per rank |
— |
Who runs it, and what they ran before
BehindMLM’s dated update of 21 March 2026 assesses the marketing-video figure as an AI face filter applied over an actor in front of a green screen, describing rendering failures around the mouth, neck and ear. The claimed biography - born Hamburg, a German private bank, then a supply-chain role in Shanghai and Hong Kong - could not be corroborated by any employer record, alumni record, press mention or third-party source predating Polar Tensor. The decisive datum is the digital footprint: the associated Facebook account was created or acquired around 8 April 2025, the same month the primary domain was registered, with earlier-looking posts created in April 2025 and backdated. Several participants report meeting a physical person, including a passport shown on a Zoom call and appearances in Stuttgart, Hamburg and Las Vegas; those reports and the AI-avatar finding are not mutually exclusive, and one participant put it as "Felix is a real person. However his real name is not Felix." He stopped appearing publicly by mid-July 2026, while the company began reselling AI-avatar tooling on a spin-off domain. RECORDED AND REFUTED: a claim circulating on YouTube that this individual was convicted of wire fraud in Danbury, Connecticut in 2015 is false - the convicted person was Ian Parker Bick, unconnected to this business. It should not be repeated.
Listed on the SEC Form D as Director at the same Panama City address as the company itself. No independent professional record, no public profile and no other corporate role could be located for this individual anywhere. A single director sharing the corporate service address of a Panama S.A. matches the profile of a nominee directorship, a service openly sold in Panama for a few hundred dollars a year - but this report has not established that she is a nominee, and she may be a genuine principal. The point is narrower and more damning than an accusation: no evidence establishes her as anything at all, and Panama nominee structures exist precisely to make that determination impossible.
Hosted a Polar Tensor "founder call" on 17 February 2026; BehindMLM’s June 2026 coverage states that US promotion is coordinated by him. His documented sequence: a "TSS Golden Team Leader" position in NovaTech FX, which collapsed in February 2023 with investor losses pegged at over $640 million and against whose co-founders - not him - the SEC brought an action in August 2024; then Defi Synergy, which collapsed in March 2024; then Fun Saver Network in mid-2024; then this. That sequence is corroborated across two independent sources and is treated here as established. A single anonymous source extends the list further and asserts he is a named defendant in a $2.3 billion RICO action over NovaTech FX; that claim was not checked against a court docket and is carried in the unverified list, not here. Promoting a program is not owning it, and this report does not assert that he owns or controls Polar Tensor.
This is the headline finding of the file and it is stated without hedging: as of 28 July 2026, no real, identifiable, independently verifiable human being has been established as owning or controlling Polar Tensor. That is a researched negative rather than an absence of effort. Checked: the SEC Form D and EDGAR filing index (two names - a Panama-addressed director and a signature block); WHOIS on every known domain (all privacy-shielded, across WebNic and NameCheap, registered between April 2025 and June 2026); the company’s own corporate-structure page (eight entities, seven jurisdictions, registration numbers, tax IDs and license numbers - zero named humans); the company’s full fifteen-document legal library, including both Customer Agreements, the Payment Services Terms, the Risk Disclosure, the Regulatory Status Disclosure, the Conflicts of Interest policy, the Withdrawals and Complaints Policy, the Group Legal Structure document and the Independent Marketers Disclosure (no officer, director or beneficial owner named in any of them); the presentation and marketing videos; LinkedIn and general web search for the named figurehead; and the payment processor, which resolves to a Montana entity holding a FinCEN MSB registration - a registration that carries no beneficial-ownership vetting or publication requirement. Eight companies, fifteen legal documents, one corporate page, one federal filing: two names, one of which is a probable nominee profile and the other of which is a face that did not exist online before April 2025.
Registered address
Declared: Torre Advanced Building, First Floor, Ricardo Arias Street, Panama City, Panama
The declared Panama address is the registered address of the only director named in any government filing, which is the standard signature of a corporate service provider rather than an operating headquarters. The Form D carries a Montana area-code telephone number - (406) 470-9023 - against that Panama address, consistent with the filing having been prepared by a US service provider. The economic reality sits elsewhere again: SimilarWeb traffic reported roughly 63,000 monthly visits in February 2026 at 69% Germany and 31% United States, then roughly 102,000 in April 2026 at 98% Germany and 1% United States. A Facebook link on one of the company’s own sites natively sets de_DE locale. This is, on the traffic evidence, an overwhelmingly German-market operation presented in Panamanian, Hong Kong and Wyoming clothing - which makes the absence of any BaFin entry the single most conspicuous gap in the regulatory file, not evidence of clearance.
The veteran's checklist
Eight questions that decide whether this is a business or a transfer mechanism. Same eight, every review.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| Who legally owns it? |
RED
Unknown. Eight declared entities across seven jurisdictions with registration numbers and tax IDs, fifteen legal documents and a corporate page - and not one named officer, director or beneficial owner. The only names in any government filing are a Panama-addressed director and a signature belonging to a face with no online existence before April 2025.
|
| Is it a securities offering? |
RED
On its own account, yes. Polar Tensor Corp. filed a Form D with the SEC on 9 September 2025 declaring a "Pooled Investment Fund — Hedge Fund," $100,000,000, under Rule 506(b). All four Howey prongs are satisfied on the company’s own description of the product. Its consumer-facing disclosure says the opposite.
|
| Is it registered anywhere? |
RED
No. A Form D is a notice filing the SEC does not review, approve or examine - not a license, whatever promoters call it. A FINTRAC MSB registration is an anti-money-laundering reporting obligation, not a securities license. No securities registration was located in any jurisdiction.
|
| What does it really cost? |
RED
Joining is free. Earning requires a 100 USDT minimum deposit, of which 10% is taken as a license fee before anything is traded. Exiting in the first twelve months costs another 10%. A 1,000 USDT deposit withdrawn immediately returns 810 - a contractual 19% round-trip loss.
|
| Can the trading be verified? |
RED
No, by any route. No audited financial statement filed with any securities regulator in any of eight jurisdictions, no proof of reserves, no published wallet, no read-only exchange API key, no signed exchange statement, no third-party trade verification. The advertised KPMG engagement is described by the company itself as a review of its "legal setup."
|
| Has any regulator acted? |
CONCERN
Three have issued caution listings on the basis of non-registration: Alberta 14 May 2026, British Columbia 27 May 2026, Québec’s AMF 5 June 2026, plus a consolidated CSA alert. None has alleged fraud. No cease-and-desist order, no asset freeze, no charge, no indictment and no conviction against the company or anyone connected to it was located anywhere.
|
| Is there an income disclosure? |
RED
None exists on any Polar Tensor property, across a fifteen-document legal library - no median, no mean, no loss rate, no percentage who withdrew more than they deposited. What is published instead are worked examples with no statement of typicality: "Weekly passive income: 470 USDT / week."
|
| Merchant play or miner play? |
RED
Neither, in the ordinary sense - there is no product to merchant. Rank is qualified purely by downline deposit volume from 100 USDT at Iron to 8,000,000 USDT at Diamond, and deeper commission levels require personally recruiting up to fourteen paying investors. The only thing anyone sells is participation.
|
What has to be true for you to get paid
| To cover | You need |
|---|---|
| Get your own money back on a 1,000 USDT deposit | +23.5% on the traded balance the 10% license fee leaves 900; a 10% exit fee in year one means the balance must reach 1,112 to return 1,000 |
| Break even against fees at the platform’s own claimed weekly return | ~7 consecutive weeks ~6.2% gross weekly less the Starter tier’s 50% performance fee is ~3.1% net; 1.031^7 ≈ 1.238 - and only if those returns are both real and payable |
| Unlock all fifteen unilevel commission levels | 14 personally recruited paying investors each must deposit at least 100 USDT; level 15 pays 0.5% of a 10 USDT license fee - five cents per minimum-sized recruit |
| Reach the top rank and its 500,000 USDT bonus | 8,000,000 USDT of downline deposits roughly 80,000 funded accounts at the 100 USDT minimum, with no single leg above 20-25% |
Read this twice
The first line of this arithmetic is the only part of the file that is certain, and it comes entirely from the company’s own published fee schedule. Ten percent is taken from every deposit as a license fee before anything is traded, and ten percent is taken from every withdrawal in the first twelve months. A participant who deposits 1,000 USDT and withdraws immediately receives 810 - a contractual 19% loss of principal in week one, before any market movement, before any trading decision, good or bad. To return the original 1,000 in year one, the 900 that reached the balance must grow to 1,112: a 23.5% gain simply to get back to zero. Every other number below that line depends on a claim this report could not verify by any route. At the platform’s own stated ~6.2% gross weekly, a Starter-tier depositor paying the 50% performance fee nets roughly 3.1% a week and needs about seven consecutive weeks to clear the fee drag; at Enterprise-tier fee levels, about 4.4 weeks. But no audited financial statement has been filed with any securities regulator in any of the eight jurisdictions the group claims, there is no proof of reserves, no published wallet, no read-only exchange API attestation and no third-party trade verification - so the honest expected value is that 19% is lost with certainty and the remaining 81% is exposed to a risk nobody outside the operator can size. And there is no income disclosure statement anywhere on any Polar Tensor property: no median, no mean, no percentage of participants who withdrew more than they deposited, no percentage who lost money. What the company publishes instead are worked examples - "Total from 3 levels: 1,245 USDT," "Weekly passive income: 470 USDT / week" - with no statement of typicality attached to either.
Run your own numbers
Drag the sliders. Nothing here is stored or sent.
Unilevel commission on the 10% license fee charged on a $1,000 deposit. Read this one differently from every other calculator on the site: the money paid to you comes out of a fee levied on the person you introduced, not out of trading margin, and the published payout schedule commits 104–106% of that fee to affiliates. Your own capital is not modeled here at all - a same-week deposit and withdrawal loses 19% before any market movement. Your own subscription cost of $0/mo is included.
What it costs to replace this yourself
What Polar Tensor charges a person who wants algorithmic crypto exposure, against what the same capability costs on the open market. The comparison is not close, and the decisive difference is not price - it is custody. Every open-market option below leaves the capital in an account the participant controls, with trade-only API permissions and withdrawal rights disabled, and every fill visible in the participant’s own exchange trade history.
| What they sell you | What you'd use instead | Your cost |
|---|---|---|
| 10% license fee deducted from every deposit | Open-source execution engine (Freqtrade, Hummingbot, Jesse) on your own keys | $0 |
| 20-50% performance fee on the profit figure the operator reports | Hosted retail bot subscription (3Commas, Cryptohopper, Coinrule tier) | $15-50/mo |
| 10% withdrawal fee for the first twelve months | Your exchange’s own withdrawal fee on your own balance | ~$0-1 per transfer |
| Custody of your principal by an operator with no named human being | Capital stays in your exchange account; the bot holds trade-only API keys with withdrawal permission disabled | $0 |
| A weekly number displayed in a private database, with no on-chain or exchange-side proof | Your own exchange trade history, plus a read-only verification link anyone can audit | $0 |
| "Institutional AI" with no audited financials filed anywhere | Published, backtestable strategies you can paper-trade before risking capital | $0-30/mo |
| No income disclosure of any kind - no median, no mean, no loss rate | Your own broker statement and P&L, generated on demand | $0 |
| A two-year taper before exit costs nothing | Stop the bot and withdraw whenever you like | $0 |
| Total as sold 190 USDT gone from a 1,000 USDT round trip in year one, plus 20-50% of whatever is reported as profit |
Total, built yourself $0-50 a month, with the capital never leaving an account you control |
Price-to-value
There is no premium to justify here, because there is no capability being sold that the open market does not supply more cheaply and more verifiably. The honest framing is that the fees are not the price of the technology - they are the price of handing custody to a counterparty you cannot identify, in exchange for a weekly number you cannot check. A retail bot on trade-only API keys is not a better deal by degree; it is a categorically different arrangement, because the failure mode is a bad trade rather than a vanished balance. One fair concession to the operator: the fee schedule really is published up front, in plain arithmetic, which is more than several peers manage. Knowing exactly what you are paying does not help when the thing you are paying for cannot be shown to exist.
Three operators, five horizons
Probability of cumulative net profit
Hover any point for median, top decile and bottom quartile.
Depositor who never recruits
1,000 USDT in, takes the weekly distribution, no downline
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 2% | −$190 |
| 6 mo | 3% | −$250 |
| 1 yr | 3% | −$400 |
| 3 yr | 1% | −$1,000 |
| 5 yr | 1% | −$1,000 |
Part-time recruiter
1,000 USDT in, works the plan a few hours a week, a handful of recruits
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 3% | −$1,100 |
| 6 mo | 5% | −$1,300 |
| 1 yr | 6% | −$1,600 |
| 3 yr | 2% | −$3,100 |
| 5 yr | 2% | −$3,100 |
Full-time promoter
larger deposit, rooms and events, building toward Platinum and above
| Horizon | P(profit) | Median |
|---|---|---|
| 3 mo | 4% | −$4,200 |
| 6 mo | 8% | −$5,600 |
| 1 yr | 11% | −$7,400 |
| 3 yr | 5% | −$12,000 |
| 5 yr | 4% | −$12,000 |
Methodology note. ANCHORED to the company’s own published figures: the 10% license fee on every deposit; the 10%/5%/0% withdrawal fee by tenure, which fixes the 19% year-one round-trip loss and the 23.5% gain needed merely to return principal; the 100 USDT minimum; the 20-50% performance fee by tier; the unilevel schedule, where level 1 pays 20% of a 10% fee - that is 2% of whatever a recruit deposits, so ten recruits at 500 USDT each returns about 100 USDT; and the rank ladder from 100 USDT at Iron to 8,000,000 USDT at Diamond. MODELED by us, and this must be stated bluntly: everything on the outcome side. No income disclosure statement exists on any Polar Tensor property, so there is no published median, mean, loss rate or cohort data to anchor to - the absence is itself one of the findings. The cohort definitions are ours; the shares in cumulative profit are ours; the dollar outcomes are ours. Two modeling choices deserve to be defended. First, the top-of-range outcomes for the full-time promoter are genuinely positive and substantial, because in a program funded predominantly by inflow, early and senior recruiters are the cohort that does extract money - that is not a flaw in the model, it is the mechanism. Second, the medians converge toward total loss at the three- and five-year horizons rather than continuing to decline linearly, because the amount at risk is bounded by what was deposited. No participant’s actual realized, withdrawn return could be located anywhere in the research corpus; the only positive participant testimony located concerns on-screen balances growing, which is not evidence of money received.
Where you are actually allowed to promote this
Platform policy reads, not verifications. Check every one before you spend a dollar - enforcement changes faster than the written policy does.
Red flags and green flags
Red flags
151The company told the SEC it runs a $100 million pooled hedge fund and tells consumers it offers no collective investment schemes
2A Rule 506(b) exemption claimed while the offering is mass-marketed to the retail public
3Not one identifiable human owner anywhere
4The founder’s public face is an AI filter with a footprint backdated to April 2025
5A 22.04% monthly return presented as verified live data
6A guaranteed 19% round-trip loss in year one
7The plan commits 104-106% of the license fee to affiliates
8Zero retailable product
9Three securities-regulator caution listings in 22 days
10US promotion coordinated by a promoter from a $640 million collapsed program
11No verifiable trading by any route
12No income disclosure statement of any kind
13Infrastructure failure and pre-built evasion capacity
14"We’re under attack" published twice in three weeks
15Recruitment is being targeted at the victims of a just-collapsed scheme
Green flags
71Membership is genuinely free
2There is no token
3The fee schedule is disclosed up front and is arithmetically clear
4The withdrawal fee really does taper to zero, and part-withdrawals are permitted
5The exit terms are unusually non-punitive on paper
6The disclosures contain an unusually candid line about regulatory endorsement
7Several corporate registrations are real and independently checkable
We would like to be wrong about this
Upward
- Name the beneficial owners - the actual natural persons who own and control the group, with verifiable pre-2025 professional histories - and file audited financial statements of the trading operation with a securities regulator in any one of the eight jurisdictions where the group claims an entity. Not a "legal setup" review.
- Publish read-only exchange API attestation and a proof of reserves: a read-only sub-account key or a signed exchange statement, plus a Merkle-tree solvency proof with published wallet addresses refreshed weekly and reconciled against aggregate participant balances. If the returns exist, this takes an afternoon.
- Register the offering - with the SEC, and with BaFin and UKNF given where the money actually comes from - or restructure so there is no offering at all: sell software for a flat fee to customers who trade their own accounts on their own exchange keys, publish a real income disclosure statement, and get removed from the ASC, BCSC and AMF caution lists.
Downward
- Withdrawals suspended, delayed, or subjected to new "tax," "compliance deposit," "verification fee" or "account migration" charges - the exact pattern documented in the predecessor scheme’s collapse, where a 12% "tax and transfer fee" preceded the exit.
- A forced migration of balances into a new internal token, the announced proprietary "Polar exchange," or the planned "Polar Money" IBAN and card product - any of which would move the money further inside the group’s own perimeter and out of reach.
- A regulator moving from caution listing to fraud allegation, cease-and-desist or asset freeze - particularly BaFin, given that 98% of traffic is German - or a further domain seizure, hosting termination or payment-processor cutoff.
Grade is F at 0.2 - the lowest on this site by a wide margin. A passive weekly return on pooled capital, registered with no securities regulator anywhere, with no verifiable revenue and no identifiable owner.
Start with what is true in the company’s favor, because it is real and the rest of this report is not softened by it. Joining costs nothing: no kit, no autoship, no monthly fee, no minimum purchase. The fees are published up front in plain arithmetic rather than sprung at withdrawal. The exit fee genuinely tapers from 10% to 5% at a year and to zero at two, part-withdrawals are permitted, and there is no hard lock-up or forced-reinvestment clause. The contract runs under Wyoming law rather than an offshore arbitration forum, with no visible class-action waiver, no non-compete, no downline forfeiture and no claim over an affiliate’s contact list. And the Regulatory Status Disclosure states, in terms, that no regulator, supervisory authority or governmental body has endorsed, approved or guaranteed the services. That is the single most useful sentence anyone in this program has been given, and the company wrote it itself. It scores a 4 on operator terms, which is the only number above zero on the card.
Everything else is arithmetic. The 10% license fee is the only charge on principal, and the published plan commits 70% of it across fifteen unilevel levels, 20-22% in differentially coded Infinity bonuses and 14% across seven leadership pools at 2% each - 104-106% of the pool, before rank bonuses reaching 500,000 USDT at Diamond and before any infrastructure, staff or trading capital. On the way in and out, 10% plus 10% is a guaranteed 19% round-trip loss in year one: deposit 1,000 USDT, withdraw the same week, receive 810. The advertised return of 22.04% a month compounds to roughly +991% a year, about twenty-five times the long-run annualised record of the best-documented quantitative fund in history, and it is presented not as a target but as verified live data across nineteen consecutive months without a single loss. There is no audited financial statement filed with any securities regulator in any of the eight jurisdictions the group claims, no proof of reserves, no published wallet, and no read-only exchange API key - which, for a business whose entire technical claim is that it trades on an exchange, is a five-minute task it has not performed in nine months.
Now the part that has to be stage-labeled precisely, because the difference matters more here than anywhere else on this site. What is established: three Canadian securities regulators formally cautioned the public between 14 May and 5 June 2026 - Alberta, then British Columbia, then Québec’s Autorité des marchés financiers - every one of them on the single basis that the entity is not registered, naming five business names and seven domains between them. A Form D is on file with the SEC self-declaring a $100 million pooled hedge fund under a private-placement exemption while the program is publicly mass-marketed. The primary domain was placed in registry clientHold on 3 June 2026 and hosting was lost around 15 May. What is NOT established, and this report will not imply otherwise: no regulator anywhere has alleged fraud; no cease-and-desist order exists against this company in any jurisdiction; no asset freeze; no charge, no indictment, no conviction of anyone in connection with it; no court finding of any kind; and it has not been shown that withdrawals have stopped. A non-registration caution is an administrative warning, not a judicial finding. The file is bad enough on established facts alone that it does not need a single one of the things that have not happened.
Run the bot yourself, on trade-only API keys
If what you actually want is algorithmic exposure to crypto with USDT you already hold, the open market supplies it. Freqtrade, Hummingbot and Jesse are open-source and free; hosted services sit in the $15-50 a month band. The critical configuration step is the one that makes this a different arrangement entirely: create the exchange API key with trading enabled and withdrawal permission disabled, and IP-whitelist it. The capital never leaves an account you control, every fill appears in your own trade history, and the worst case is a bad strategy rather than a vanished balance.
Price the yield you actually want, then look at what is being offered
Boring USDT yield on a regulated venue, or short-dated Treasury exposure, runs in the low-to-mid single digits annually with counterparty risk you can name and size. Anything offering 5-8% weekly is not a better version of that trade - it is a different product with a different failure mode. Write down the annualised equivalent of any weekly number before you deposit against it: 6.2% a week is +2,183% a year, and a business earning that would not need your 100 USDT.
Demand exchange-side proof before a single dollar moves, and treat refusal as the answer
The industry standard is trivial to meet: a read-only exchange API key you can plug into a third-party verification service, or a signed statement from the exchange, or published wallet addresses with a Merkle-tree solvency proof refreshed weekly. Ask for one. If a system is genuinely compounding 22% a month, producing this takes an afternoon. Nine months, three website rebuilds, eight corporate registrations, a KPMG letter, three legal opinions and a Form D have not produced it.
If you are already in: withdraw in tranches, document everything, and refuse every recovery approach
Withdraw in stages rather than in one request, and screenshot every balance, transaction ID, ticket and reply with timestamps as you go. File a complaint with your own securities regulator - the ASC, BCSC and AMF have all listed this entity, and the SEC takes tips at sec.gov/tcr - and with your card issuer or exchange if a payment route is still open. Then be warned about the second wave: recovery-scam lead generation targeting Polar Tensor losses is already circulating, dressed as victim journalism that resolves into a pitch from a fund-recovery firm. No legitimate recovery service asks for an up-front fee, and no legitimate one finds you first.
Nine dimensions, weighted
Dimension profile
Further from center is better. Hover any point.
Hard caps that bind here
The lowest binding cap wins, regardless of the weighted arithmetic.
What we read
Every source below links to the document itself. Tier 1 is a primary record - the company’s own plan, policy or disclosure, a court filing, a regulator’s decision or an SEC filing. Tier 2 is a self-regulatory or secondary regulator record, tier 3 reporting or academic work, tier 4 an open-market price comparison. Where a document can be moved or withdrawn, an archived copy is linked beside it. If a link is dead when you try it, that is a correction we want.
- Polar Tensor Corp. - Form D, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, filed 9 September 2025 (EDGAR filing index, Acc. No. 0002085242-25-000001, File No. 021-557106)
SEC EDGAR - Polar Tensor Corp., CIK 0002085242, Form D filed 9 September 2025, File No. 021-557106: "Pooled Investment Fund" / "Hedge Fund," $100,000,000 offering, Rule 506(b) claimed, total sold reported as $0, related person Veronica Camano (Director, Panama City address), signed Felix Bick (Director); filing carries a Montana area-code telephone number
- Polar Tensor Corp. Form D - full submission text (Pooled Investment Fund / Hedge Fund, $100,000,000, Rule 506(b), $0 sold; Veronica Camano, Director; signed Felix Bick)
- EDGAR company filing index for Polar Tensor Corp., CIK 0002085242
- British Columbia Securities Commission Investment Caution List - Polar Tensor, published 27 May 2026
BC Securities Commission Investment Caution List entry, published 27 May 2026 - "This company is not registered with the BC Securities Commission"; Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec) investor warning, 5 June 2026 - "not registered with the AMF and is not authorized to solicit investors in Québec"; Canadian Securities Administrators consolidated investor alert, June 2026
Not established by this document: The AMF's individual Polar Tensor warning page sits behind a JavaScript-gated index and has no separately addressable URL that could be confirmed; the AMF warning index and the CSA consolidated alert are cited in its place.
- Canadian Securities Administrators investor alert - Polar Tensor (June 2026)
- Autorité des marchés financiers (Québec) - Mises en garde list, carrying the Polar Tensor warning
- BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor securities fraud warning from Canada (QC)" - quotes the AMF's 5 June 2026 warning text and lists the seven domains cited
- Alberta Securities Commission Investment Caution List
Alberta Securities Commission Investment Caution List addition, 14 May 2026 - "not registered to trade in or advise on securities or derivatives in Alberta," citing polar-tensor.com and polar-money.com, and warning the program "may be actively advertising to victims of BG Wealth Sharing and DSJ Exchange"
Not established by this document: The ASC publishes caution-list entries under per-entity slugs but no Polar Tensor slug surfaced in search; only the list index is linkable directly. The wording quoted in the report is reproduced verbatim in the BehindMLM item cited.
- BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor securities fraud warning from Canada (AB)" - quotes the ASC's 14 May 2026 entry, the polar-tensor.com / polar-money.com domains and the BG Wealth Sharing and DSJ Exchange victim-targeting warning
BehindMLM company coverage: securities warnings from Canada (AB) 21 May 2026, (BC) 2 June 2026 and (QC) 6 June 2026; "Polar Tensor loses website domain, regulatory compliance fraud," 4 June 2026 - hosting lost around 15 May 2026, registry clientHold and clientUpdateProhibited set 3 June 2026, the Bitbanki Ltd. disclosure one day later, and SimilarWeb traffic figures
- Alberta Securities Commission Investment Caution List entry for BG Wealth Sharing Ltd. (the predecessor scheme named in the Polar Tensor warning)
- Polar Tensor - "About" / corporate page listing the group entities and registration numbers
Polar Tensor’s own corporate page and fifteen-document legal library - eight entities across seven jurisdictions with registration numbers; Customer Agreement (US) §2 and §5.2 (Wyoming governing law, "no collective investment schemes," manual-activation clause); Regulatory Status Disclosure §§2.1-2.3 ("does not offer securities," Wyoming MTL stated as held); Withdrawals and Complaints Policy (restriction powers, "no guarantee is provided as to processing speed"); Independent Marketers Disclosure (prohibition on performance guarantees); Risk Disclosure ("You may lose part or all of your invested capital")
- Polar Tensor Customer Agreement (US)
- Polar Tensor Regulatory Status Disclosure ("does not offer securities")
- Polar Tensor Withdrawals, Complaints & Client Communications Policy
- Polar Tensor Independent Marketers & Referral Disclosure
- Polar Tensor Risk Disclosure Statement
- FinCEN MSB registration letter for Polar Tensor US, MSB No. 31000321683570, Sheridan, Wyoming (PDF as served by Polar Tensor)
- Polar Tensor's US legal opinion (PDF) - the Wyoming MSB/MTL and "no pooled investment" analysis
- Polar Tensor affiliate marketing site - "Companies & Licenses" page listing the eight group entities and their certificates
Polar Tensor affiliate marketing sites - the full compensation plan (fifteen unilevel levels totaling 70% of the license fee, ten-level residual match, License Infinity to 22% at Diamond, seven Global Leadership Pools at 2% each), the ten-rank ladder from Iron at 100 USDT to Diamond at 8,000,000 USDT with bonuses to 500,000 USDT, the six-tier deposit ladder and 20-50% performance fees, the 10% license fee and 10%/5%/0% withdrawal schedule, the 22.04% monthly / 39.76% peak / 12.39% worst performance table and the $2M-to-$90M narrative
Not established by this document: Polar Tensor's own affiliate compensation pages were taken offline after the June 2026 domain suspension; the promoter presentation PDF is the surviving copy of the compensation plan and is served from a third-party investigator's site, not the company's.
- Polar Tensor promoter presentation (PDF) - the fifteen-level license-reward table, Infinity Rewards, Global Leadership Pools, Iron-to-Diamond rank ladder and the deposit tiers with 50%–20% performance fees
- "KPMG" Panama report addressed to Polar Tensor Corp. (PDF on the marketing domain)
- BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor Review: AI trading bot MLM crypto Ponzi", 20 March 2026 (updated 21 March and 15 July 2026)
BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor Review: AI trading bot MLM crypto Ponzi," 20 March 2026, updated 21 March and 15 July 2026, with a 53-comment thread - the AI-avatar analysis, the April 2025 backdated social footprint, the compensation-plan breakdown, the Bob Bearden history, the legal-opinion analysis and the KPMG assessment
- BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor securities fraud warning from Canada (BC)", 2 June 2026 - includes the SimilarWeb ~102,000 monthly-visit figure
- BehindMLM, "Polar Tensor loses website domain, regulatory compliance fraud", 4 June 2026 - clientHold status, the Bitbanki Ltd. disclosure and the lost hosting
- Danny de Hek, "Polar Tensor Exposed: BG Wealth Sharing Promoters Push Victims Into Another AI Trading MLM", 11 May 2026
Danny de Hek, "Polar Tensor Exposed: BG Wealth Sharing Promoters Push Victims Into Another AI Trading MLM," 11 May 2026 - the Brian N. Beane presentations, the $500-to-$16-million five-year projection, the "deposit $550 to get $500 working" explanation of the license fee, the Hong Kong trip deadline and the "Bronze unlocks infinity" slogan
- Texas State Securities Board Order No. ENF-26-CDO-1897 - In the Matter of BG Wealth Sharing LTD, DSJ Exchange PTY Ltd, BG Wealth Sharing Group LLC, Thaddious Thomas and Gagandeep Sarkaria: Emergency Cease and Desist Order (PDF)
Texas State Securities Board Emergency Cease and Desist Order ENF-26-CDO-1897, June 2026 - against BG Wealth Sharing LTD, DSJ Exchange PTY Ltd, BG Wealth Sharing Group LLC and two named individuals. Polar Tensor is NOT a respondent; the order is cited only for the predecessor scheme’s exit pattern and for its statement that a Reg D filing does not constitute governmental approval
- Texas State Securities Board order landing page - Order No. ENF-26-CDO-1897
- Texas State Securities Board press release, "Texas State Securities Board Halts Alleged Crypto Pyramid Scheme Targeting Texas Investors", 3 June 2026
- polartensorscam.com, "Polar Tensor Scam: Full Fraud Investigation 2026" (anonymous, April 2026) - the Base44 build claim, infrastructure-cost estimate and exchange-API findings
polartensorscam.com (anonymous, April 2026) and TradersUnion - used with attribution only, for the technical and infrastructure claims listed in the unverified section below and for the ASC blacklist confirmation of 22 May 2026
- Traders Union, "Is Polar Tensor a Safe or Scam?" - records the Alberta Securities Commission blacklist entry confirmed 22 May 2026
What we could not get
- SINGLE ANONYMOUS SOURCE - the platform’s reported technical stack and origins: that the production platform was built on Base44, a low-cost no-code app builder, with a live artifact at a base44 subdomain, and that total infrastructure cost runs to $44-254 a month. The existence of the subdomain appeared in search results; the inference that the production platform runs on it, and the cost estimate, are not independently confirmed and are not asserted anywhere else in this report
- SINGLE ANONYMOUS SOURCE - the source-code findings: internationalisation strings reportedly extracted from the server-rendered payload including an earnings_distribution transaction type described as "manually entered weekly profit," an investment_loss type reportedly defined but never displayed, a balance_removal type that would allow an operator to zero a user balance unilaterally, and a withdrawal string requiring orders before Sunday midnight server time. The Friday 23:00 UTC distribution string is independently corroborated by the company’s own marketing; nothing else in that set is
- SINGLE ANONYMOUS SOURCE - the exchange-API finding: that live analysis of client-side code and network traffic in April 2026 detected zero connections to Binance, Bybit, OKX, Coinbase or any exchange and no real-time market data feed, and that the platform’s own "Live Trading Feed" shows "Waiting for trades…" permanently. This report did not reproduce the network inspection and does not rely on it - the absence of any read-only API attestation is established independently and on its own
- Whether Polar Tensor ever held a genuine Binance account and whether Binance terminated it. All evidence is participant testimony: reports of $1 test transactions going unanswered, third-party accounts of Binance describing the account as a scam, and an April 2026 Zoom in which "independence" was announced with comments disabled for 725 attendees
- Whether "Veronica Camano" is a genuine principal or a nominee director, and whether "Felix Bick" corresponds to any real person and if so who. Several participants report meeting a physical individual, including a passport shown on a Zoom call; the AI-filter finding and those reports are not mutually exclusive; the underlying legal identity remains unknown
- Whether withdrawals are currently being processed. Reports conflict. One anonymous forum comment of 21 May 2026 claims members are being given excuses; the company has twice published "we’re under attack" notices. Neither establishes that withdrawals have stopped, and this report does not claim that they have
- Total funds raised and the number of participants - no credible figure exists anywhere; circulating estimates are traffic-derived guesses. Also unverified: any participant’s actual realized, withdrawn return. The only positive participant testimony located concerns on-screen balances growing, which is not evidence of money received
- Bob Bearden’s alleged status as a named defendant in a $2.3 billion RICO action over the prior program, and his alleged pre-2019 MLM history - single anonymous source, not checked against a court docket. Also unverified: the contents and scope of the KPMG engagement (the document was not obtained), the claim that the company retained the German firm behind the 2015 OneCoin legal opinion (a promoter claim only), and a Medium article’s assertion of an IOSCO global alert on 6 June 2026, which could not be located and whose source resolves into a promotion for a fund-recovery firm
Not advice
This is independent analysis for decision-making, not legal, financial or investment advice. Allegations reported by third parties should be verified against primary court and regulatory records before any decision.
Researched by Claude. Reviewed by an editor.
Every report is researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, from the company’s own plan documents, policies, terms and regulatory file - then reviewed before publication by Rob Fore, who checks the sources and the stage-label on every allegation.
- Nine weighted dimensions, published with their weights
- The editor checks the evidence and cannot change the number - the build rejects any page whose grade does not reconcile to its own arithmetic
- Every affiliate position we hold is disclosed on the report it touches
- No company has paid for a grade, and no report carries an affiliate link
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Polar Tensor - frequently asked
QIs Polar Tensor a scam?
QWho owns Polar Tensor?
QHow much does Polar Tensor cost, and can you get your money out?
QWhere does the 22% a month come from?
QWhat is wrong with the Polar Tensor compensation plan?
Author, editor and publisher
This report was researched and written by Claude, Anthropic’s AI assistant, working from primary documents - Polar Tensor’s own compensation plan, its policies and procedures, its terms of service, its income disclosure statement where one exists, and its regulatory and self-regulatory file. It was scored against nine weighted dimensions that are published in full, with their weights, on the methodology page.
Before publication it was reviewed by Rob Fore, who checks every source link, every figure against the document it came from, and every allegation against its stage-label - an investigation is not a finding, a warning letter is not an enforcement action, and a filed claim is not a verdict.
The editor does not set the grade. The published score is the weighted composite of the nine dimension scores, and the build refuses to emit a page where the two disagree by more than 0.06. A grade moves when the evidence moves it and not otherwise.
Rob Fore has marketed online since 1996, wrote Online MLM Marketing (2014), and is CEO of Listech Inc, the Nevada corporation that publishes this site. He holds affiliate positions in companies graded here - including LiveGood, which this site grades D, SendOutCards, which it grades C−, and the Home Business Academy, which it grades B−. Those positions are disclosed on the reports they touch, and changed nothing on this page.
About the author and our conflicts · Contact the editor · Corrections: corrections@opportunitygrade.com
Tell me if this grade changes
Polar Tensor is graded F as of July 28, 2026. Grades move when the evidence moves - a new income disclosure, a regulatory action, a rewritten compensation plan. Leave your address and you will get one email if this one does.
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Corrections
Every factual claim on this page is sourced, and the ones we could not stand up are named in the unable to verify list above. If something here is wrong, we want to know, and we would rather hear it from Polar Tensor than from a reader.
Write to corrections@opportunitygrade.com. Point at the specific sentence and send the document that contradicts it - a plan document, a filing, an income disclosure, a policy page. We will check it against the primary source, correct the page if it is wrong, and say in the report that it was corrected and when. A grade moves if the evidence moves it.
This address reaches a person, not a form. We do not require a takedown demand, an NDA or a lawyer to accept a correction, and we do not remove a report because a company disputes its conclusion - only because the underlying facts turn out to be wrong.